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Abstract
Complex engineering projects comprise many individual design decisions. As these
decisions are made over the course of months, even years, and across different teams of
engineers, it is common for them to be based on different, possibly conflicting assump-
tions. The longer these inconsistencies go undetected, the costlier they are to resolve.
Therefore it is important to spot them as early as possible. There is currently no soft-
ware aimed explicitly at detecting inconsistencies in interrelated design decisions.
This thesis is a step towards the development of such tools. We use formal meth-
ods of argumentation, a branch of artificial intelligence, as the foundation of a logical
model of design decisions capable of handling inconsistency. It has three parts. First,
argumentation is used to model the pros and cons of individual decisions and to reason
about the possible worlds in which these arguments are justified. In the second part we
study sequences of interrelated decisions. We identify cases where the arguments in
one decision invalidate the justification for another decision, and develop a measure of
the impact that choosing a specific option has on the consistency of the overall design.
The final part of the thesis is concerned with non-deductive arguments, which are used
in design debates, for example to draw analogies between past and current problems.
Our model integrates deductive and non-deductive arguments side-by-side.
This work is supported by our collaboration with the engineering department of
Queen’s University Belfast and an industrial partner. The thesis contains two case
studies of realistic problems and parts of it were implemented as software prototypes.
We also give theoretical results demonstrating the internal consistency of our model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In this chapter we identify the problem solved in this thesis and give an overview of the
solution. We start by characterising the engineering design process in Section 1.2.1.
We then derive a list of requirements for a formal model of design processes (1.2.2),
which establishes the scope of the thesis. We discuss some traditional tools for decision
analysis (1.2.3) and justify our choice of argumentation as the foundation of our model
of design processes (1.2.4). The chapter is completed by an overview of the thesis (1.3),
a list of contributions of this thesis to the state of the art (1.4) and a list of peer-reviewed
publications that form parts of the work presented here (1.5).
1.2 Decision Processes
Decisions are ubiquitous in our professional and private lifes. Some decisions are made
in isolation – what car to buy, where to go for lunch, whether to take an umbrella.
However, many decisions are made in the context of decision processes. The term
describes sequences of related decisions with a product as the overall result. We use
the word product rather loosely here and mean any kind of design, specification etc.
that is the outcome of a number of individual decisions.
1.2.1 Decisions in Context: Motivating Examples
Decision theory, the science of decision-making, is concerned primarily with isolated
decisions. However, decisions in practice rarely exist without context: They are influ-
enced by earlier decisions and in turn will impact later decisions. This is especially true
in engineering design, where decisions are part of a long-running process that can span
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months or years.
The theory of engineering design distinguishes two kinds of thought processes;
intuitive thinking and discursive thinking [1, page 48]. The former is characterised by
sudden, unforeseeable insights resulting from unconscious “thinking”. The latter, on
the other hand, “is a conscious process that can be communicated and influenced” [1,
page 48f], characterised by its systematic structure comprising a series of steps. Since
intuition has the disadvantage of being unpredictable, a stronger reliance on discursive
methods is advisable [1, page 55]. Further, the discursive method stimulates intuition,
indicating that the two are symbiotic.
The systematic approach requires a precise definition of goals and boundary con-
ditions, which is a prerequisite for breaking down a large problem into a sequence of
smaller tasks. If requirements and constraints are clearly stated, then the systematic
approach may help in minimising errors resulting from prejudice (experience) of the
designers [1, page 55f]. A crucial part of both kinds of thought processes is document-
ing any decisions that were made.
The value of documentation does not only lie in the support it provides for dis-
cursive thought processes. Accurate project documentation provides a degree of pro-
tection from litigation and, more importantly, constitutes a competetitive advantage to
its owners [2, page 118]. Design documentation is often incomplete [3]: Decisions are
justified retroactively, so the documentation contains mostly arguments in favour of the
option that was chosen, and does not represent the full picture of the pros and cons of
all options available at the time. As a result of this bias, design documents do not give
comprehensive evidence of the design process - they only document the outcome of
that process.
Engineering design processes consist of sequences of decisions, ranging from
small to complex, which collectively determine the final design. At this point we will
introduce some terminology. Every decision requires a set of at least two distinct op-
tions; the set of options is the outcome of the previous step in the process, namely the
actual design, in which different possibilities are systematically produced. The deci-
sion making itself then is rather mechanical, as it is an evaluation of the design options
according to some clearly defined goals and requirements. Decisions thus mark the
boundaries of various stages in the design process.
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We can find further evidence for this view in the literature. Pahl and Beitz [1] state
that “without decisions there can be no progress” [1, page 54]. In their methodology,
each of the successive phases of the design process is ended by a decision. This decision
determines whether to advance to the next stage, or to repeat the current stage with an
adapted list of requirements, if no satisfactory solution has been found [1, page 66]. The
“Total Design” approach by Pugh [4] exhibits a similar structure, although this method
only involves a single decision phase at the transition from concept design to detailed
design [4, page 11]. The design process by Ertas and Jones [5] features decisions at
two distinct stages, first after the feasibility assessment of the initial conceptualisation,
and again after the preliminary and detailed design phases. At both of those stages,
the decision determines whether to proceed to the next step or to repeat the previous
steps. The need for automated tools to support decision making in engineering design
has long been recognised [6].
It is clear that while there is no universal definition of “the” engineering design
process, a consensus exists that decision making plays a crucial role in transitioning
from one phase to the next, and thus in making progress towards the eventual design. It
is also clear that knowledge is re-used throughout the decision process, be it in written
form (design documents, requirements, experimental data) or in the minds of engineers.
1.2.2 Requirements for a Formal Model of Decision Processes
Decisions are made within a set of constraints that change regulary. Within those con-
straints, options are chosen intuitively, not by purely mechanical means. Further, de-
cision making processes are distributed across several teams or individuals. Earlier
decisions influence later ones, both in their range of available options and in their
constraints. Knowledge is re-used throughout the process in two forms: As concrete
artifacts (specifications, requirements, experimental data, etc.) and intangibly as the
knowledge of people involved in the decision making process. In addition, there are
trade-offs that have to be made in enineering design, as one tries to balance cost and,
broadly, quality (including aesthetics, quality control, margins of error).
There have been efforts to support the knowledge-specific tasks of decision pro-
cesses in order to increase product quality and to avoid redundant work, for example as
part of knowledge management in engineering [7]. Previous approaches that recorded
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the reasoning behind design decisions have not found widespread industry acceptance
[8, 9], broadly because the effort required for their implementation was unproportional
to the benefits they provided. The survey by Lee [8] suggests that this is due in part to
their lack of automated reasoning facilities, which made it more difficult to apply the
knowledge stored in those systems.1
Based on this discussion we identify the following requirements for a knowledge-
based model of engineering design processes.
RQ1 Represent design decisions with the pros and cons for each of their options, in-
cluding the reasoning that was applied to arrive at the pros and cons and possible
worlds in which the underlying assumptions hold.
RQ2 Reason about decisions so represented, specifically by characterising the decision
rules used to arrive at the decision, and determining the effect that “choosing an
option” has on the knowledge base.
RQ3 Formulate sequences of decision problems in which decisions made at one stage
influence the range of options and constraints for decisions made later in the
process, and assess the impact of changing a previous decision.
RQ4 Combine various forms of reasoning such as deductive arguments, empirical ev-
idence, intuition and heuristics.
The individual decisions mentioned in RQ1 and RQ2 are the smallest “building blocks”
of design processes. By requiring that the effects of choosing an option should be
discoverable through inference (RQ2) we address the central weakness of previous
approaches to modeling engineering design processes, which were entirely syntactical
in nature - no inferences could be made. As a result, they required a high amount of user
input. Through the ability to make automated inferences, any knowledge expressed
in our model becomes reusable. RQ3 is the central requirement, placing individual
decisions (as in RQ1) in the context of the engineering processes that we are trying
to model. And finally RQ4 addresses the fact that most arguments made by human
beings are not expressible in classical logic, because they rely on a number of implicit
assumptions.
1cf. Krause et al.: “(...) the application of knowledge is the most essential task of knowledge man-
agement.” [7, p.215]
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1.2.3 Decision Models
In this section we discuss the traditional approach to decision modelling and point out
where it fails to meet the requirements set in Section 1.2.2.
Decision theory is a rich research area on its own. We will attempt to briefly
characterise some of the assumptions made by most of the popular decision models,
bearing in mind that all of those methods focus on individual decisions only and thus
fail to satisfy requirements RQ2 and RQ3.
1.2.3.1 Decision Making Under Uncertainty
The first axiomatic account of decision theory is given by Savage [10]. It breaks with
the dominating, frequentist interpretation of probabilities and introduces a subjective,
bayesian alternative. The debate over the two interpretations is still on-going, but we
can make some observations about decision theory that are acceptable regardless of
one’s interpretation of probability.
In the probabilistic approach to decision theory, the decision maker’s goal is to
maximise utility [11]. The abstract concept of utility is expressed as a function from
possible outcomes to the real numbers. In financial decisions, utility is often identified
with returns, even though this does not appear to be an accurate reflection of human
preferences [12].
The third fundamental concept in decision theory, besides utility and possible out-
comes, is the set of possible worlds. This is an expression of the uncertainty inherent
in most decisions. Each possible world is associated with a probability. The three
concepts are tied together by a function that relates options and possible worlds to out-
comes.
An analysis of classical decision theory from the viewpoint of our requirements
(Section 1.2.2) reveals three shortcomings. First, the assumption that the probabilities
of possible worlds can be quantified has already been shown to be problematic, and in
many debates no quantitative information about the proabilities of possible worlds is
available.
The second problem is with the mapping of options and possible worlds to out-
comes in the form of real-valued functions. Such functions are in general not a re-
usable representation of knowledge since the only way that two real-valued functions
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can be combined is by combining their results. Hence, there is no meaningful infer-
ence that can be performed automatically. In order to assess the impact of, say, changed
assumptions on the utility functions, the thought processes that led to the original as-
signments have to be performed again (by a human being), because they are lost as
soon as the number is decided on. The probabilistic-quantitative approach to decision
theory therefore fails to meet requirement RQ2.
Thirdly, decision theory as outlined above does not have a notion of decision pro-
cesses (E.g. as in 1.2.1) and thus cannot meet requirement RQ3. Because of the models’
lack of support for automated inferences, any concept of decision processes would of-
fer no additional value, no knowledge that is not already apparent by simply viewing
each of the decisions on its own.
1.2.3.2 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
A complementary approach to decision theory is multi-criteria decision making. Here,
the decision maker’s preferences are given on multiple dimensions rather than with
a single utility function. The key question is how to choose an option if no option
completely dominates (outperforms) the others. In this approach, uncertainty does not
play as prominent a role as it does in the utility approach discussed above. However,
multi-criteria decision making also does not meet requirements RQ1 to RQ3, for the
same reasons as the utility approach.
1.2.3.3 Summary & Critique
Regardless of its usefulness for our particular purpose, decision theory has been ques-
tioned on general grounds also. Quantitative decision theory as a descriptive model
of human decision behaviour has drawn some criticism because of the assumptions it
makes. The tendency of people to apply heuristics in decision making [12] (for ex-
ample to overvalue outcomes that are certain over those that are probable) inspired the
development of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky [13]). The assumption that
decision makers act rationally has been drawn into question by studies in cognitive
psychology, e.g. Stewart et al. [14] and Gigerenzer [15]. Certain phenomena such as
the purchase of insurance policies and lottery tickets as well as the high popularity of
government bonds cannot adequately be described with expected utility models [16].
In conclusion, decision theory as described above does not have a representation
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of the knowledge from which its utilities, outcomes etc. are derived, which prevents its
models from being re-used. Because of that, neither decision making under uncertainty
nor multi-criteria decision making are suitable starting points for our search of a model
that meets the requirements we listed above.
1.2.4 Formal Methods of Argumentation
In this section we introduce formal methods of argumentation and sketch informally
how they might address our requirements. An overview of relevant work in argumen-
tation can be found in Chapter 2.
Argumentation is a field within Artificial Intelligence (AI) research that uses the
concept of arguments (consisting of claims and support) to reason about inconsistent
knowledge bases [17, 18]. Apart from being a research area in its own right, argumen-
tation has been applied to problems in agent-based communication [19, 20, 21, 22],
satellite image analysis [23], medicine [24, 25], law [26, 27] and others.
Common uses ofw argumentation systems include: To identify conflict-free (ac-
ceptable) subsets of inconsistent knowledge bases; to organise conflicting knowledge
in a way that highlights how conflicting conclusions can be inferred; to reason with
alternative notions of conflict (i.e. ones that do not necessarily lead to absurdity in the
form of a∧¬a).
The suitability of argumentation-based methods for our requirements will be dis-
cussed in detail below, but first we will explain how argumentation addresses one crit-
ical requirement that is not met by other decision models (in Section 1.2.3), namely
the re-usability of knowledge implied by (RQ2). The key to reusability is being able to
combine two elements of the same type (the one that is re-used and the new one) into
a new element of the same type – that is to have an associative binary operation. In
argumentation, this operation is simply the set union of knowledge bases. Any incon-
sistencies that emerge from the combination of two sets of propositions will be dealt
with by the argumentation system. We will return to this point on several occasions
throughout this thesis, but for now we can summarise that argumentation systems fulfil
requirement RQ2 automatically.
Having identitified formal methods of argumentation as a potential foundation for
a model of decision processes, we can now assess what previous work exists in this
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area, and whether it meets our requirements. There exists a large body of work on
decision making with argumentation [28, 29, 22, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33], and some of those
contributions are aimed explicitly at representing design debates. This covers the first
part of RQ1, but none of the existing approaches combine the idea of “possible worlds”
in which assumptions hold (cf. Section 1.2.3.1) with the weighing up of pros and
cons for each option (cf. Section 1.2.3.2). This is an area where argumentation-based
approaches to decision making can learn from decision theory.
A common characteristic of all argumentation-based approaches to decision mak-
ing is that they focus on individual decisions. As a result, none of them meet require-
ments RQ2 and RQ3, which have to be addressed on the level of decision processes.
The last requirement RQ4 is somewhat orthogonal to the previous three, because it
relates to the nature of arguments used in by model, rather than the model itself. There
are two distinct areas of previous work: meta-argumentation and argument schemes.
While argument schemes are more directly related to RQ4 (“integrating different kinds
of reasoning”), we claim that they are an example of meta-argumentation and thus
should be treated the same way as meta-arguments.
To summarise, prior art in argumentation covers parts of RQ1 and RQ4, and for
RQ2 and RQ3 no previous work exists. We intend to fill that gap with the work pre-
sented here.
1.3 Thesis Overview
The thesis contains the following chapters:
1. Introduction This chapter
2. Background A review of the foundations formal methods of argumentation as
far as they are required to read the thesis, as well as other definitions that are re-
quired. Each of the three following chapters has a separate review of the literature
relevant to it.
3. Decision making with argumentation An argument-based model for multi-criteria
decision making and decision making with uncertainty. The model is based on a
realistic use case developed with an industrial partner. It also includes a charac-
terisation of decision rules, and a method for adjusting the knowledge base after
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making a decision
4. An argumentation-based model of decision processes A model of decision se-
quences in which it is possible to assess the impact of choosing a specific option
on the justifications of other decisions in the sequence.
5. Argument schemes for decision making Non-deductive arguments (argument
schemes) cast as an instance of meta-argumentation. A special emphasis is on
using argumentation to interpret experimental data (by way of analogies), which
is illustrated by an extensive use case.
6. Conclusion & Discussion A summary and review of the results and some discus-
sion of future work
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis to the state of the art are
• A formal model of decision making using the ASPIC+ argumentation system.
Our model combines multi-criteria decision making with decision making under
uncertainty, by mapping possible worlds (caused by uncertainty in decision mak-
ing) to preferred extensions of argument graphs (a manifestation of conflicting
inferences).
• A method for comparing decision rules in argument-based decision making, e.g.
for their optimism or their decisiveness
• A method for adjusting a knowledge base to reflect the fact that a decision has
been made
• A method for describing and analysing sequences of argument-based decisions,
and measuring the impact that changing a previous decision has on the overall
consistency of the designs
• A framework in which non-deductive arguments, such as analogies and refer-
ences to authority, can be expressed side-by-side with deductive (logical) argu-
ments, as well as arguments not about the domain but about other arguments (i.e.
meta-argumentation)
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1.5 Publications
Parts of this thesis have been published in peer-reviewed conference proceedings.
1.5.1 Main authorship
The following papers are directly based on this thesis:
1. Jann Mu¨ller and Anthony Hunter: An Argumentation-Based Approach for Deci-
sion Making. 2012 IEEE 24th International Conference on Tools with Artificial
Intelligence (ICTAI), ppage 564–571 [34]
This work is on a system for multi-criteria decision making using the ASPIC+
argumentation system [35]. The paper is the foundation of Chapter 3, Section 1.
2. Jann Mu¨ller and Anthony Hunter: Comparing Decision Rules in Argument-Based
Decision Making with Uncertainty. (preparing for re-submission after receiving
helpful feedback from reviewers)
Another paper on decision making with argumentation; the focus is on formal
criteria for the comparison of decision rules. This paper is the foundation of
Chapter 3 Section 2.
3. Jann Mu¨ller, Anthony Hunter, Philip S. Taylor: Meta-level Argumentation with
Argument Schemes. Scalable Uncertainty Management - 7th International Con-
ference (SUM) 2013, Proceedings: LNCS 8078, ppage 92–105 [36]
A publication on meta-argumentation with argument schemes. This paper is a
short version of Chapter 5.
4. Jann Mu¨ller and Anthony Hunter: Deepflow: Using argument schemes to query
relational databases. Computational Models of Argument - Proceedings of
COMMA 2014 in: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications 266,
ppage 469-470 [37]
This demo paper describes the implementation of a system for using argument
schemes (Chapter 5) to generate queries of SQL databases.
A journal article based on Chapter 4 (theory of decision processes) is in preparation.
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1.5.2 Co-authorship
This thesis constitutes a part of project DEEPFLOW, an R&D collaboration between
SAP AG (my employer during the project), the Queen’s University Belfast’s Mechan-
ical Engineering Department and the Computer Science department at the University
of Ulster. This collaboration provided me with a realistic understanding of the deci-
sion documentation problem in engineering design, and also gave me the opportunity
to contribute to other publications in related areas. The findings from this research in-
fluenced my understanding of argumentation within engineering design processes and,
by extension, this thesis.
1. Niall Rooney, Hui Wang, Fiona Browne, Fergal Monaghan, Jann Mu¨ller, Alan
Sergeant, Zhiwei Lin, Philip S. Taylor, Vladimir Dobrynin: An Exploration into
the Use of Contextual Document Clustering for Cluster Sentiment Analysis. Re-
cent Advances in Natural Language Processing (RANLP) 2011: 140-145 [38]
2. Fiona Browne, David A. Bell, Weiru Liu, Yan Jin, Colm Higgins, Niall Rooney,
Hui Wang, Jann Mu¨ller: Application of Evidence Theory and Discounting Tech-
niques to Aerospace Design. Advances in Computational Intelligence - 14th In-
ternational Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncer-
tainty in Knowledge-Based Systems, IPMU 2012 Part III: 543-553 [39]
3. Jann Mu¨ller and Tobias Trapp: Using Argumentation to Develop a Set of Rules
for Claims Classification. 7th International KES Conference on Intelligent Deci-
sion Technologies (KES-IDT): 459-469 [40]
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will review the background in formal methods of argumentation
upon which the rest of the thesis is built. There are two main parts. We first introduce
abstract argument graphs (in Section 2.2) and then define the ASPIC+ argumentation
system [35, 41] which we will use for concrete instantiations of arguments (Section
2.3). We then present additional notation and definitions (Section 2.4) and conclude
the chapter with a brief discussion (Section 2.5).
Abstract argument graphs allow us to model the relationships between arguments.
Unlike dialectical trees (an alternative method for computing the acceptability of ar-
guments), graphs make it possible to evaluate all arguments in a debate at the same
time, instead of one argument at a time. However, abstract arguments do not contain
any information about the content of arguments. In order to be able to identify all re-
lationships between arguments – and not just those that are explicitly mentioned in a
design document and can thus be mapped directly to an attack in the argument graph
– we need a formal language to give structure to the arguments, or to instantiate them.
Several instantiations have been proposed in the literature, and we will discuss them in
Section 2.5. For this thesis we decided to use the ASPIC+ argumentation system. AS-
PIC+ is quite flexible, allowing us to leave the choice of underlying logical language to
the eventual application of our model.
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2.2 Abstract Argumentation
Dung’s 1995 article [42] introduced argument graphs with arguments as nodes and
their “attacks” (a notion of conflict) as directed edges. Argument graphs are given an
interpretation using one of several extension semantics.
The internal structure of arguments is not specified, so they are only defined in
their relationships with other arguments. We will present the concept of argument
graphs in some detail here, because it is referenced in almost every single publication
discussed in this chapter.
Definition 1 (Argument Graph). An argument graph is tuple (A,Att) where A is a set
and Att ⊆ A×A.
In an argument graph G = (A,Att), elements of the set A are called arguments and
Att is the “attacks” relation. Given two arguments a,b ∈ A, a attacks b if (a,b) ∈ Att.
We will display argument graphs visually by drawing circles for arguments and arrows
for attacks, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Example 1. Imagine we are faced with the problem of designing a structure that has
two components which are joined using a bracket fixed by bolts. Our task is to decide
what type of bolts to use, whether or not to use a shim (a thin sheet of metal) between
the bracket and the components, and how many layers of varnish to apply. Some re-
quirements are to maintain the structural integrity of the component and to achieve a
high resistance to corrosion. The following arguments might be put forward:
a1 Not using a shim means that the structure remains balanced. Therefore, it will
not be damaged.
a2 Steel/titanium bolts cause microscopic fractures in the two parts, leading to dam-
age to the structure.
a1 a2
a3 a4
Figure 2.1: Graph for Example 1
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a3 Steel/titanium bolts are too strong for the material that the structure is made of,
so there will be microscopic fractures.
a4 The structure is highly corrosion resistant, because two layers of varnish are
used.
The argument graph for this example is given by (A,Att) with A = {a1, . . . ,a4} and
Att = {(a1,a2),(a2,a1),(a3,a1)} and visualised in Figure 2.1.
There are several acceptability semantics, based on the idea that a set of arguments
is admissible if it defends itself against any attacks, and does not attack itself. An
acceptability semantics is a way of computing certain admissible sets of arguments,
called extensions, from an argument graph. The semantics differ in their degree of
credulity, that is, whether arguments can stand for themselves (and hence may defend
themselves against attackers) or not (and hence must be defended by other arguments).
Acceptability semantics select conflict-free sets of arguments. Sets of arguments
are conflict-free if there is no attack between any two of their arguments. A set defends
an argument a if it can attack any attacker of a.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free, defence). Let (A,Att) be an argument graph and let B⊆ A.
• B is conflict-free iff there exist no a, b in B such that a attacks b.
• B defends an argument a iff for each argument b ∈ A: If b attacks a, then there
exists an argument c in B such that c attacks b.
Note that if an argument has no attackers then it is defended by and acceptable to
any set of arguments.
admissible set
preferred
stable
complete
grounded
credulous sceptical
Figure 2.2: Extension semantics
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Example 2. The graph in Figure 2.1 on page 24 has several conflict-free sets, for
example {a3,a2,a4} and {a4,a1}.
Semantics in abstract argumentation make use of the following notions of accept-
ability and admissibility.
Definition 3 (Acceptable, admissible). Let G = (A,Att) be an argument graph.
1. An argument a ∈ A is acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ A of arguments if
and only if for each argument b ∈ A: If b attacks a then b is attacked by some
argument in S.
2. A conflict-free set of arguments S ⊆ A is admissible iff each argument in S is
acceptable with respect to S
The following result by Dung [42] makes a connection between acceptability and
admissibility.
Proposition 1 ([42]). Let S be an admissible set, and a and a′ be arguments that each
are acceptable with respect to S. Then
1. S′ = S∪{a} is admissible
2. a′ is acceptable with respect to S′.
Semantics in Dung’s framework are sceptical or credulous. Sceptical semantics
result in a single extension called the grounded extension, whereas credulous seman-
tics may result in more than one extension, called preferred extensions. We start with
the grounded extension, which requires us to introduce the characteristic function of
an argument graph. This function maps a set of arguments to the set of arguments
acceptable to it.
Definition 4 (Characteristic Function). The characteristic function of an ar-
gument graph G = (A,Att) is FG : 2A → 2A such that FG(B) = {a ∈ A |
a is acceptable with respect to B}.
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Example 3. For the graph G = ({a1, . . . ,a4},{(a1,a2),(a2,a1),(a3,a1)}) from Figure
2.1, we can compute for example
FG( /0) = {a3,a4} FG({a1}) = {a3,a4}
FG({a3}) = {a2,a3,a4} FG({a2}) = {a2,a3,a4}
Definition 5 (Sceptical Acceptability). The grounded extension of an argument graph
G is the least fixed point ofFG
Example 4. The characteristic function of the graph G = ({a1, . . . ,a4}, {(a1,a2),
(a2,a1), (a3,a1)}) from Figure 2.1 reaches a fixed point after one iteration:
FG( /0) = {a3,a4}
FG({a3,a4}) = {a2,a3,a4}
FG({a2,a3,a4}) = {a2,a3,a4}
Every argument graph has a single grounded extension. This is not the case for
preferred extensions, of which there can be more than one.
Definition 6 (Credulous Acceptability). A preferred extension of an argument graph G
is a maximal admissible set.
Besides grounded and preferred extensions, Dung introduced two additional ex-
tension semantics. A conflict-free set of arguments is a stable extension if it attacks
every argument that does not belong to it, and an admissible set of arguments S is a
complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable with respect to S belongs to
S. The relationships between the four semantics are shown in Figure 2.2 (arrows indi-
cate the “is-a” relationship). In this thesis however we will use grounded and preferred
semantics.
The function Σs(G) computes the set of s-extensions of an argument graph G, with
s ∈ {pr,gr} (preferred and grounded, respectively). Σpr may return an empty set and
Σgr returns a set with exactly one element (which in turn may be the empty set). Other
semantics besides preferred and grounded have been discussed in the literature, but in
this thesis we will only use the two.
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The following result by Dung will be useful in proofs about the acceptability of
arguments.
Proposition 2 (Dung 1995, [42]). Let G = (A,Att) be an argument graph. Then
1. The set of all admissible sets of G forms a complete partial order with respect to
set inclusion
2. For each admissible set S of G, there exists a preferred extension E ∈ Σpr(G) such
that S⊆ E
3. Every argumentation framework posseses at least one preferred extension
Argument graphs can tell us which sets of arguments are acceptable, but they do
not contain any information about the structure of arguments. This gap will be filled by
the ASPIC+ framework.
2.3 Aspic+
In this section we introduce the ASPIC+ argumentation system which will be used
throughout the thesis. ASPIC+ [35, 41] is a framework for structured argumentation
that combines strict and defeasible inference rules. Defeasible rules, unlike their strict
counterparts, can only be applied in contexts where they are not attacked by exceptions.
Exceptions are arguments whose conclusion is a contrary of the rule itself (as opposed
to a contrary of one of the rule’s premises). The applicability of defeasible rules in
ASPIC+ is therefore determined locally for each application.
2.3.1 Formal Definition of Aspic+
The ASPIC+ framework assumes an unspecified logical language L . Inference rules
can be strict or defeasible. If the conditions of a rule hold, then its conclusion must be
accepted unconditionally if it is a strict rule, but if it is a defeasible rule then there may
be exceptions that render the rule unapplicable.
Rules in ASPIC+ can be used to encode domain-specific knowledge or general pat-
terns of reasoning [41]. An example of a domain-specific rule is bird(X)⇒ fly(X),
and an example of a general pattern is (a → b),a ⇒ b. In this thesis we use AS-
PIC+ rules for domain-specific inferences, and rely on ASPIC+ arguments (Definition
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9 below) as the sole general reasoning pattern. It would also be possible to encode
domain-specific rules in the logical language L and add a general inference rule for
modus ponens to the ASPIC+ system [35].
In ASPIC+ the choice of underlying logic is left to the user. An argumentation sys-
tem therefore contains as parameters both the logical language used inside arguments
(L ) and a means of determining the relationship between arguments (· andR).
Definition 7 (ASPIC+ argumentation system). An argumentation system is a four-tuple
AS = (L , ·,R,≤) where
• L is a logical language
• · is a contrariness function with · :L → 2L
• R=Rs∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules of the form
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn→ ϕ and ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk⇒ ϕ respectively (where ϕi,ϕ are meta-variables
ranging overL and k,n≥ 0), and such thatRs∩Rd = /0
• ≤ is a partial order1 onRd
We will give a comprehensive example on page 34, when all notation has been
introduced. The function name assigns a name to each defeasible rule, so its signature
is name :Rd →L . We will use an infix notation 〈r〉 to mean name(r). Note that 〈·〉
is a meta-level operator. A set S ⊆L is consistent iff @ψ,ϕ ∈ S such that ψ ∈ ϕ , or
inconsistent otherwise.
In ASPIC+, argumentation systems set out the general rules for arguments – what
constitutes an argument and what determines an attack. To actually use these rules, one
requires a knowledge base that contains knowledge about a particular problem.
Definition 8 (ASPIC+ knowledge base). A knowledge base in an argumentation system
(L , ·,R,≤) is a pair (K ,≤′) where
• K ⊆L and K =Kn∪Kp∪Ka such that the three constituent subsets of K
are disjoint
• ≤′ is a partial order onK \Kn
1A definition for partial order is given on page 36, along with definitions for other general concepts.
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In a knowledge base, the set Kn contains axioms, the set Kp contains premises
and the set Ka contains assumptions. The intuition behind this stratification of K is
that the three sets represent different kinds of certainty: Axioms are similar to strict
rules in that they always apply and cannot be attacked. Formulae in Kp and Ka can
be attacked. Attacks on premises in Kp are resolved using the preference relations
≤ and ≤′, whereas attacks on assumptions Ka always succeed. Arguments combine
knowledge from a knowledge base with rules from an argumentation system. They are
defined in Definition 9 below. Please note that each of the two conditions defines the
functions prem, conc, sub, rules and topRule which return the premises, conclusion,
sub-arguments, rules and top rule of an argument. Further, Definition 9 Cond. 2 covers
both strict rules (→) and defeasible rules (⇒), separated by the / symbol.
Definition 9 (ASPIC+ arguments). An argument “a” on the basis of a knowledge base
(K ,≤′) in an argumentation system (L , ·,R,≤) is:
1. ϕ if ϕ ∈ K with prem(a) = {ϕ}; conc(a) = ϕ; sub(a) = {a}; rules(a) = /0;
topRule(a) = undefined
2. a1, . . . ,an→ /⇒ψ if a1, . . . ,an are finite arguments such that there exists a stric-
t/defeasible rule conc(a1), . . . ,conc(an)→ /⇒ ψ inRs/Rd
prem(a) = prem(a1)∪ . . .∪prem(an)
conc(a) = ψ
sub(a) = sub(a1)∪ . . .∪ sub(an)∪{a}
topRule(a) = a1, . . . ,an→ /⇒ ψ
We use the symbol A for the set of all arguments, and use capital letters A,B, . . .
to denote sets of arguments. The set of arguments for a given knowledge base KB is
denoted with args(KB).
Once a number of arguments have been established, their inconsistency can be
analysed in an argument graph, by determining attacks between arguments. In AS-
PIC+, three kinds of attack are possible: Rebuttal, undermining and undercut. A re-
buttal occurs if an argument is attacked on its conclusion. Undermining is an attack
on an argument’s premises and undercut is an attack on a defeasible inference step
(application of a defeasible rule).
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Definition 10 (ASPIC+ Attack). Let a,b be two arguments on the basis of a knowledge
base (K ,≤′) in an argumentation system (L , ·,R,≤). a attacks b if and only if
1. conc(a) ∈ conc(b) (rebuttal) or
2. conc(a) ∈ 〈topRule(b)〉 (undercut) or
3. ∃b′ ∈ sub(b) such that a attacks b′ (undermining on b′)
To determine which attacks result in defeats (i.e. are valid), we assume a partial
order on the constructed arguments. In [35], a method is presented for deriving a def-
inition of  from ≤ and ≤′, the orderings of non-axiom premises and defeasible rules.
However, any partial order of arguments  is acceptable for the following definition:
Definition 11 (ASPIC+ defeat). Let a, b be two ASPIC+ arguments on the basis of a
knowledge base (K ,≤′) in an argumentation system (L , ·,R,≤). a defeats b iff
1. a undercuts b or
2. a rebuts/undermines b on b′, and either a contrary rebuts/undermines b or a⊀ b′.
The above definitions allow us to compute the argument graph of an ASPIC+ sys-
tem, by taking its set of arguments and their defeats (Definition 11):
Definition 12 (Argument graph of an ASPIC+ system). Given a knowledge base KB =
(K ,≤′) in an argumentation system AS= (L , ·,R,≤), the argument graph of KB and
AS is (A,Att) where
1. A = args(KB) and
2. Att = {(a,b) ∈ A | a defeats b} (Definition 11)
Definition 12 is the connection between ASPIC+, described here, and argument
graphs, described in Section 2.2. In this thesis, the function of the ASPIC+ framework
is to construct arguments, and the function of argument graphs is to select acceptable
subsets of arguments.
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2.3.2 ASPIC+ Conventions
As we mentioned before, we will adopt some conventions for ASPIC+ knowledge bases
in this thesis. The first set of conventions aims to streamline the presentation of our
ideas by simplifying definitions and proofs, and the second set of conventions enables
us to reason about arguments about rules, by restricting the arguments we can poten-
tially form.
At the same time, all knowledge bases considered in this thesis are valid ASPIC+
knowledge bases, so all related work on ASPIC+ applies to our system without adjust-
ments. However, not all of our results transfer to general ASPIC+ systems.
In the following paragraphs, remember that ASPIC+ systems are four-tuples
(L , ·,Rs∪Rd,≤) and ASPIC+ knowledge bases are pairs (K ,≤′) withR =Rd∪Rs,
≤ a partial order ofRd ,K =Kn∪Kp∪Ka with ≤′ a partial order ofK \Kn.
2.3.2.1 Simplifications
As this thesis is about modeling human argumentation, we regard all knowledge to
be defeasible and consequently all our ASPIC+ rules will be defeasible. Concretely,
we require that Rs = /0 (no strict rules). This means that R = Rd . We also make
no assumptions about the ordering of rules in R, so we define ≤ to contain only the
minimum information necessary to make it a partial order - that is,≤ only contains pairs
of rules (r,r) so that it satisfies the property of reflexivity: ≤= {(r,r′) ∈Rd×Rd | r =
r′}.
Regarding knowledge bases, we assume there are no ASPIC+-assumptions (in the
set Ka). Whenever the behaviour of assumptions (literals that can be disproved) is
required, we will use a defeasible rule with empty antecedent instead. For example,
we write⇒ bird(Tweety) to express the assumption that Tweety is a bird. This con-
vention allows us to introduce attacks on assumptions that always succeed, through a
literal ¬〈⇒ bird(Tweety)〉, which results in an asymmetric attack on the argument
[⇒ bird(Tweety)]. We also assume there are no ASPIC+-axioms. As a result, we
always setKn =Ka = /0.
The definition of ≤′ follows the familiar pattern of containing only the minimum
of information required for it to be a partial order: ≤′= {(a,a′) ∈Kp×Kp | a = a′}.
The reason for this restriction is that non-minimal definitions of≤ and≤′ disable some
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attacks (so they do not become defeats and do not appear in the argument graph of
the ASPIC+ system). ≤ and ≤′ therefore solve the same problem as Dung’s extension
semantics – both decide which attacks hold and which attacks are to be rejected. By
restricting the two relations we ensure that all attacks are evaluated within the argument
graph that is generated from an ASPIC+ system, and not at the stage where attacks are
turned into defeats inside ASPIC+ (cf Definition 11).
Argument graphs in ASPIC+ arise from a combination of a general ASPIC+ system
(L , ·,Rs∪Rd,≤) with concrete knowledge bases (K ,≤′). Due to the the restrictions
we make, we can drop ≤ and ≤′ from these definitions because they are directly deter-
mined by K and Rs. In addition, we assume that  (the argument ordering required
to decide which attacks are defeats, Definition 11) is defined in the same, minimal way,
which allows us to elide it too (because in this setting, all ASPIC+-attacks are ASPIC+-
defeats). Further, we will assume the logical language L to consist only of atoms, so
all inferences will be made via rules inR. L is therefore just a set of symbols, and we
will not mention it explicitly in our definitions and examples. The same goes for the
naming function 〈·〉. As a result we can drastically simplify our presentation: Instead
of specifying a four-tuple and a pair, we only need to give a single component, R (de-
feasible rules) explicitly. We will therefore adopt the notation KB =R to specify both
the ASPIC+ system (L , ·,R,≤) and the knowledge base (K ,≤′) withK = /0, where
KB stands for “knowledge base”. Since KB is a set we can use ⊆ to determine whether
one knowledge base contains another one, and ∪ to describe the union of two knowl-
edge bases. We will use the function argGraph(KB) to refer to the argument graph of a
knowledge base KB.
2.3.2.2 Other Restrictions
In chapters 3 and 4 we will develop a model of decision making in which decisions
made at an earlier stage in the process can impact decisions made at a later stage.
Conversely, decisions at a later stage can override decisions made earlier. In order to
ensure that our definitions have the desired properties for overriding knowledge, we
will assume that all ASPIC+ knowledge bases meet the following two conditions:
Condition 1: No Unused Rules In a given knowledge base KB = R, for every rule
r ∈R, there exists at least one argument a ∈ args(KB) such that topRule(a) = r.
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Condition 2: Injective Rule Labels The function 〈·〉 is injective, so each rule is as-
signed a different name.
We are now going to define a number of common functions that operate on objects
in ASPIC+. These functions will make it easier to refer to specific parts of an argument
or a set of arguments. We start with the attackers function, which restricts a set of
arguments A to those that attack a given argument a.
Definition 13 (Attackers). For all ASPIC+ arguments a, and A⊆A : attackers(a,A) =
{b ∈ A | b attacks a}
We also use the function attacks(A) to return all pairs of arguments (a,b) ∈ A×A
such that a attacks b.
In the context of argumentation systems, specifically for ASPIC+, a knowledge
base KB infers a literal l, short KB ` l, if there exists an argument with conclusion
l that is acceptable under a given semantics, for example grounded or preferred. The
inference relation is therefore parameterised over the semantics, and we use an index pr
to indicate preferred semantics and gr for grounded semantics. The following definition
is based on Definition 14 in [41]:
Definition 14 (ASPIC+ Inference). Let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base and let l ∈
L . Let s ∈ {gr,pr}. KB s-infers l, short KB `s l, if and only if there exists an extension
E ∈ Σs(argGraph(KB)) such that a ∈ E.
In addition to the conventions on ASPIC+ systems and knowledge bases just dis-
cussed, we will also use the following syntax for arguments, which is easy to read and
conveys all the information contained in an argument.
To refer to arguments we use variables a,b, . . .. When talking about the structure
of an argument a we write a = [l] if a is a literal argument (Definition 9 case 1) and
we write a = [b1, . . . ,bn;r;c] if a is the application of a rule r with sub-arguments b1 to
bn and conclusion c. In both cases, the conclusion is immediately visible (either l or
c) and in the second case both sub-arguments and the rule are included. The following
example demonstrates our syntax conventions.
Example 5. Let KB = {r1,r2,⇒ a,⇒ b,⇒ c} be a knowledge base with r2 = d,b⇒
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¬c. KB gives rise to the following arguments. args(KB) = {a1, . . . ,a5} with
a1 = [⇒ a] a2 = [⇒ b]
a3 = [⇒ c] a4 = [a1;r1;d]
a5 = [a4,a2;r2;¬c]
We get attacks(args(KB)) = {(a5,a3),(a3,a5)}. In other words, a5 rebuts a3 and vice
versa.
2.3.3 Discussion
Engineering design processes are iterative, involving several refinements and adjust-
ments before settling on a final design [1]. The iterations serve not only to increase the
design’s specificity, but also to revisit and change earlier decisions, in order to adapt to
information (for example, when requirements have changed). It is important to keep a
record of those changes, including the reasoning behind them, and not just of the latest
state of the design, so that repeated mistakes can be avoided and knowledge can be
re-used. Since we use a logical language to model engineering design processes, the
logical language should support changes to earlier decisions (conclusions). This means
that we should be able to invalidate knowledge additively, by adding new rules to our
knowledge base, without deleting the invalidated formula.
This property will be a major concern in Chapter 3, and the restrictions we im-
posed on ASPIC+ systems in this chapter prepare the ground for our developments
there, because they ensure that our model of decision processes has the desired prop-
erty of being able to invalidate knowledge solely through the addition of new rules.
An immediate consequence of Condition 1 (no unused rules) on page 33 is the
following:
Proposition 3. If attackers(a,args(KB1)) = /0 and attackers(a,args(KB2)) = /0 then
attackers(a,args(KB1∪KB2)) = /0.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let KB1, KB2 be two ASPIC+ knowledge bases such
that attackers(a,args(KB1)) = /0 and attackers(a,args(KB2)) = /0. Assume there exists
an argument b ∈ attackers(a,args(KB1∪KB2)) with conc(b) = l. Then by Definition
9 and condition 1 on page 33, b is either an application of a rule with empty antecedent
2.4. Additional Definitions 36
argument (b = [⇒ l]) or arises from the application of a rule r witn non-empty an-
tecedent, b = [. . . ;r; l]. Assume b = [⇒ l]. Then⇒ l ∈ KB1∪KB2, so⇒ l ∈ KB1 or
l ∈KB2. In the first case, [⇒ l]∈ args(KB1), so [⇒ l]∈ attackers(a,args(KB1)), and in
the second case [⇒ l]∈ args(KB2), so [⇒ l]∈ attackers(a,args(KB2)). Both contradict
the assumption.
Now assume b = [. . . ;r; l]. In that case, r ∈ KB1 ∪KB2, so r ∈ KB1 or r ∈ KB2.
Assume without loss of generality r ∈ KB1. Then, by Cond. 1 on page 33, there exists
an argument b′ ∈ args(KB1) such that topRule(b′) = r. Therefore, conc(b) = conc(b′)
so b′ attacks a, and b′ ∈ attackers(a,args(KB1)), contradicting the assumption.
This result will play a role in Chapter 3, as will the rest of the restrictions. With
ASPIC+ we can define arguments and their attacks, and with argument graph semantics
we can select acceptable sets of arguments.
2.4 Additional Definitions
Before we conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of alternatives to ASPIC+, we
will define a number of mathematical concepts that are used throughout the thesis. The
definitions are not argumentation-specific and will be given without much comment.
For a list of all symbols and function names the reader may refer to Table A.1 on page
233.
Powerset
Definition 15. Let S be a set. The powerset of S, shortP(S), is defined as
P(S) = {T | T ⊆ S}
Partial Order
Definition 16. A binary relation R ⊆ S×S over a set S is a partial order if and only if
it is
Reflexive For all s ∈ S : sRs
Antisymmetric For all s, t ∈ S: If sRt and tRs then s = t
Transitive For all s, t,u ∈ S: If sRt and tRu then sRu.
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If there is a partial order R for a set S, then we may call S a partially ordered set,
or a poset.
Equivalence Relation
Definition 17. A binary relation R⊆ S×S over a set S is an equivalence relation if and
only if it is
Reflexive For all s ∈ S : sRs
Symmetric For all s, t ∈ S: If sRt then tRs
Transitive For all s, t,u ∈ S: If sRt and tRu then sRu.
If S is a set and ∼ is an equivalence relation over S then S/∼ is the set of equiva-
lence classes of S. Formally, S/∼ = {[a] | a ∈ S} where [a] = {b ∈ S | b∼ a}.
Lattice
Definition 18 (Lattice). A lattice is a partially ordered set L equipped with two binary
operations unionsq,u : (L×L)→ L satisfying the following equations:
aunionsqb = bunionsqa, aub = bua (commutative)
aunionsq (bunionsq c) = (aunionsqb)unionsq c, au (bu c) = (aub)u c (associative)
aunionsq (aub) = a, au (aunionsqb) = a (absorption)
The powerset P(S) of a set S is a lattice with unionsq = ∪ and u = ∩. We use the
symbol
⊔
C to mean c1u c2u . . .u cn for a set C = {c1, . . . ,cn}.
A lattice is join irreducible (meet irreducible) if x= aunionsqb (x= aub) implies x= a
or x = b
Symmetric Difference
The symmetric difference between two sets A and B consists of exactly those elements
that are either in A or in B but not in both.
Definition 19 (Symmetric Difference). The symmetric difference of two sets A and B
is
A∆B = (A\B)∪ (B\A)
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Kleene Closure
Definition 20 (Kleene Closure). The Kleene closure (or free monoid) of a set S, denoted
by S∗, is the set of all words w over S.
S∗ includes the empty word ε . If w and w′ ∈ C ∗ then w◦w′ ∈ C ∗ is their concate-
nation. The prefix relation of words is denoted by v. |w| stands for the length of word
w with |ε|= 0. To distinguish an element of the set c ∈ S from a word in S we write [c]
for the latter, where required.
Lexicographic Order
If we have a set S with a partial order ≤, then we can derive from ≤ a partial order on
the set S∗ as follows (again v denotes the prefix relation).
Definition 21 (Lexicographic Order). Let S be a set with a partial order ≤, and let
w,w′ ∈ S∗. w w′ if and only if
1. wv w′ or
2. w = vau and w′ = vbu′ where v is the longest common prefix of w,w′, a ≤ b and
u,u′ ∈ S∗.
Linear Extension
In Chapter 4 we will compare different versions of a knowledge base over time, in
order to describe the evolution of acceptable sets of arguments over time. To this end
we introduce the concept of linear extensions, a relationship between sets of sets (in our
case, sets of sets of acceptable arguments). If the preferred extensions of an argument
graph G′ are a linear extension of the preferred extensions of an argument graph G, then
all arguments that were credulously acceptable in G are credulously acceptable in G′,
but there may be additional, credulously acceptable arguments in G′ that did not exist
in G. Further, every preferred extension in G is subsumed by a preferred extension in
G′, and every preferred extension in G′ subsumes a preferred extension in G.
Formally, a linear extension of a set of sets P is a set P′ in which each of the
original sets in P is a subset of one of the sets in P′, and every set in P′ is a superset of
a set in P.
2.4. Additional Definitions 39
Definition 22 (Linear Extension). Let P,P′ be two sets of sets. P′ is a linear extension
of P iff
1. For all p ∈ P, there is a p′ ∈ P′ such that p⊆ p′.
2. For all p′ ∈ P′, there is a p ∈ P such that p⊆ p′.
If the preferred extensions of G′ are a linear extension of G’s preferred extensions,
then (a) G v G′ (subgraph) and (b) G′ does not contain any sceptically acceptable
attackers for arguments that were credulously acceptable in G.
Example 6. Consider the set P = {p1, p2}. P has two elements, the sets p1 = {a,b}
and p2 = {d}. A linear extension P′ is given by P′ = {p1, p′2} with p′2 = {d,e}. While
Definition 22 itself works on any sets of sets, it makes most sense when P, P′ are sets of
arguments. If P is the set of preferred extensions of an argument graph G and P′ of a
graph G′, then the extensions in P are still acceptable in G′, but may contain additional
arguments (such as e in the example). Conversely, for each preferred extension E of G′
there exists a preferred extension E ′ of G such that E ′ ⊆ E.
For any set S, if P⊆P(S) then P′ = {⋃p∈P p} is a (trivial) linear extension of P.
Proposition 4. For any two argument graphs G,G′, if Σpr(G′) is a linear extension of
Σpr(G), then the grounded extension of G is a subset of the grounded extension of G′.
Proof. Let G,G′ be two argument graphs such that Σpr(G′) is a linear extension of
Σpr(G), and let E be the grounded extension of G. Let E ′ be the grounded extension of
G′, and let a ∈ E. We will show that a ∈ E ′.
Let F ′ ∈ Σpr(G′) a preferred extension of G′. By Definition 22 Cond. 2, there
exists a preferred extension F ∈ Σpr(G) such that F ⊆ F ′. Since a is in the grounded
extension of G, a is also in every preferred extension of G, and specifically a ∈ F so
a ∈ F ′. Since a is in all preferred extensions of G′, a is also in the grounded extension
of G′.
Although the definition of linear extensions (Definition 22) does not make any
reference to argument graphs, the concept is particularly useful in an argumentation
setting. It can be used to express that an argument graph G′ contains an argument
graph G, by stating that the preferred extensions of G′ are a linear extension of the
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preferred extensions of G. This ensures not only that all of G’s credulously acceptable
arguments are credulously acceptable in G′, but also that any credulously acceptable
set of arguments in G is still credulously acceptable as a set in G′. In particular, this
definition ensures that G′ does not introduce any attacks between arguments that are
credulously acceptable together, that is as part of the same extension, in G.
This is a much stronger statement than saying that an argument graph G is a sub-
graph of an argument graph G′. If we only knew that G is a subgraph of G′, then G′
could introduce arbitrary attacks between any two arguments that were conflict-free in
G. If the preferred extensions of G′ are a linear extension of the preferred extensions
of G, then all arguments that share a preferred extension in G also share a preferred
extension in G′ (and are therefore conflict-free in G′). Linear extensions of preferred
extensions thus preserve not only the acceptability status but also the context of argu-
ments.
2.5 Discussion
In this chapter we gave formal definitions of abstract argument graphs (Section 2.2) and
ASPIC+ (Section 2.3), the two systems we will use to construct and evaluate arguments.
Before we begin the development of our decision making framework in Chapter 3, we
will briefly discuss possible alternatives to the chosen systems.
2.5.1 Grounded and Preferred Semantics
One of the developments in the first part of this thesis is enforce, a function that elevates
the status of a set of arguments in an argument graph from credulously to sceptically
acceptable. enforce is an important building block for the model of decision processes
developed in Chapter 4. We choose preferred and grounded semantics as representa-
tives of credulous and sceptical acceptability, because they were defined in the original
article by Dung [42], and because their definitions are relatively convenient to work
with (maximum admissible sets and least fixed point of the characteristic function, re-
spectively).
An open question for future work is whether these two semantics are good models
of the semantics used in design debates, or whether other semantics such as robust
[43], naive [44] or ranking-based [45] would be more realistic, and how the choice of
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different semantics affects our results, particularly on enforcement (see Section 3.4.3
on page 94).
2.5.2 Alternatives to ASPIC+
ASPIC+ is a framework for structured argumentation. It provides definitions for creat-
ing and evaluating arguments based on a knowledge base, and a method for identifying
attacks between those arguments. A number of other approaches to structured argu-
mentation have been proposed (see e.g. [46] for an introduction), and we will briefly
review them here.
2.5.2.1 ABA
Assumption-based argumentation (ABA [47]), like ASPIC+, is a general framework
that instantiates abstract argument graphs. Every ABA-system has an underlying de-
ductive system, a subset of which is designated as assumptions, and a set of inference
rules. An ABA-argument is a set of assumptions from which a claim can be inferred
by applying the inference rules. Attacks are determined by a contrariness-relation. In
ABA, all inference rules are strict and defeasibility is expressed through assumptions.
2.5.2.2 DeLP
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP, [48]) is a logic-programming inspired system
for argumentation. In DeLP there are two kinds of negation, strong negation and default
negation. Unlike ABA and ASPIC+, DeLP uses dialectical tree semantics. A DeLP
system can respond to queries of the status of a claim with one of four answers: Yes (if
the claim is supported by an undefeated argument), no (if the complement of the claim
is supported), undecided (neither yes or no), and unknown (if the query is not known
to the program).
2.5.2.3 Deductive Argumentation
In deductive argumentation (e.g. [49, 50]) arguments are pairs of support and conclu-
sion such that the conclusion is entailed (inference in the chosen base logic) by the
claim. In deductive argumentation, the only inference rules are those of the base logic.
Deductive argumentation has a great degree of flexibility, for example in the choice of
base logic and how an argument graph is constructed from a knowledge base.
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2.5.2.4 Discussion
Our primary reason for choosing ASPIC+ is that its syntax is appropriate for our needs,
and – with the adjustments discussed on page 32 – its knowledge bases lead to a
straightforward interpretation as argument graphs.
However, the model we develop in this thesis does not inherently require AS-
PIC+, and we presume that it could be translated to the other approaches without much
difficulty. Such a translation of our model into other approaches to structured argumen-
tation would help to draw out the distinction between characteristics that are intrinsic
of decision processes, and those that are specific to the concrete expression of decision
processes in ASPIC+. We leave this study for future work.
Chapter 3
Argument-Based Decision Making
3.1 Introduction
Individual decisions are the smallest building block of decision processes, so they are
a good starting point for our model of decision processes. In decision analysis, the two
fields multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) and decision making with uncertainty
(DM) are different areas of research, each with their own methodologies, research ques-
tions, models, etc. One can say – with quite a bit of simplification – that MCDM is
DM minus uncertainty plus multiple conflicting utility functions, and likewise DM is
MCDM with uncertainty and with only a single criterion (i.e. utility).
In argumentation, Dung’s argument graphs represent uncertainty non-numerically,
namely as conflict between arguments. The same mechanism is used to represent mul-
tiple conflicting utilities (preferences) of decision outcomes. It should thus be possible
for an argumentation-based model of decision making to combine DM’s focus on un-
certainty with MCDM’s focus on multiple criteria. In this chapter we develop such a
moel.
In our approach, the pros and cons of different options in a decision form an ar-
gument graph. In this graph, multi-criteria decision problems are analysed using the
grounded extension of an argument graph, and decision problems with uncertainty are
analysed using preferred extensions. In this model, credulous acceptability is an ex-
pression of “what-if” hypothetical reasoning, while sceptical acceptability amounts to
evaluating one or more dialectical trees of arguments. Unlike in earlier proposals, de-
cisions in our framework are modeled as sets of literals, rather than as single literals.
This means that they can partially overlap, resulting in a more finely tuned set of deci-
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sions. The need for this kind of analysis was identified during our collaboration with
an aerospace manufacturer.
Our system also provides output that can be used to create decision documentation.
It uses formal logic to reason with arguments and counterarguments. Because these
arguments are generated from structured knowledge (in the form of rules), they can with
little additional effort be transformed into an ontology-based format. This is because
ontology standards are based upon a formal foundation of description logics [51].
We begin with a review and precise definition of problems in multi-criteria de-
cision making and decision making under uncertainty, in Section 3.2. This section
establishes our understanding of existing, non-argumentative methods that will act as
a guideline to frame the necessary (but not sufficient) features our system should have.
In the same section we look at additional requirements beyond the two approaches dis-
cussed. These requirements are direct consequences of the fact that the decisions we
are interested in are parts of a larger process, and any artifacts (in the form of formal
models) should be reusable.
In Section 3.3 we present our own argumentation-based decision model. After
some initial definitions and examples, we evaluate it from the perspective of MCDM,
DM, und the additional, reusability-related requirements established in the previous
section. We pay specific consideration to decision rules, functions that establish a
ranking of options in a decision. Decision rules serve two different purposes. First,
they describe how the best option can be identified automatically, which is how they
are used most commonly. Second, they can be used to characterise a decision after it
has been made (by checking which of a number of decision rules would have lead to
the outcome that was actually chosen). It is therefore important to develop a good un-
derstanding not just of a single decision rule, but of the differences between a number
of decision rules.
In the next Section, 3.4, we investigate what it means to accept a decision - this
is the process of adjusting one’s knowledge base after choosing an option, in order to
promote the arguments supporting this option from credulously to sceptically accept-
able. This step is not usually part of decision models, but it is crucial for the remaining
chapters of this thesis, in which we will look at sequences of decisions. Accepting a
decision has implications for subsequent decisions, and those implications should be
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reflected in the formal model.
We conclude the chapter with a review of previous work in the field of decision-
making in argumentation (Section 3.5) and a discussion of our results (Section 3.6).
3.2 Two Models of Decision Making
Engineering design processes, such as those practised in the aerospace industry, are of-
ten complex and long-running. They involve a multitude of decisions, many of which
affect subsequent steps in the process. Automated methods are commonly used to han-
dle the complexity and interrelatedness of the decisions. The formal foundation of
these methods has been studied widely in the literature (see [52] for a survey). How-
ever, while the quantitative analysis of decisions helps to manage the complexity of
individual decisions, it does not address requirements that result from the long duration
of the overall process. These requirements relate to decision documentation and include
justifiability of decisions and traceability of the impact decisions have on one another.
Information of this kind is usually recorded in a less rigorous manner, for example
as text documents. The two tasks of analysing and documenting decisions are solved
using two different methods. Therefore, a single human reasoning process (making a
particular design decision) results in the production not only of two different artifacts,
but of two entirely different models of that decision. We claim that an argumentation-
based model can be the common foundation for both analysis and documentation of
decisions.
3.2.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
A variety of formal definitions exists for multi criteria decision making. We will focus
our analysis on the class of problems characterised by the definition below. The criteria
Cr are represented by functions that map options onto numerical values, representing
the quality of an option w.r.t a criterion. The values for each criterion are then ag-
gregated to obtain an overall result (or a ranking) that determines the most favourable
option.
Definition 23 (Multi criteria decision problem). A multi criteria decision problem P =
(O,Cr,agg) consists of
1. A set of options O = {o1, . . . ,on} with n≥ 1
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2. A set of criteria Cr = {c1, . . . ,ck} with k ≥ 1 such that each ci ∈Cr is a function
ci : O→ R
3. An aggregation function agg : R|O|∗|Cr|→ R|O|
The set of all multi criteria decision problems is called MCD. We denote with VP the
two-dimensional vector of the criteria for each decision:
VP =

c1(o1) . . . ck(o1)
... . . .
c1(on) ck(on)

Definition 23 corresponds to the decision matrix, a popular decision method in
engineering [4]. The actual rating of an option for a particular criterion is assigned by
the decision maker who creates the table. In order to achieve consistency and account-
ability in the decision making process, additional documentation is required to justify
decisions for a later verification. The numerical model alone does not explain why the
criteria were assigned their values.
Example 7. Table 3.1 on page 47 illustrates the problem of choosing a material for a
wing component of an airplane. There are four possible options, aluminium, plastics,
steel, and composite materials. The two criteria are weight and cost. The example
demonstrates how the choice of the aggregation function agg influences the results:
If one considers the sum of the criteria, aluminium is the first choice, but if one is
instead interested in maximising the best criterion, then composites and steel are tied
for first place, and aluminium is last. Aluminium has better results for both criteria
than plastics, therefore plastics is dominated by aluminum.
A preferred option is a decision that is as good as or better than all other options.
Definition 24 (Preferred Option). Given a multi criteria decision problem P =
(O,Cr,agg), with O = {o1, . . . ,on} an option oi ∈ O is preferred iff for all o j ∈ O
agg(VP) j ≤ agg(VP)i
Example 8. In the example given in Table 3.1, aluminium is preferred if we choose Σ
as the aggregation. Otherwise, steel or composites would be preferred.
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Table 3.1: Multi Criteria Decision Making
Criteriaa Aggregations
Weight Cost Σb maxc
Aluminium 0.4 0.7 1.1 0
Plastics 0.3 0.6 0.9 0
Steel 0.2 0.8 1.0 1
Composites 0.7 0.2 0.9 1
a The higher the value, the better this criterion is
met, e.g. low weight will result in a high value for
weight.
b Σ is the sum of all criteria for one option.
c max(d) is the number of criteria in which d has the
highest value.
3.2.2 Decision Making under Uncertainty
We will now develop a formal definition of problems in decision making under un-
certainty, in the same way we did for multi-criteria decision making problems in the
previous section. It aims to capture the essence of the axiomatic approach by Savage
[10], although we do not repeat the axioms here and jump directly to the definition
commonly found in the literature [53].
Definition 25 (Decision Making Problem under Uncertainty). A decision making under
uncertainty problem is a three-tuple (S,X ,F) where S is a set of states of the world, X
is a set of consequences and F = { f1, . . . , fn} with n≥ 1 is the set of possible acts with
fi : S→ X. Further, there is a probability distribution p over S, and a utility measure
u : X → R.
Definition 25 makes some strong assumptions about what can be quantified: Both
the probabilities of states of the world S, and the utilities of consequences X . As with
MCDM, it is our aim to relax those assumptions by replacing them with weaker al-
gebraic structures. As we will see in Section 3.3.4, we make no assumptions about
the likelihood of possible worlds (and thus consider all possible worlds to be equally
likely), and only assume a partial order of S, equipped with a lattice.
Example 9. Table 3.2 shows the utilities for a decision similar to the one in Example
7, but with uncertainty about the future price developments of commodities. Aluminium
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Table 3.2: Decision Making Problem under Uncertainty (Example 9)
Option Stagnation Increase Decrease
Aluminium 3 1 4
Plastics 3 3 1
Steel 3 1 3
Composites 2 2 2
and steel are much more affected by price movements, so their utilities vary more in the
three scenarios. Composites are completely unaffected, and plastics are somewhere in
the middle.
This example is related to the previous example: Depending on market prices, the
criterion Cost may take different values for the same material. However, this relation-
ship does not appear in the formal definitions of multi-criteria decision making and
decision making under uncertainty problems. In our argumentation-based approach
we will be able to express relationships between criteria and uncertainty about the
state of the world.
Table 3.2 shows the decision making under uncertainty problem (S,X ,F) based
on the following values:
S = {Stagnation, Increase,Decrease}
X = {1,2,3,4}
F = { fal, fpl, fst , fco} with
fal = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 1,Decrease 7→ 4
fpl = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 3,Decrease 7→ 1
fst = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 1,Decrease 7→ 3
fco = Stagnation 7→ 2, Increase 7→ 2,Decrease 7→ 2
In this example, X ⊆R, so the utility measure u is simply the identity function u(x) = x.
Finally, assuming all three states in S are equally likely, the probability distribution p
is given by p(Stagnation) = p(Increase) = p(Decrease) = 13 .
In DMU, options are compared using decision rules. Decision rules rank options
by evaluating their consequences in different possible worlds. A common example is
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the maxmin decision rule, which maximises the outcome in the worst case. Decision
rules are functions d : F → B from the set of actions F to a set B with a total order
≤, so that the ordering of actions f ∈ F is determined by the ordering of their results
d( f ) ∈ B. To illustrate the concept we now give a definition of maxmin, followed by an
example.
Definition 26 (Maxmin for DMU). Let P = (S,X ,F) be a decision making problem
with uncertainty. maxminP : F → R is defined as
maxmin( f ) = min
s∈S
f (s)
Note that the “max” part of maxmin is determined by the ordering of R, so it is not
present in the definition of maxmin itself.
Example 10. For the decision making under uncertainty problem in Table 3.2, the
maxmin rule recommends composites, because with composites we are guaranteed a
utility of 2 in the worst case. For the other options, the worst case has a utility of 1.
The example also shows why maxmin is a rather pessimistic rule: By choosing
composites we forego the possibility of much higher utilities than 2. For example, we
could get a utility of 4 by choosing aluminium.
Another common decision rule in DMU is to compute the expected utility for
each option, by multiplying the probability of each possible world with its payoff. This
requires both probabilities and payoffs to be quantifiable. In this thesis we do not make
either of those assumptions, so we will not calculate expected utilities.
There is another use for decision rules, besides identifying the best option. They
can be used to characterise decisions after they have been made. For example, if we
have an optimistic decision rule and a pessimistic decision rule, we can see which of
the two would have selected the option that was actually chosen. This application of
decision rules benefits from having more rules, and it is a motivation for our analysis
of decision rules in Section 3.3.5 of this chapter.
3.2.3 Documentation of Decisions
As outlined above, the primary reasons for documenting design decisions are consis-
tency and accountability. The design decision process needs to be consistent throughout
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organisations and, with regards to regulations, the entire industry. Consistency means
that given a specific problem, any decision maker would ideally come to the same con-
clusion. Records need to be kept in order to verify that the decision making process is
consistent.
Design decisions in the aerospace industry are often complex. They are also part
of an iterative design process, which means that decisions may need to be revised to
account for previously unconsidered factors or for changed requirements.
In our collaboration with one major aerospace manufacturer, we found that discus-
sions about design questions were primarily carried out in emails and personal meet-
ings. Only when a decision was made, was it documented in a central repository used
to manage the design process. To create this documentation, some of the information
contained in the emails had to be duplicated, while the rest remained only on the email
server and was thus not readily available to a search of the structured repository. Hav-
ing to duplicate information carries the risk of introducing errors, sometimes simply by
using a slightly different wording.
This process also entails that alternative options which had been discussed would
only be documented informally. Later on in the process, a changing requirement might
lead to a re-evaluation of previously made decisions. In this case, the alternatives have
to be retrieved from the unstructured documentation. This is a labour intensive process.
It is also error prone, especially after several iterations of the design. The retrieval of
decision rationale could therefore benefit greatly from a formal, structured documenta-
tion.
Contract and claims management are another use case for decision documentation.
At the beginning of each phase in the project life cycle, it needs to be shown that all
of the requirements of the previous stage have been fulfilled. Design documentation
is used to show how each requirement is addressed. Here, the same issues that were
described in the previous paragraph arise.
3.2.4 Problems with Current Approach
The two problems described at the beginning of this chapter are the modeling and
the documentation of decisions. Having presented common solutions to each of those
problems, we are now going to highlight their shortcomings.
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1, Opaque resoning process For each of the potential decisions, a set of criteria has
to be evaluated. Assigning values to decisions accounts for a large part of the effort
involved in making decisions with an MCDM or DMU approach. It usually represents
the outcome of some reasoning process, which itself does not appear in the final model
and needs to be documented separately.
2, Local optimum An MCDM/DMU model can only identify the best of a predefined
set of options. It is possible that there exists a better decision that was not part of the
model. Therefore, MCDM models have the inherent risk of producing only a local
optimum.
3, Proprietary documentation formats There is no standard method of documenting
decisions. This prevents the development of standard tools to support decision docu-
mentation.
4, Manual analysis If decisions are documented informally, there is no underlying
model on which an automated analysis of decisions could be performed. With an au-
tomated approach, one could, for example, immediately spot conflicting assumptions
made by two different engineers, or characterise past decisions by matching them to
decision rules.
5, Costly retrieval of documentation Most of the documentation relating to the pro-
cess of decision making is documented in an unstructured way. The effort required to
find a particular piece of information in an unstructured repository is much higher than
that of finding it in a structured repository. If, at the end of a project, there are claims
that some requirements have not been met, the entire documentation related to that sub-
component has to be read by an engineer in order to verify that either the requirement
has actually been met or that the requirement was defined differently in the contract.
Both of the problems associated with the formal models of DMU and MCDM (1-
2) relate to the fact that creating the model is the actual challenge in those approaches.
Once a model has been created, the actual evaluation consists of mechanically applying
a set of predefined mathematical operations. The informal documentation of decisions,
on the other hand, is limited in terms of automated processing of information (3-5).
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Figure 3.1: Joining Two Structures
3.3 Argument-Based Decision Framework (ADF)
3.3.1 Overview
We present a framework for decision making using argumentation. More precisely,
given a set of options and a set of goals, we are going to use argumentation to construct
arguments in favour of and against each option, with the aim of identifying the best
option. The best option is the one that satisfies the most goals. However, this should not
be the only criterion for selecting an option: Any formal method of decision making
depends on a model, a formalised representation of the problem. The quality of the
model affects the quality of the decision. There are two factors which determine the
quality of the model: The quality of the information that the model was built on, and
the quality (correctness) of the model itself. Because of these two inherent risk factors,
we argue that any formal method of decision making should not only identify the best
option, but it should also present a justification for the outcome, so that the influence
on the decision making process of potential flaws in the model can be traced.
Formal methods of argumentation are well suited for this purpose. They produce
not only a claim, but also a description of how the available information was used to
arrive at that claim, and how any counterarguments were addressed. Our decision mak-
ing framework uses argumentation to reason about the possible outcomes of decisions.
Example 11. Imagine we are faced with the problem of designing a structure (t) that
has two components, s1 and s2 as illustrated in Figure 3.1. s1 and s2 are joined with a
bracket fixed by bolts, bb. Our task is to decide which bolts to use, whether or not to use
a shim, a thin sheet of metal, between the bracket and the components, and how many
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Figure 3.2: Argument graph for Example 11.
layers of varnish to apply. Our requirements are to maintain the structural integrity
of t and to achieve a high resistance to corrosion. The first option we consider, O1, is
to use steel/titanium bolts, not to use a shim, and to apply two layers of varnish to the
product. The following arguments might be put forward:
a1 Not using a shim means that the structure remains balanced. Therefore, it will
not be damaged.
a2 Steel/titanium bolts cause microscopic fractures in s1 and s2, resulting in damage
to the structure.
a3 Steel/titanium bolts are too strong for the material that s1 is made of, so there
will be microscopic fractures.
a4 The structure has a high corrosion resistance, because two layers of varnish are
used.
A possible argument graph for this example is shown in Figure 3.2, with the grounded
extension {a2,a3,a4}. a3 is a sub-argument of a2 (giving the reason for microscopic
fractures), so a3 and a2 both attack a1, but a1 only attacks a2 because their conclusions
directly contradict. a4 is not in conflict with any arguments.
3.3.2 Decision Frames
A core concept of our argumentation-based decision system is the decision frame, de-
fined below. It captures the context of a decision, that is, the background knowledge,
requirements, and any other possible consequences. Background knowledge is simply
a set of ASPIC+ rules, and conseqences and requirements are represented as literals of
the language L . To show that a decision has good consequences, we will construct
arguments that have a goal as their claim. We then check which of those arguments are
part of a grounded extension.
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Table 3.3: Rules for Example 12
Rule name Content
r1 mat(bb,st)⇒ fractured(s1)
r2 fractured(s1)⇒ damaged(t)
r3 ¬shim(t)⇒ balanced(t)
r4 ¬shim(t)⇒¬fractured(s1)
r5 ¬fractured(s1),balanced(t)⇒¬damaged(t)
r6 varnish(t,2)⇒ coRes(t,high)
r7 mat(al)⇒¬fractured(s1)
r8 mat(al),shim(t)⇒ balanced(t)
Example 12. The background knowledge from Example 11 can be formalised as shown
in Table 3.3. r1 shows that using steel/titanium bolts (mat(bb,st)) will cause micro-
scopic fractures in s1. r2 says that if s1 is fractured, then the whole structure t is
damaged. Not using a shim results in a good overall balance of t, as well as in the
absence of fractures (r3,r4). If the structure is balanced and free of fractures, then it
is not damaged (r5). Applying two layers of varnish results in high resistance to corro-
sion (r6). The final two rules, r7 and r8 state that using aluminium will not result in a
fractured component, and if the aluminium component is supported with a shim then it
will be balanced.
We model options as ASPIC+ knowledge bases and use the symbol O for the set
of all options. Each of the options O ∈ O , together with the knowledge base of the
decision frame, forms an argumentation system. This argumentation system is used to
derive arguments about the goals achieved by choosing this option.
Decision frames also include a set of consequences, C. It contains all conse-
quences that choosing an option could potentially have, both good and bad. We require
C to be a lattice1 over a partial order ≤C, in order to be able to compare decisions by
their possible consequences.
Definition 27 (Decision frame). A decision frame is a tuple (K,C,R) where
1. K is an ASPIC+ knowledge base,
2. C ⊆ L is a finite set of consequences equipped with a lattice (C,u,unionsq) over a
partial order ≤C and
1See Definition 18 on page 37
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3. R⊆C is a set of requirements.
The set of options itself is not part of a decision frame. This is because we view
decision frames as functions from the set of all possible options O to the powerset of
all arguments, P(A ). By adopting this definition we address the problem of “local
optimum” (page 51), which is caused by the need to supply a predetermined set of
options in the traditional models of decision making.
The set of all decision frames is D . We will make use of two utility functions,
argsD and consequencesD defined as follows.
Definition 28 (Utility Functions). Let D= (K,C,R) be a decision frame. The functions
argsD : O →P(A ) and consequencesD :P(A )→C are defined as follows:
argsD(O) = args(K∪O)
consequencesD(A) = {c ∈C | ∃a ∈ A.conclusion(a) = c}
In the remainder of this chapter we will use the term decision frame to refer specif-
ically to Definition 27, and the term argument-based decision framework, short ADF,
to refer to our approach in general.
Example 13. Continuing with Example 12 on page 53, we can define a decision frame
DM = (K,C,R), with the components defined below, as well as two options, O1,O2 ∈O ,
given by Table 3.4. The variable t stands for the structure (a t-connector) that is being
designed. For now we set C = R, so we do not pay any special attention to the set of
consequences beyond what is needed to capture the requirements. Consequences will
play a role in Section 3.3.4 on decision making with uncertainty.
For option O1, we get the argumentation system (A1,attacks(A1)) with A1 =
{a1, . . . ,a9}. The arguments look as follows:
a1 = [⇒¬shim(t)] a6 = [a5;r1;fractured(t)]
a2 = [a1;r3;balanced(t)] a7 = [a6;r2;damaged(t)]
a3 = [a1;r4;¬fractured(t)] a8 = [⇒ varnish(t,2)]
a4 = [a2,a2;r5;¬damaged(t)] a9 = [a8;r6;coRes(t,high)]
a5 = [⇒ mat(bb,st)]
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Table 3.4: Decision Frame for Engineering Example
Name Definition
O1 {⇒ mat(bb,st),⇒¬shim(t),⇒ varnish(T,2)}
O2 {⇒ mat(bb,al),⇒ shim(t),⇒ varnish(T,2)}
K {r1, . . . ,r6}, as in Table 3.3
C {¬damaged(t),coRes(T,high)}
R =C
There are two pairs of mutually rebutting arguments: a3 and a6, and a4 and a7.
a3 is also an undercutter of a7, and a6 is an undercutter of a4. The grounded exten-
sion consists of {a1,a2,a8,a9} and the argumentation graph for option O1 is shown in
Figure 3.3 on page 57 (conflicting arguments only).
To see why the set of consequences C is required to be a lattice, consider the case
where we argue about the outcome of a decision on two distinct, qualitative scales - for
example, form and function. Each of these can be good, fair or bad. This results in
six values V = {good f orm, good f unction, f air f orm, f air f unction, bad f orm,
bad f unction} with a partial order ≤V . Each of the scales on its own is totally or-
dered, but ≤V does not relate elements from different scales. As a result, neither
( f air f unction,good f orm) ∈≤V nor (good f orm, f air f unction) ∈≤V .
The lattice structure comes into play when we summarise the set of arguments for
an option. For example, assume that an option gives rise to three sceptically accept-
able arguments a1,a2,a3 with conclusions good f orm, f air f orm and f air f unction
respectively. In order to apply the maxmin rule we need to identify the maximum (best)
among the conclusions of a1 to a3. Clearly, good f orm ≥ f air f orm, because both
are on the same scale, but the better one of f air f unction and good f orm can only be
chosen with additional information. This is a common problem in qualitative decision-
making (cf. Dubois [54]). The purpose of the lattice structure with its
⊔
,
⊔
operators
is to make any two elements of C comparable in some sense (by choosing an element
of C that is smaller than or greater than both), while still retaining the requirement for
≤ to be a partial order only, and not a full order.
A possible solution for our example is to extend the set V with a common scale,
say C = V ∪ {overall good, overall f air, overall bad}. We can then – within the
boundaries required for C to be a lattice – define u according to our preferences e.g. by
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Figure 3.3: Argument graph for Example 13.
stipulating f air f unctionugood f orm = overall f air.
In engineering design we frequently have to handle different ordinal scales when
discussing qualitative criteria such as fire safety ratings or usability.
Having established the general concept of ADF, we will evaluate our approach in
relation to MCDM and DMU in the following two sections.
3.3.3 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
We will now translate some concepts that are specific to multi-criteria decision making
(Section 3.2.1) to our model. A common notion in multi criteria decision making is
that of dominated options. Informally, an option O is dominated if there is another
option O′ that satisfies the same criteria at least as well as O. It is not reasonable to
choose a dominated option, because there is a better option that can be chosen without
any disadvantages. In order to identify the goals that an option satisfies, we define a
satisfaction function sat. It returns the goals that can be shown by arguments generated
with this option.
Definition 29 (Satisfaction Function). Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame. satD :
O → P(R) is defined as satD(O) = {r ∈ R | ∃a ∈ argsD(O) such that a is in the
grounded extension of the graph (argsD(O),attacks(argsD(O))) and conclusion(a) =
r}.
Example 14. The grounded extension for option O1 is {a1,a2,a8,a9}. Since only the
conclusion of a9 is a goal, we get satD(O1) = {coRes(t,high)}.
It is important to note that we restrict the satisfaction function to arguments in
the grounded extension. If, for example, admissible or stable semantics had been used
instead, we would face the problem of having to choose one out of a set of extensions.
Each of the extensions could contain arguments in favour of the option, but they cannot
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all be accepted at the same time, and thus should not be returned by sat. Further
information would be required to resolve this conflict. In Section 3.3.4, we will use
preferred extensions to represent uncertainty about the consequences of an option.
Definition 30 (Dominated Option). Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame. An option
O ∈O is dominated by an option O′ ∈O with O 6=O′ such that satD(O)⊆ satD(O′). O
is strictly dominated if satD(O)⊂ satD(O′).
Example 15. In Example 13, O1 is strictly dominated by O2, because satDM(O2) =
{coRes(t,high),¬damaged(t)}, so satDM(O1)⊂ satDM(O2).
3.3.3.1 Comparison with Current Approach
To conclude the comparison with MCDM, we show how our system formally cor-
responds with the class of multi criteria decision making problems characterised by
Definition 23 on page 45. Our proof of the correspondence consists of two results:
That every decision frame can be expressed as an MCDM system (assuming a fixed set
of options), and conversely that every MCDM system can be expressed as a decision
frame. The first result can be found in Amgoud and Prade, 2008 [33] and we repeat
it here for completeness. In order to achieve the second result, we will construct a
function that maps multi criteria decision problems to decision frames. We are going to
model MCDM options as options in a decision frame, each containing a single element.
The values of the criteria functions are also going to be represented as literals. We then
express the results of the aggregation function agg as goals in the decision frame, and
finally we will create a rule for each decision that leads to the desired goals. We will
use the function 〈·〉 whenever a value (for example a number) is meant to be read as a
symbol in L , rather than as the value itself, in the same sense that 〈·〉 is used to refer
to the names of ASPIC+ rules in the object language.
Proposition 5 (Equivalent to property 7 in [28]). For every argumentation decision
problem D= (K,C,R) and set of options {O1, . . . ,On}⊆O , there exists a multi criteria
decision problem P′ = (O,Cr,agg) such that for all Oi,O j with i, j ≤ n:
satD(O j)⊆ satD(Oi)⇔ agg(VP′) j ≤ agg(VP′)i
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This shows that we can construct a mapping from ADF to MCD which preserves
the preference relation over decisions. Next, we will show that a similar mapping can be
constructed in the other direction, from MCD to ADF, again preserving the preference
relation.
Definition 31 (Mapping from MCD to ADF). Let P = (O,Cr,agg) be a multicriteria
decision problem. We construct a decision frame P′ = (K,C,R) and a set of options
OP ⊆ O as follows:
1. OP = {{⇒ 〈di〉} | di ∈ O}
2. K = R1∪R2∪R3 and
(a) R1 = {〈di〉 ⇒ 〈c j(vi, j)〉 | vi, j ∈VP and c j ∈Cr}
(b) R2 = {〈vi,1〉, ...,〈vi,k−1〉,〈vi,k〉 ⇒ 〈agg(VP)i〉 | {〈di〉} ∈ OP and k = |Cr|}
(c) R3 = {〈agg(VP)i〉 ⇒ 〈agg(VP) j〉 | agg(VP)i ≥ agg(VP) j}
3. R = {〈agg(VP)i〉 | di ∈ O}
4. C = R
The mapping in Definition 31 has four components - a set of options, OP and three
constituent parts of the decision frame (K,C,R). OP contains a one-element knowledge
base {⇒ 〈di〉} for each original option in O. The literal 〈di〉 is to be read as “di is
selected”. K, the knowledge base of the decision frame, contains three types of rules,
R1, R2 and R3. Rules in R1 map decisions (di) to their score on each criterion in Cr.
R1 therefore contains |O| ∗ |Cr| rules. Rules in R2 connect the individual criteria of
options in OP to their aggregated score in the multi-criteria decision making problem
P. R2 contains |O| rules. The set R3 contains perhaps the most interesting rules. To
understand the construction, consider the definition of C first: C = R = {〈agg(VP)i〉 |
di ∈ D}, so there is one element in C for each possible aggregated score that an option
might have. To ensure that options which rank higher under agg also rank higher under
sat, we need to translate “high numerical scores” (agg) to “large sets of acceptable
arguments” (sat). This is the purpose of the rules in R3. The effect of the rules is
that every time we have an acceptable argument for a high aggregated score in P, we
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also have arguments for all lower scores. As a result, the set of arguments for a high-
ranking option includes more arguments with conclusions in C, and hence the option
ranks higher under ⊆ and sat. The number of rules in R3 is equal to the number of
different aggregated scores (and so smaller than or equal to the number of options).
We will now give a lemma (Propage 6) before our main result, Theorem 1, in
which we show that every MCDM problem can be represented as a decision frame
with the same results, i.e. with the same ranking of decisions. This demonstrates that
ADF is at least as expressive as MCDM – and it adds benefits such as reusability, ac-
countability, inference of decisions and the ability to compare multiple possible worlds,
as will be explored below.
Proposition 6. Let P = (O,Cr,agg) be a multi criteria decision problem and
P′ = (K,C,R) and OP as constructed according to Definition 31. For every op-
tion O = {⇒ 〈di〉} ∈ OP and every criterion c ∈ Cr, there exists an argument
[[⇒ 〈di〉],〈di〉 ⇒ 〈c(di)〉;〈c(di)〉] in the grounded extension of the argument graph
(argsP(O),attacks(argsP(O))).
Proof. Let O= {⇒ 〈di〉} ∈OP for a di ∈O and let c j ∈Cr be a criterion. By Definition
31 Cond. 2a, there is a rule r= 〈di〉⇒ 〈c j(vi, j)〉 in K, so argsP′(O) contains an argument
a= [[⇒〈di〉],r,〈c j(vi, j)〉]. Since the rules in K do not have any conflicting conclusions,
and the literals in O are conflict-free too, the set of arguments argsP′(O) is conflict
free. Therefore the grounded extension of the argument graph of argsP′(O) contains all
arguments, including a.
If a decision frame is generated from a multi criteria decision making system,
then its knowledge base is very simplistic, because it does not contain any domain
knowledge. This results from the fact that the domain knowledge which was applied to
assign the criteria values for each decision is not represented in the model, and therefore
cannot be included in the decision frame.
Theorem 1. For every multi criteria decision problem P = (O,Cr,agg), there exists a
decision frame P′= (K,C,R) and a set of options OP⊆O such that for all Oi,O j ∈OP:
agg(VP) j ≤ agg(VP)i⇔ satP′(O j)⊆ satP′(Oi)
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The proof relies on the fact that in the mapping constructed according to Definition
31, if an option {⇒ 〈dk〉} ∈OP subsumes all options {⇒ 〈di〉} ∈OP that are worse than
dk, that is if agg(VP)i ≤ agg(VP)k, then the corresponding option dk satisfies all goals
that are satisfied by dk.
Proof. Let P = (O,Cr,agg) be a multi criteria decision problem and let P′ = (K,C,R)
and OP the decision frame and set of options as constructed according to Definition 31.
(⇒) Let di,d j ∈ O such that agg(VP) j ≤ agg(VP)i. We are going to show that every
element v ∈ satP′(D j) is also in satP′(Di). Let v ∈ satP′(D j). Then 〈v〉 ∈ R. By Cond.
3 of Definition 31, v ∈ agg(VP), and v ≤ agg(VP) j (Cond. 2c of Definition 31). Let
v′ = agg(VP)i. By Cond. 3 of Definition 31, v′ ∈ G , and by Cond. 2a and 2b of
Definition 31 there is an argument [[⇒〈di〉],〈di〉⇒ 〈v′〉;〈v′〉] in the grounded extension
of (argsP′({⇒ 〈di〉}),attacks(argsP′({⇒ 〈di〉}))) By Cond. 2c of Definition 31, 〈v′〉⇒
〈v〉 ∈ K, so there is an argument [[⇒ 〈di〉];〈di〉 ⇒ 〈v〉;〈v〉] in the grounded extension of
(argsP′({⇒ 〈di〉}),attacks(argsP′({⇒ 〈di〉}))). Therefore, 〈v〉 ∈ satP′(Di).
(⇐) Let O j, Oi ∈ OP such that satP′(O j) ⊆ satP′(Oi). By Definition 29 Cond. 3, for
all requirements r ∈ R, r = 〈agg(VP)i〉 for some di ∈ D – that is, every r corresponds
to the aggregated score of some option di. Let r j = 〈agg(VP)k〉 be the highest-ranking
requirement in satP′(O j), and ri = 〈agg(VP)l〉 be the highest-ranking requirement in
satP′(Oi). By Definition 29 Cond. 2b and 2c, we know that in fact k = j and l = i,
because the highest ranking for which an argument exists in the argument graph for an
option {⇒ 〈dm〉} ∈ OP is exactly agg(VP)m. So r j = 〈agg(VP) j〉 and ri = 〈agg(VP)i〉
and it remains to show that agg(VP) j ≤ agg(VP)i. We do this by contradiction: Assume
agg(VP) j > agg(VP)i. Then, by Definition 29 Cond. 2c, there is no argument a ∈
argsP′(Oi) with conclusion(a) = 〈agg(VP) j〉, so by Definition 29 satP′(O j)* satP′(Oi).
This contradicts the assumption that satP′(O j)⊆ satP′(Oi).
In the definition of sat (Definition 29 on page 57) we limited ourselves to argu-
ments that are acceptable under grounded semantics. The reason for this restriction is
that we have reserved preferred semantics for decision making with uncertainty (as op-
posed to multi-criteria decision making). This allows us to treat both kinds of decision
making in the framework of arguments about the consequences of options.
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3.3.4 Decision Making With Uncertainty
Decision making with uncertainty is characterised by having only uncertain knowledge
about the state of the world, and considering multiple possible worlds. Options can
have different outcomes and utilities depending on the possible world. Decision making
with uncertainty as a branch of decision theory has been pioneered by Savage [10], but
unlike multi-criteria decision making it has not been investigated widely in the context
of formal argumentation.
Decision Rules The term “decision rule” denotes the method used to derive a ranking
of options from a ranking of outcomes and the knowledge of how options relate to
outcomes.
For example, the literature on decision making with uncertainty in general (with
or without argumentation) distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic decision rules. An-
other characteristic of decision rules is their decisiveness, which has played a role in
analyses of the “drowning effect”, i.e. of some options being ranked the same even
though their different outcomes suggest that one should be preferred over the other.
Decision rules are important for evaluating formal decision models, because they
are the means by which decision models are interpreted. In our application domain
of engineering design, decision rules serve two purposes. First, they can be used to
recommend an option based on a set of arguments for and against each of a number of
options. In this regard they are similar to the notion of dominated options and the sat
function we introduced for multi-criteria decision making. Second, they can be used to
analyse decisions after the fact. When a decision has been made, we can characterise
that decision as optimistic, pessimistic, etc. by checking which of the decision rules
the chosen option corresponds to. The second use case is perhaps more relevant to our
application because – as set out in the introduction – our primary aim is to document
and analyse decision processes, rather than to automate the actual decision making.
In our approach, decision rules are maps from an option and a knowledge base
to a sequence (word in a formal language) of consequences, an ordered set of literals.
The exact meaning of words in this language is not specified and different rules have
different languages. We use the languages generated by decision rules as proxies to
compare the rules themselves. Apart from the general framework of decision rules
and their languages we introduce four concrete decision rules, maxmin, lexmaxmin,
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smaxmin and maxmax to demonstrate the concepts.
Uncertainty The interpretation of attacks in our decision making framework is novel:
Symmetric attacks in an option’s set of arguments stand for multiple possible worlds,
because possible worlds are exactly the preferred extensions of an argument graph and
preferred extensions arise from symmetric attacks. This interpretation also gives an in-
tuitive explanation of argument graphs whose grounded and preferred extensions con-
incide: In this case, there is only one possible world and we obtain a model for decision
making without uncertainty.
Example 16. We will now extend the running example (started in Example 11 on page
52) with uncertainty about consequences. We still want to decide which bolts to use,
whether or not to use a shim, and how many layers of varnish to apply. The require-
ments remain the same (structural integrity and corrosion resistance), and so do the
options. Unlike before, we are not certain about the consequences of options and con-
sider some alternative outcomes. We will again describe the arguments for option O1
(use steel and titanium bolts, do not use a shim, and apply two layers of varnish).
a1 Not using a shim in an undamaged structure means that the structure remains
balanced.
a2 Steel/titanium bolts cause microscopic fractures in s1 and s2, resulting in damage
to the structure.
a3 Steel/titanium bolts do not cause microscopic fractures in s1 and s2, so the struc-
ture will not be damaged.
a4 Steel/titanium bolts are too strong for the material that s1 is made of, so there
will be microscopic fractures.
a5 Steel/titanium bolts are too strong for the material that s1 is made of, but there
will not be any microscopic fractures.
a6 The structure has a high corrosion resistance, because two layers of varnish are
used.
The core issue can be seen in arguments a4 and a5: Will there be microscopic fractures
as a result of using steel/titanium bolts? a4 and a5 agree that steel/titanium bolts are
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Figure 3.4: Argument graph for Example 16.
stronger than necessary, but they disagree about the consequences: a4 argues that there
will be microscopic fractures, and a5 argues the opposite. Based on that, arguments
a2 and a3 are also conflicting, a2 being based on the assumption that there are some
fractures, and a3 on the assumption that there are none.
The abstract argument graph for this discussion is shown in Figure 3.4. Besides
the mutual attacks between a4 and a5, and a2 and a3 respectively, there are three asym-
metric attacks. a5 attack a2 because a2 is based on the assumption that there are
fractures whereas a5 argues that there are none. Similarly, a4 attacks a3 because the
latter assumes no fractures whereas the former argues for fractures. And finally, a2
attacks a1 because the latter assumes that the structure is not damaged.
There are two preferred extensions: {a5,a3,a1,a6} and {a4,a2,a6}. The first one
stands for the case that the bolts do not result in microscopic fractures, and the second
one stands for the opposite case. A possible solution to this dilemma would be ac-
quiring more information (for example through experiments – see Chapter 5, or using
probabilistic argumentation – see Section 3.5.2), but for now we have to assume that
both scenarios are possible.
Example 16 demonstrated how preferred extensions are related to possible worlds.
The following definition makes the idea precise:
Definition 32 (Possible World). Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame and let O ∈ O
be an option. Let G = (argsD(O),attacks(argsD(O))) be the argument graph for O.
The set of possible worlds of O in D is given by
possibleWorlds(D,O) = {E ∈ Σpr(G) | consequencesD(E) 6= /0}
Example 17. Rules for the arguments of Example 16 are shown in Table 3.5 (mat
stands for material). Together with O1 = {⇒ mat(bb,st),⇒¬shim(t),⇒ varnish(t,2)},
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Table 3.5: Rules for Example 17
Name Rule
r1 ¬shim(t),¬damaged(t)⇒ balanced(t)
r2 microscopic fractures⇒ damaged(t)
r3 ¬microscopic fractures⇒¬damaged(t)
r4 bolts strong⇒ microscopic fractures
r5 bolts strong⇒¬microscopic fractures
r6 mat(bb,st)⇒ bolts strong
r7 varnish(t,2)⇒ coRes(t,high)
they result in the same argument graph as shown in Figure 3.4, with additional argu-
ments for the antecedent-free rules in O1:
a7 = [⇒ mat(bb,st)]
a8 = [⇒¬shim(t)]
a9 = [⇒ varnish(t,2)]
The graph for argsD(O1) has two preferred extensions, E1 and E2:
E1 = {a5,a3,a1,a6,a7,a8,a9}
E2 = {a4,a2,a6,a7,a8,a9}
So we get two possible worlds: possibleWorlds(D,O1) = {E1,E2}.
If we have the set of possible worlds for an option, we want to compare them to
see how good or bad the option looks in each of them. The comparison of possible
worlds should therefore involve the set of consequences C. This concept is similar to
the sat function in multi-criteria decision making, where we compared options by the
requirements they fulfil (Definition 29 on page 57). Possible worlds can be analysed
in several ways. For example, we could find the worst (least desirable) consequence in
each world. This gives us a set of worst-case scenarios, which is useful for a pessimistic
evaluation of the consequences of an option. On the other end of this spectrum, we
could compare possible worlds by taking only their best consequences. Either way,
by comparing possible worlds we distil the set of all arguments for an option down to
a set of consequences representing the different potential outcomes of this option. In
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a second step (Section 3.3.5), we will use this representative set of consequences to
compare options themselves.
To start with, we compare (rather optimistically – see Section 3.3.5.2) the upper
bound of the consequences of possible worlds. The best consequence of a possible
world E is the upper bound (under unionsq) of all possible consequences of that world.
Definition 33. Let E be a set of arguments.
bestConsequence(E) =
⊔
consequences(E)
Example 18. Before we can compute the best consequences for the previous example,
we need to establish an ordering of all consequences. As required by Definition 27, the
set of all consequences contains the requirements R= {¬damaged(t),coRes(t,high)}
as before. In this example we also consider other consequences that are not re-
quirements, including bad consequences that should be avoided: C′ = R ∪ T with
T = {balanced(t),damaged(t),weight(t,high)}. The set C′ is ordered as follows:
¬damaged(t) > coRes(t,high) > balanced(t) > weight(t,high) > damaged(t).
Since we have a total order of requirements we get u = min and unionsq = max for the lat-
tice (C′,u,unionsq). Now we can compute the best consequences for both possible worlds:
bestConsequence(E1) = max{balanced,¬damaged(t),coRes(t,high)}= ¬damaged(t)
bestConsequence(E2) = max{coRes(t,high),damaged(t)}= coRes(t,high)
The first possible world, E1 has a better best consequence, namely ¬damaged(t).
Every option has a set of possible worlds and one of those possible worlds is the
least desirable one, that is the worst of the possible worlds for this option. The following
definition of worstCase returns the best consequence that can be achieved should the
worst possible world come true. It can also be viewed as the minimum outcome of an
option.
Definition 34. Let E be a set of sets of arguments. The worst case outcome of E is
given by
worstCase(E ) =
⊔
{c ∈C | ∃E ∈ E such that c = bestConsequence(E)}
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As pessimistic decision makers, we compare two options by comparing their out-
comes in the worst case, in order to maximise the minimum result of our decision. This
decision rule is known as maxmin.
Definition 35. Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame and let O be an option. The
minimum result of O in D, short maxmin(D,O) is given by
maxmin(D,O) = worstCase(possibleWorlds(D,O))
Example 19. For O1 in Example 18 we get maxmin(D,O1)=min{¬damaged(t),coRes(t,high)}=
coRes(t,high).
3.3.4.1 Comparison with Current Approach
Just as we compared ADF with the classical (decision theory) approach to MCDM, we
can compare it with DMU. We do this by giving another correspondence result: Given
a DMU problem with a set of options ordered by the maxmin rule (see Definition 26
on page 49), we can produce a decision frame in which the corresponding options have
the same ordering under the maxmin decision rule. The result is specific to the maxmin
rule because the underlying information about utilities and probabilities in the DMU
problem are lost when translating it to a decision frame – similar to Propage 1, which
is based on a mapping that incorporates the ordering of options under one specific
aggregation agg.
Proposition 7. Let P= (S,X ,F) be a decision making under uncertainty problem (Def-
inition 25) with F = { f1, . . . , fn}. There exists a decision frame D and a set of options
{O1, . . . ,On} such that for every fi, f j ∈ F:
fi ≤maxminP f j⇔ Oi ≤maxminD O j
For the proof we will use angled braces 〈·〉 to denote · as a symbol in the logical
language L – in the same way as in Section 3.3.3.1 when we compared ADF with
MCDM. For example, 〈1.3〉 maps the number 1.3 to the three-digit symbol 1.3. This
operator exists only to improve readability.
The proof itself is analogous to that of Theorem 1. For every action fi we construct
a single defeasible rule 〈 fi〉⇒ 〈maxminP( fi)〉. The set of consequences C is exactly the
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set containing 〈maxminP( fi)〉 for every fi ∈ F . C is totally ordered (by ≤ on the range
of maxminP), and the lattice is given by u= min and unionsq= max.
Proof. Let P = (S,X ,F) be as required. Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame with
1. K = {〈 fi〉 ⇒ 〈maxminP( fi)〉 | fi ∈ F}
2. C = {〈maxminP( fi)〉 | fi ∈ F}
3. R = /0
Further, let O = {{⇒ 〈 fi〉}, . . . ,{⇒ 〈 fn〉}} ⊆ O . We show that D meets the condition
of the proof for the set of options O.
(⇐) Let Oi,O j ∈O with Oi = {⇒ 〈 fi〉} and O j = {⇒ 〈 f j〉}, and with Oi ≤maxminD O j.
Now we need to show that fi ≤maxminP f j. By construction, argsD(Oi) and argsD(O j)
are conflict-free and contain exactly two arguments each, namely {[⇒ 〈 fi〉], [〈 fi〉 ⇒
〈maxminP( fi)〉]} = argsD(Oi) and {[⇒ 〈 f j〉], [〈 f j〉 ⇒ 〈maxminP( f j)〉]} = argsD(O j).
Since Oi ≤maxminD O j, fi ≤maxminP f j (by Definition of ≤C).
(⇒) Let fi, f j ∈ F with fi ≤maxminP f j. Then there exist {⇒ 〈 fi〉},{⇒ 〈 f j〉} ∈ O
and, by construction of K, argsD({⇒ 〈 fi〉}) = {[⇒ 〈 fi〉], [〈 fi〉 ⇒ 〈maxminP( fi)〉]}
and argsD({⇒ 〈 f j〉}) = {[⇒ 〈 f j〉], [〈 f j〉 ⇒ 〈maxminP( f j)〉]}. Both are conflict-
free, so we get maxmin({⇒ 〈 fi〉}) = {〈maxminP( fi)〉} and maxmin({⇒ 〈 f j〉}) =
{〈maxminP( f j)〉}, and by construction of C, maxmin({⇒ 〈 fi〉})≤maxmin({⇒ 〈 f j〉}).
Example 20. To demonstrate the encoding, consider the DMU problem P = (S,X ,F):
S = {Stagnation, Increase,Decrease}
X = {1,2,3,4}
F = { fal, fpl, fst , fco} with
fal = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 1,Decrease 7→ 4
fpl = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 3,Decrease 7→ 1
fst = Stagnation 7→ 3, Increase 7→ 1,Decrease 7→ 3
fco = Stagnation 7→ 2, Increase 7→ 2,Decrease 7→ 2
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Since X ⊆ R, the utility measure u is simply the identity function u(x) = x.
To encode P in a decision frame D = (K,C,R) as in the proof of Propage 7, we
first need to compute the result of maxminP for each of the actions fal , fpl , fst and fco.
maxminP( fal) = 1 maxminP( fpl) = 1
maxminP( fst) = 1 maxminP( fco) = 2
Therefore, K contains the following rules: K = { 〈 fal〉⇒ 〈1〉, 〈 fpl〉⇒ 〈1〉, 〈 fst〉⇒ 〈1〉,
〈 fco〉 ⇒ 〈1〉 }. The set of criteria is C = {〈1〉, 〈2〉}.
O, the set of options, contains one entry for each action: O = {{⇒ 〈 fal〉}, . . .}.
For each option o ∈ O, the set of arguments argsD(o) contains two arguments, one for
the option itself and one with a rule application: argsD({⇒ 〈 fal〉}) = {[⇒ 〈 fal〉], [[⇒
〈 fal〉];〈 fal〉 ⇒ 〈1〉;〈1〉]}. The claim of the rule application is a consequence in C. The
ordering of C is determined by the ordering of the range of maxminP. We therefore get
{⇒ 〈 fal〉} ≤maxminD {⇒ 〈 fco〉}
and so forth.
Proposition 7 is the DMU equivalent of Propage 1 on page 60. This is important,
because the two results together show that our model of decision frames subsumes both
multi-criteria decision making and decision making with uncertainty.
3.3.5 Decision Rules
Decision rules are useful both for selecting options and for analysing decisions after
the fact. In our use case – documenting engineering decisions – decision making itself
is a human task, so the second use case is much more relevant: Given a set of decisions
that make up a design, we can use decision rules to check how many decisions were
made optimistically, pessimistically etc.
In Propage 7, we saw how the maxmin function can be used to establish a rank-
ing of options. This was the first formal example of a decision rule. In this section
we will give a precise definition of the term and discuss some additional rules includ-
ing maxmin.We show that maxmin suffers from the so-called “drowning effect”, which
means that it may fail to distinguish options even though their consequences are equal
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only in some of the possible futures. We then define a second decision rule, lexmaxmin,
that solves this problem using a lexicographic criterion. We show that, while not suf-
fering from the drowning effect, lexmaxmin still fails to distinguish some options, and
propose a third rule that exploits some argumentation-specific properties to be even
more decisive.
Decision rules are mappings from decision frames and options to words over the
set of all consequences. We will denote the set of all consequences with C and its
partial order with ≤C . Consequently, the set of words over C will be called C ∗ (see
Definition 20 on page 38).
Definition 36. A decision rule ∆ is a function ∆ :D×O → C ∗
The function maxmin is already a decision rule, since it assigns a consequence
to each option (and thus produces words of length one). We write ∆maxmin to make
clear that we are talking about the decision rule: ∆maxmin(D,O) = [maxmin(D,O)]. If
maxmin(D,O) is undefined then ∆maxmin = ε .
Example 21. Recall the set of consequences C′ = { ¬damaged(t), coRes(t,high),
balanced(t), weight(t,high), damaged(t) } from Example 18 above. A decision
rule is any function that maps options to words over R. For example, it could re-
turn [coRes(t,high) balanced(t)] for an option where the most likely outcome is
coRes(t,high) and the second most-likely outcome is balanced(t).
To compare two options with a decision rule, one compares the words generated
for the two options using the lexicographic ordering of words over C with the underly-
ing partial order ≤C (see page 38).
Definition 37. Let ∆ be a decision rule. For every decision frame D, ∆ induces a partial
order of O on D as follows:
O≤D∆ O′ if and only if ∆(D,O) ∆(D,O′)
where  is the lexicographic ordering of words in C ∗. If O ≤D∆ O′ and O′ ≤D∆ O then
we write O =D∆ O
′.
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Example 22. Before we can compare O1 and O2 in our running example (Example 17),
we need to add some rules about the consequences of O2. The rules are listed in Table
3.6. In summary, the rules say that aluminium increases the weight of the component,
and aluminium bolts will definitely not damage the structure.
For O2 = {⇒ mat(bb,al),⇒ shim(t),⇒ varnish(t,1)} we get the following
arguments: argsD(O2) = {a1, . . . ,a6} with
a1 = [⇒ mat(bb,al)] a2 = [⇒ shim(t)]
a3 = [⇒ varnish(t,1)] a4 = [a1;r8;weight(t,high)]
a5 = [a2;r9;¬balanced] a6 = [a1;r9;¬damaged(t)]
As a result, there is only a single preferred extension in argsD(O2), containing
all arguments a1 to a6. This means there is no uncertainty about the consequences of
choosing O2. We then get ∆Dmaxmin(O2) = ¬damaged(t), because ¬damaged(t) is the
best outcome we can expect to achieve by choosing O2.
Using the ∆maxmin decision rule, O1 ≤D∆maxmin O2 and O2 D∆maxmin O1, because the
best consequence we are certain to get with O2 is ¬damaged(t), which is better than
coRes(t,high).
In Definition 36 and 37, the two tasks of evaluating an individual option and com-
paring two options are separated, but in existing work on decision making with un-
certainty, both tasks are performed in a single stepage The name maxmin hints at the
two steps: First find the minimum expected result of an option and then maximise this
value across all options. In our approach, minimisation is performed by the decision
rule ∆maxmin and maximisation happens in the partial order established by Definition
37.
The codomain of every decision rule ∆ is a language called L(∆). The key idea
Table 3.6: Additional rules for Example 22
Name Rule
r8 mat(bb,al)⇒ weight(t,high)
r9 shim(t)⇒¬balanced
r10 mat(bb,al)⇒¬damaged(t)
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in our approach is to compare decision rules by comparing their languages, in order to
abstract away from individual decision frames and options.
Definition 38 (Language of a decision rule). Let ∆ be a decision rule. The language
of ∆, L(∆) is the codomain of ∆:
L(∆) = {w ∈ C ∗ | ∃D ∈D .∃O ∈ O.w = ∆(D,O)}
The language of a decision rule ∆ therefore contains all words w over C for which
there is a decision frame D and an option O such that ∆ applied to D and O produces
the word w.
Proposition 8. For every w ∈ L(∆maxmin), |w| ≤ 1
Proof. Since maxmin (Definition 35) returns exactly one consequence, the words in
L(∆maxmin) are of length one, or 0 when maxmin is undefined.
We represent decision rules by their languages, the sets of words over consequencs
they can produce. In the next sections, we will look at two characteristics of decision
rules: Decisiveness and optimism. We give formal definitions of these concepts, eval-
uate ∆maxmin on them and propose improved rules that are more decisive and more
optimistic.
3.3.5.1 Decisiveness
Multiple options may be mapped to the same word and considered equal under
≤∆maxmin, even though their outcomes in possible worlds other than the worst one are
actually quite different. This phenomenon, known as the drowning effect, is a symp-
tom of a lack of decisiveness of decision rules. The drowning effect occurs when two
options are ranked equally even though they should not be, because they lead to dif-
ferent outcomes. Before we can define it formally, we need need to specify when two
options should be ranked equally. This is the case if they lead to the same possible
consequences, denoted by the equivalence relation ∼=D:
Definition 39. Let D = (K,C) be a decision frame and let O,O′ be two options with
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E = possibleWorlds(D,O) and E ′ = possibleWorlds(D,O′)
O∼=D O′ iff
⋃
E∈E
bestConsequence(E) =
⋃
E ′∈E ′
bestConsequence(E ′)
If a decision rule ∆ has the drowning effect, then it will rank two options O,O′ as
equal (O≤D∆ O′ and O′ ≤D∆ O) even though they are not equal under ∼=D.
Definition 40. A decision rule ∆ has the drowning effect if and only if there exists a
decision frame D and two options O,O′ ∈O such that ∆(D,O)=∆(D,O′) and OD O′.
Example 23. To demonstrate the drowning effect on maxmin, let us introduce a third
option O3 that will be ranked equal to O2, even though we can expect a slightly better
outcome from it. O3 = { ⇒ mat(bb,al), ⇒ shim(t), ⇒ varnish(t,2) }. The only
difference between O2 and O3 is that we apply two layers of varnish (varnish(t,2))
instead of one. This allows us to apply rule r7 = varnish(t,2)⇒ coRes(t,high) (see
Table 3.5 on page 65), resulting in the following arguments for O3. argsD(O3) =
a1 = [⇒ mat(bb,al)] a2 = [⇒ shim(t)]
a7 = [⇒ varnish(t,2)] a4 = [a1;r8;weight(t,high)]
a5 = [a2;r9;¬balanced] a6 = [a1;r9;¬damaged(t)]
a8 = [a3;r7;coRes(t,high)]
Let us now apply Definition 39 to see whether O2 ∼=D O3. Since both argsD(O2)
and argsD(O3) are conflict-free, E = possibleWorlds(D,O2) = {argsD(O2)} and E ′ =
possibleWorlds(D,O3) = {argsD(O3)}. Taking the best consequences of the possible
worlds of O2 and O3, we get
⋃
E∈E
bestConsequence(E) = {¬damaged,weight(t,high)}
⋃
E∈E ′
bestConsequence(E) = {¬damaged,weight(t,high),coRes(t,high)}
So because there is an argument for coRes(t,high) in at least one possible world of
O3, but not of O2, O2 is not D-equivalent to O3 (O2 D O3).
Proposition 9. ∆maxmin has the drowning effect
3.3. Argument-Based Decision Framework (ADF) 74
Proof. In Example 23, O2D O3, but maxmin(D,O2)= [¬damaged] =maxmin(D,O3),
so ∆maxmin has the drowning effect.
The decision rule maxmin can be repaired by considering not just the single best
minimum outcome, but also the second-best outcome, the third-best outcome and so
forth (see [53]). This is achieved through repeatedly evaluating the set of possible
worlds, removing the one with the “minimal outcome” each time. We are now going to
extend ∆maxmin, the argumentation-specific version of the rule, in similar fashion.
In order to be able to pick the possible world with the minimal outcome, we require
the lattice operation unionsq on C to have the property aunionsqb ∈ {a,b} - in other words, is must
be join-irreducible (cf. page 37). Also please note that ◦ denotes concatenation of
words (as defined on page 38).
Definition 41. Let D be a decision frame and let O be an option. ∆lexmaxmin(D,O) =
lmaxmin(possibleWorlds(D,O)) where
lmaxmin(E ) =

ε if E = /0
[c]◦ lmaxmin(E ′) otherwise, with
c = worstCase(E ) and
E ′ = E \{E ∈ E | c =⊔(consequences(E))}
The behaviour of ∆lexmaxmin for option O1 in Example 24 is an example of the
property that each one of the different “best consequences” of an option O appears
exactly once in ∆lexmaxmin(D,O), for any decision frame D:
Proposition 10. For every decision frame D and every option O, if E = possibleWorlds(D,O)
then
∆lexmaxmin(D,O) is a permutation of
⋃
E∈E
bestConsequence(E)
Proof. (Sketch) Let D be a decision frame and let O be an option. Let E =
possibleWorlds(D,O) and let w = [c1 . . .cn] = ∆lexmaxmin(D,O). (⊆:) By Defini-
tion 41, w = lmaxmin(E ). Let ci ∈ C with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By Definition 41, there
exists a E ′ ⊆ E such that ci = worstCase(E ′), so by Definition 34, there exists an
E ∈ E ′ such that c= bestConsequence(E), so ci ∈⋃E∈E bestConsequence(E). (⊇:) Let
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Example 24. For option O1 from Example 18, we get
∆lexmaxmin(D,O1) = lmaxmin(possibleWorlds(D,O1))
(see Example 17)
= lmaxmin({E1,E2})
(by Definition 41)
= [worstCase({E1,E2})]◦ lmaxmin(E ′)
(by Definition 34 and Example 18)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ lmaxmin(E ′)
(by Definition 41)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ lmaxmin({E1})
(by Definition 41)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ [worstCase({E1})]◦ lmaxmin(E ′′)
(by Definition 34 and Example 18)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ [¬damaged]◦ lmaxmin(E ′′)
(by Definition 41)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ [¬damaged]◦ lmaxmin( /0)
= [coRes(t,high)]◦ [¬damaged]◦ ε
(Simplify)
= [coRes(t,high)¬damaged]
showing that the guaranteed minimal outcome we can achieve by choosing O1 is
coRes(t,high), and the “almost guaranteed” (in all but the worst possible worlds)
minimal outcome is ¬damaged.
c∈⋃E∈E bestConsequence(E). To show that there is an i≤ n such that c= ci, consider
that there exists an E ∈ E such that c = bestConsequence(E). Definition 41 ensures
that for every E ∈ E , bestConsequence(E) appears exactly once in ∆lexmaxmin(E ), so
the ci exists and w is a permutation.
Lemma 1. ∆lexmaxmin(D,O) = ∆lexmaxmin(D,O′) if and only if O∼=D O′
Proof. ⇒: Let options O,O′ and a decision frame D s.t. ∆lexmaxmin(D,O) =
∆lexmaxmin(D,O′). Then by Propage 10 and Definition 39, O ∼=D O′. ⇐: Assume
options O,O′ and a decision frame D such that O ∼=D O′. Let w = ∆lexmaxmin(D,O)
and let w′ = ∆lexmaxmin(D,O′). Definition 41 Case 2 implies that the letters in any
word in L(∆lexmaxmin) are in strictly increasing order (over ≤C ), and since w and w′
contain the same letters (Propage 10 and Definition 39) w = w′.
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For the next result, recall that if S is a set and ∼ is an equivalence relation over S
then S/∼ is the set of equivalence classes of S (see page 37).
Theorem 2. For every decision frame D, ≤D∆lexmaxmin is a total order of O/∼=D
Proof. (Sketch) ≤D∆lexmaxmin is a total order if it is reflexive, antisymmetric, transi-
tive and defined on every pair O,O′ ∈ O . Reflexivity and antisymmetry follow from
Lemma 1. To show transitivity, let D be a decision frame and consider three op-
tions O1,O2 and O3 such that O1 ≤D∆lexmaxmin O2 and O2 ≤D∆lexmaxmin O3. Then, by
Definition 37, ∆lexmaxmin(D,O1)  ∆lexmaxmin(D,O2) and ∆lexmaxmin(D,O2) 
∆lexmaxmin(D,O3). By transitivity of , ∆lexmaxmin(D,O1)  ∆lexmaxmin(D,O3)
and therefore O1 ≤D∆lexmaxmin O3.
Corollary 1. ∆lexmaxmin does not have the drowning effect
Another way of comparing the decision functions ∆maxmin and ∆lexmaxmin is
by establishing a relationship between L(∆maxmin) and L(∆lexmaxmin), namely that
∆maxmin is a prefix of ∆lexmaxmin:
Proposition 11. For every decision frame D and every option O,
∆maxmin(D,O)v ∆lexmaxmin(D,O)
Proof. Let D be a decision frame, let O be an option and let w = [c1] ◦ w′ =
∆lexmaxmin(D,O). Then, by Definition 41, c1 = worstCase(possibleWorlds(D,O)).
Since worstCase(possibleWorlds(D,O)) =∆maxmin(D,O) (by Definition 35) the claim
holds.
The preceding discussion of the drowning effect in ∆maxmin leads to the general
question of how decisive a decision rule is. While we cannot assign a “degree of deci-
siveness”, we can say which of two decision rules is more decisive than the other one.
The more decisive a rule is, the fewer pairs of options are ranked equally by it.
Definition 42. Let ∆, ∆′ be two decision rules. ∆ is more decisive than ∆′ iff for every
decision frame D and for every pair of options O,O′: If O =D∆ O
′ then O =D∆′ O
′
If ∆ is more decisive than ∆′ and ∆′ is not more decisive than ∆, then we say ∆ is
strictly more decisive than ∆′.
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Theorem 3. ∆lexmaxmin is strictly more decisive than ∆maxmin
Proof. We first show that ∆lexmaxmin is more decisive than ∆maxmin, and then that
∆maxmin is not more decisive than ∆lexmaxmin. (1) Let D be a decision frame
and let O,O′ be options such that O =D∆lexmaxmin O
′. Let w = ∆lexmaxmin(D,O) =
∆lexmaxmin(D,O′). If w = ε then ∆maxmin(D,O) = ∆maxmin(D,O′) = ε so
O =D∆maxmin O
′. If w 6= ε then w = [c] ◦w′ for a c ∈ C . Consider v = ∆maxmin(D,O)
and v′ = ∆maxmin(D,O′). By Propage 8, |v|= |v′|= 1 and since both v and v′ are pre-
fixes of w (by Propage 11), v = v′ = [c], so O =D∆maxmin O
′. (2) Refer to the examples
for a counterexample
The definitions and results presented so far clarified the meaning of decisiveness
of decision rules, but the actual rules discussed were not novel (except for their trans-
lation to our argumentation-based model of decision making with uncertainty). With
∆smaxmin we will now study a novel decision rule that considers information which is
not available in the non-argumentative appproach.
Argument strength is a notion that is, by definition, only available in settings where
there are arguments. Several measures of argument strength have been developed in the
literature, based for example on abstract argumentation [55] or on additional informa-
tion about arguments such as preferences [56, 57]. The idea of argument strength is to
measure the “convincingness” of an argument numerically. At this point we will not
review all measures of argument strength, nor pick a specific one. Instead we are going
to use the number of arguments in favour of a claim as a proxy for the claim’s strength.
Counting arguments is generally dubious - we only use it here to give an example of
an argumentation-specific decision rule, not as a representative example of argument
strength.
With this in mind we simply set “strength” to be equal to the number of accepted
arguments in favour of it: strength(c,E) = |{a ∈ E | claim(a) = c}|.
First note that in L(∆lexmaxmin) and in L(∆maxmin), every word contains a con-
sequence at most once, and the letters of each word are ordered by preference (≤C ) in
descending order. The idea for expressing argument strength in decision functions is to
repeat claims backed by stronger arguments proportionately to their strength. Due to
the lexicographic ordering used in decision rules (Definition 37), words with repeated
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letters will be preferred over their single-letter counterparts.
This idea is the basis of the final decision rule ∆smaxmin (s for strength).
Definition 43. Let D be a decision frame and let O be an option.
∆smaxmin(D,O) = smaxmin′(possibleWorlds(D,O)) where
smaxmin′(E ) =

ε if E = /0
[c]n ◦ smaxmin′(E ′) otherwise, with
c = worstCase(E ) and
E ′ = E \{E ∈ E | c = bestConsequence(E)}
n = ∑E∈E ′ strength(c,E)
Example 25. With option O1 = {⇒ mat(bb,st),⇒¬shim(t),⇒ varnish(t,2)} in
our running example, we get ∆smaxmin(D,O1)= [coRes(t,high)coRes(t,high)¬damaged],
because the argument for coRes(t,high) is part of both possible worlds, E1 and E2.
The argument for ¬damaged is only part of one possible world.
Note that our Definition 43 applies the measure of argument strength to each ex-
tension E ∈ E ′. With our definition of strength, this amounts to counting the number of
arguments for c across all extensions (so the same argument may be counted multiple
times if it is in more than one extension).
Proposition 12. ∆smaxmin does not have the drowning effect
Proof. (Sketch) Proof analogous to proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
Proposition 13. ∆smaxmin is more decisive than ∆lexmaxmin.
Proof. (Sketch) Every claim in
⋃
E∈possibleWorlds(D,O) bestConsequence(E) has a
strength of at least 1, so lexmaxmin can be viewed as a special case of maxmin where
the strength of each claim is exactly 1. So whenever two options result in equal words
with smaxmin, they also result in equal words in lexmaxmin.
We conclude this section with two general results on the connection between in-
jectivity of a decision rule ∆ and its decisiveness. By injectivity of a decision rule
we specifically mean its injectivity for the same decision frame: A decision rule ∆ is
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option-injective if for every decision frame D, the function ∆D(x) =∆(D,x) is injective
(∆D is ∆ with the first argument fixed).
Proposition 14. If a decision rule ∆ is option-injective then it does not have the drown-
ing effect.
Proof. Assume a decision rule ∆ option-injective and assume ∆ has the drowning effect.
By option-injectivity of ∆, O∼=D O′ if and only if O = O′, so if OD O′ for a decision
frame D then O 6= O′ so ∆(D,O) 6= ∆(D,O′). This contradicts the assumption that f
has the drowning effect (Definition 40).
As one might expect, option-injectivity of decision rules acts as an upper bound
on decisiveness:
Theorem 4. If two decision rules ∆, ∆′ are option-injective then both are equally deci-
sive.
Proof. Assume two decision rules ∆,∆′ option-injective such that ∆ is strictly more
decisive than ∆′. Then there exists a decision frame D and two options O,O′ such that
(1) O=D∆′ O
′ and (2) O 6=D∆ O′. By option-injectivity of ∆, O 6=O′, but then by injectivty
of ∆′, O 6=D∆′ O′, which contradicts the assumption that ∆ is strictly more decisive than
∆′.
In this chapter we only used a simple measure of the strength of a claim – namely
the number of arguments in favour of it – in order to demonstrate how strength can
be reflected in the language of decision rules. However, any of the more sophisticated
measures proposed in the literature could be used in a similar way. Additionally, pro-
posals for probabilistic argumentation [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63] or argumentation with
belief values [64] can be harnessed to obtain quantitative decision making with uncer-
tainty in an argumentation-theoretic setting.
The ∆smaxmin rule (Definition 43) is also an example of how argumentation-
specific properties may be combined with existing decision rules for decision making
with uncertainty. This illustrates how decision rules such as ∆maxmin and ∆lexmaxmin,
which treat the argumentation system as a black box and only use its preferred exten-
sions, do not achieve the same decisiveness as, for example, ∆smaxmin. The language-
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based approach we advocate in this thesis enables decision makers to compare both
kinds of rules systematically.
3.3.5.2 Optimism
The ∆maxmin decision rule and its descendants ∆lexmaxmin and ∆smaxmin are rather
pessimistic since they pick the consequences that will be achieved with certainty (in all
possible worlds) rather than those that may only be achieved in one or two cases. A
more optimistic decision maker would compare options by their best consequences in
any possible world. For decision rules this means a rule ∆ is more optimistic than a rule
∆′ if it selects better consequences for the same option. Formally:
Definition 44. Let ∆,∆′ be two decision rules. ∆ is more optimistic than ∆′ if for every
decision frame D and every option O: ∆′(D,O) ∆(D,O)
The optimistic decision rule ∆maxmax can now be defined as
Definition 45. Let D be a decision frame and let O be an option.
∆maxmax(D,O) = unionsq{c ∈ C | ∃E ∈ possibleWorlds(D,O)
such that c = bestConsequence(E)}
Proposition 15. ∆maxmax is more optimistic than ∆maxmin.
Proof. (Sketch) Assume that the proposition is false. Then there exist D,O such
that ∆maxmax(D,O) ≺ ∆maxmin(D,O). Let [c] = ∆maxmin(D,O) and let [c′] =
∆maxmax(D,O). Then, by Definition 35, w is the worst outcome of all possible worlds
and by Definition 45, c′ is the best outcome. Since the best outcome is always greater
than or equal to the worst outcome, [c] [c′], so the assumption is false.
3.3.5.3 Summary
Let us briefly summarise our tour of decision making with uncertainty in ADF, and
specifically the topic of decision rules. Starting with the idea that uncertainty is man-
ifested in preferred extensions of an argument graph (Section 3.3.4 on page 63), we
translated the well-known maxmin decision rule into our ADF framework, demon-
strating that every decision-making with uncertainty problem formulated in the tradi-
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tional model can be expressed as an ADF in a way that maxmin gives the same results
(Propage 7).
Decision rules are important in the analysis of engineering design decisions be-
cause they allow us to classify past decisions by their optimism or other character-
istics. In support of this application we developed a theory of decision rules. Our
theory was built on a novel, language-based understanding of rules (see Definition 36
on page 70). We translated the two well-known rules maxmin and lexmaxmin into our
argumentation-theoretic setting, and proposed a new rule ∆smaxmin based on argument
strength. The decisiveness of decision rules is crucial for our use case, and we showed
that the three rules we studied have different degrees of decisiveness.
In the preceding paragraphs we developed a useful toolkit for analysing decisions.
This includes the identification of recommended options according to some formal
principles, and the classification of past decisions by the same principles. Using our
work, an engineering design manager will thus be able to say for example “two-thirds
of decisions in the last quarter were made rather optimistically” – a valuable piece of
information.
3.4 Accepting a Decision
The previous sections equipped us with the ability to weigh the different options of a
decision against each other in the presence of multiple decision criteria (Section 3.3.3)
and of multiple possible worlds (Section 3.3.4). We are now going to add the ability to
actually make a decision, which is also quite important. By making a decision we mean
adjusting the knowledge base to reflect the fact that an option was chosen. Afterwards,
the knowledge representing the chosen option should be part of the knowledge base, in
a way that all arguments pro the option are sceptically acceptable.
3.4.1 On the Deactivation of Rules in ASPIC+
Before we get to our actual goal (accepting a decision), we need to define a general
operation on ASPIC+ knowledge bases that will be required later: Enforcing a set of
arguments, which in turn relies on the operation of deactivating a defeasible rule r.
To enforce a set of arguments means to make it part of the grounded extension of an
argument graph, and to deactivate a rule means to make it unavailable for reasoning in
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accepted arguments (any arguments that use r defeated by an attacker whose conclusion
is ¬〈r〉). Both operations will be defined only in terms of additional rules that are
added to the knowledge base. They do not require the deletion of any knowledge.
Enforcement has been studied for abstract argument graphs [65, 66, 67, 68]. However,
no prior work exists on enforcement in the context of instantiated arguments, such as
with ASPIC+.
As an example, if a rule r1 expresses the assumption that all birds can fly (r1 =
bird(X)⇒ fly(X)) then r1 could be deactivated by adding the literal l = ¬〈r1〉 to
the knowledge base. The effect of l is that every argument which uses r1 is attacked
asymmetrically by the argument [¬〈r1〉]. Of course, r1 could also be attacked in a
specific context only: r2 = penguin(X)⇒ ¬〈r1〉.2 In this section we are interested
in a generic approach to deactivation, such as l. In contrast, rules such as r2 require
domain-specific knowledge and can therefore not be the result of a generic deactivation
that can be applied to any possible rule.
Deactivation of rules and enforcement of arguments are highly relevant for engi-
neering design. Since design processes are iterative, it is common to revisit previous
decisions when assumptions or external requirements have changed. In such cases it
is important to keep a record of the reasoning behind the original (changed) decision,
in order to prevent repeating the same mistakes, and for auditing purposes. Therefore,
the processes analysed in the next chapter have the property that while their underlying
knowledge bases grow monotonically, their sets of acceptable arguments do not. This
non-monotonicity requires us to override – that is, to make unavailable – rules without
actually removing them from the knowledge base.
Our proposal for deactivation and enforcement consists of two functions, which
we will define in this section: enforce and deactivate. enforce relies on the more fun-
damental operation, deactivate. If a rule r is deactivated then any argument that uses
it is attacked asymmetrically (by an argument with conclusion ¬〈r〉) and thus excluded
from any preferred extension.
In order to deactivate a rule r in ASPIC+, the deactivate operation defined below
(Definition 47) adds a rule r′ = ⇒¬〈r〉 with empty antecedent. Because r′ is itself a
2With either of l and r2, the argument using r1 is attacked by the grounded extension of the graph, so
¬fly(X) is sceptically acceptable. This is different from the classical penguin-fly example, where the
two conclusions fly(X) and ¬fly(X) each have a credulously acceptable argument.
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rule, it can be deactivated (and r re-activated) with another rule r′′= ⇒¬〈r′〉, resulting
in a chain of arguments in the corresponding argument graph. The chain acts as a record
of repeated de- and re-activations of r.
In other words, to enable a rule r, we need to “disable” all arguments whose con-
clusion is ¬〈r〉. By this definition, to activate a rule r is to un-deactivate its name 〈r〉.
Note that this does not guarantee the availability of r for arguments, it only means if an
argument uses r then it will not be defeated by default.
In this section we will find a correct definition of deactivate in several iterations,
by considering various candidates.
3.4.1.1 Naive Approach
The simplest definition of deactivate(r,KB) would be to add the literal ¬〈r〉 to the rules
in KB:
deactivate1(r,KB) = KB∪ ({¬〈r〉}, /0)
This will allow us to generate an argument for ¬〈r〉 which asymmetrically attacks any
argument that uses r, effectively deactivating r. However, there are two disadvantages
to this approach:
1. deactivate1 cannot be reversed easily (through adding more knowledge). We
could add another literal 〈r〉 to the knowledge base, but that would lead to a sym-
metric attack between it and the argument for ¬〈r〉 (assuming the contrariness
function behaves like classical negation), so any argument that uses r would be
acceptable in some preferred extensions and rejected in others, so its acceptabil-
ity would not be exactly the same as before applying deactivate.
2. deactivate1 implictly assumes that there are no arguments with conclusions 〈r〉 or
¬〈r〉 in KB (because if there were, either the new argument would be defeated, or
it would be engaged in a symmetric attack, so it would potentially be only cred-
ulously acceptable). Ideally the approach should work without any assumptions
about KB.
Example 26. To demonstrate why deactivate1 is not an adequate definition, consider
the ASPIC+ knowledge base KB1 = (R1,K1) with R1 = {r1}, r1 = a⇒ b and K1 =
{a,〈a⇒ b〉}. KB′1 = (R ′1,K ′1 ) = deactivate1(KB1,r1) withK ′1 =K1∪{¬〈r1〉} and
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a1 a2 a3 a4
Figure 3.5: Argument graph for Example 26
R ′1 =R1. The argument graph of KB
′
1 contains four arguments:
a1 = [a]
a2 = [a1;a⇒ b;b]
a3 = [¬〈r1〉]
a4 = [〈r1〉]
As shown in Figure 3.5, a3 attacks a2 and a4. a4 attacks a3. Therefore there are
two preferred extensions, {a1,a2,a4} and {a1,a3}. So the rule r1 is still used in a
credulously acceptable argument (a2) and deactivate1 did not work as intended.
3.4.1.2 Improvement
The first problem of deactivate1 is irreversibility. More precisely, the problem is that
the reversal of deactivate1 would produce a symmetric attack, since arguments can be
attacked asymmetrically only on their rules and the argument for ¬〈r〉 does not use any
rules, since ¬〈r〉 is a fact in KB′. This means that any definition of deactivate should
only add rules to the knowlege base, not facts. This is what deactivate2 does:
deactivate2(r,KB) = KB∪{⇒ ¬〈r〉}
In order to reverse the effect of deactivate2, we could add another rule ⇒ ¬〈⇒
¬〈r〉〉, which creates a defender of all arguments that use r. This solves the first issue,
but the second one still remains, in addition to a new problem:
1. deactivate2 can be reversed by adding a rule⇒¬〈⇒¬〈r〉〉 as described, but what
if r is to be de-activated again after that? Simply applying deactivate2 again is
not enough, since the rule it creates is already part of the knowledge base and it
therefore has no effect at all.
2. The second problem remains: deactivate2 implictly assumes that neither⇒¬〈r〉
nor⇒¬〈⇒ ¬〈r〉〉 can be derived from KB.
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We are getting closer to a solution, since problem 1 is now a special case of problem 2.
3.4.1.3 Final Definition
The discussion of deactivate2 indicated that the real definition of deactivate has to add
a new rule whose content depends on the argument graph of KB. This leads to the
following approach for deactivating a rule:
1. Let r′ = ⇒¬〈r〉3
2. Add r′ to the knowledge base
3. For each credulously acceptable attacker a ∈ A of the argument [;r′;¬〈r〉]:
(a) Deactivate topRule(a)
4. Repeat until no more rules are added.
Definition 47 is a straightforward translation of this recipe, except for step 4, which
is realised by recursion. deactivate delegates all work to deactivate′, which we will
define first:
Definition 46. Let r be a rule and let A be a set of ASPIC+-arguments.
deactivate′(r,A) = {r′}∪
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A)
deactivate′(topRule(a),A\{a})
with r′ =⇒¬〈r〉, and b = [;r′;¬〈r〉].
In Definition 46, the variables have the following intuitive meaning: r is the rule to
be deactivated by introducing a new argument b, A is the set of arguments with potential
attackers of b, r′ is the deactivating rule that enables b, and A′ contains all arguments
in A except the “offending” one, a (this guarantees termination as the recursive call is
made with a strictly smaller set than A). An example of deactivate′ can be found on
page 87 (Example 29).
You may have noticed that the function topRule, which we used in the definition of
deactivate′, is only defined for arguments that have a top rule, and undefined for literal
arguments such as [a] (cf. its definition on page 30). This is the reason why we only
3r and r′ stand for rules, not for rule names. If we want to refer to them in definitions we need to use
the naming function 〈·〉 which maps rules to elements of the languageL .
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consider knowledge bases without literals in this thesis (see discussion on page 32).
All literals are represented by defeasible rules of the form⇒ a, and instead of atomic
arguments [a] we have arguments [⇒ a].
With the previous definitions in place, deactivate itself is relatively simple:
Definition 47 (Deactivate). Let r be a rule and let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base.
deactivate(r,KB) = KB∪deactivate′(r,arguments(KB))
By this definition of deactivate (Definition 47), all acceptable attackers of r are
themselves attacked (through deactivation of their top rule). The recursion ensures that
all leaves of the dialectical tree for each “user” of r are attacked.
Example 27. We begin with a simple example. Consider the argumentation system
KB1 = {r1,⇒ a,⇒ b,⇒ c} where there is only one rule with non-empty antecedent,
r1 = a⇒ d. Then KB2 = deactivate(r1,KB1) = KB1∪{r′} where r′ =⇒ ¬〈r1〉. The
argument graph of KB2 contains five arguments, a1 = [⇒ a], a2 = [⇒ b], a3 = [⇒ c],
a4 = [a1;r1⇒ d] and a5 = [;⇒¬〈r1〉;¬〈r1〉]. a5 attacks a4 asymmetrically so the only
preferred extension is {a1,a2,a3,a5} which coincides with the grounded extension.
Example 28. An example with multiple preferred extensions, KB2 = {r1,r2,r3,⇒ a}
with r1 = a⇒ b, r2 = a⇒¬b and r3 = b⇒ c.
The arguments for KB2 are
a = [⇒ a]
b = [a;a⇒ b;b]
c = [a;a⇒¬b;¬b]
d = [b;b⇒ d;b]
with attacks as in Figure 3.6 (left) on p 87. Dashed lines indicate sub-argument re-
lations (transitive sub-arguments may be inferred, for example a is a sub-argument
of d). The graph on the left is of KB2 and the graph on the right is of KB′2 =
deactivate(KB2,r2).
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Figure 3.6: Argument graphs for Example 28.
a1a2a3 a4
Figure 3.7: Argument graph for Example 29.
There are two preferred extensions: E1 = {a,b,d} and E2 = {a,c}. In E2, rule r2
holds and in E1 it does not hold.
After deactivating rule r2 with KB′2 = deactivate(r2,KB2), we get the argument
graph shown in Figure 3.6 on the right. It contains all of KB2’s arguments plus a new
one, e with
e = [;⇒¬〈r2〉;¬〈r2〉]
Argument e attacks c and thus makes rule r2 unusable in any accepted arguments.
The preferred extension of KB′2’s argument graph now conincides with its grounded
extension and contains the arguments a,b,d and e.
Example 29. This example demonstrates how deactivate traverses all counter-
arguments, counter-counter arguments and so forth for each user of r1 (each argument
that uses r1). The original knowledge base (before applying deactivate) contained a
defeasible rule with empty antecedent,⇒ a, and two rules with non-empty antecedents:
r1 = a⇒ b
r2 =⇒¬〈⇒ ¬〈r1〉〉
If we compute deactivate(r1,KB), then a new rule r3 =⇒ ¬〈r1〉 will be added, dis-
abling r1. However, rule r2 (equal to ⇒ ¬〈r3〉) which is already in the knowledge
base now results in an argument that attacks all arguments which use r3. This is
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a1a2a3 a4a5
Figure 3.8: Argument graph for Example 29, part II.
why the definition of deactivate contains a recursive clause. Figure 3.7 shows the
resulting graph, after applying deactivate(r1,KB). The arguments are a1 = [⇒ a],
a2 = [a1;r1;b], a3 = [;r2;¬〈r3〉] and a4 = [;r3;¬〈r1〉]. Argument a4 was introduced by
the deactivate2 operation, but it is defeated by a3. This is the reason why deactivate
needs to examine the resulting argument graph again.
Therefore, deactivate(r1,KB) also contains the knowledge added by deactivate(r2,KB).
The final result of deactivate(r1,KB) is the following set of arguments:
a1 = [⇒ a]
a2 = [a1;r1;b]
a3 = [;⇒¬〈⇒ ¬〈r1〉〉;¬〈⇒ ¬〈r1〉〉] = [;r2;¬〈r3〉]
a4 = [;⇒¬〈r1〉;¬〈r1〉] = [;r3;¬〈r1〉]
a5 = [;⇒¬〈⇒ ¬〈⇒ ¬〈r1〉〉〉;¬〈⇒ ¬〈⇒ ¬〈r1〉〉〉]
And attacks a5→ a3→ a4→ a2. The grounded extension consists of a5,a4 and a1. The
graph is shown in Figure 3.8.
We conclude this example with a detailed description of how deactivate(r1,KB)
is computed. Let R′ = deactivate′(r1,arguments(KB)), so deactivate(r1,KB) = KB∪
KB′. Figure 3.9 on page 89 shows the computation of deactivate′ step by step.
3.4.2 Results on Deactivating Rules
3.4.2.1 deactivate Is Well-Defined
The first question we might like to answer about deactivate is whether it produces
finite output for finite input. Proposition 16 shows that the number of rules added to
the knowledge base by deactivate′ is indeed bounded, and that deactivate′ terminates
whenever it is applied to a finite set of arguments.
Proposition 16. For all sets of ASPIC+-arguments A and rules r, if A is finite, and
topRule(a) is defined for all a ∈ A, then deactivate′(r,A) is defined and finite.
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KB′ = deactivate′(r1,arguments(KB))
(Simplify)
= deactivate′(r1,{a1,a2,a3})
(Apply Definition 46; Let r3 =⇒¬〈r1〉 )
= {r3}∪
⋃
a∈attackers([;r3;¬〈r1〉],{a1,a2,a3})
deactivate′(topRule(a),{a1,a2,a3}\{a})
(attackers([;r3;¬〈r1〉],{a1,a2,a3}) = {a3})
= {r3}∪
⋃
a∈{a3}
deactivate′(topRule(a),{a1,a2,a3}\{a})
(Simplify)
= {r3}∪deactivate′(topRule(a3),{a1,a2})
(Simplify)
= {r3}∪deactivate′(r2,{a1,a2})
(Apply Definition 46; Let r4 =⇒¬〈r2〉)
= {r3}∪{r4}∪
⋃
a∈attackers([;r4;¬〈r2〉],{a1,a2})
deactivate′(topRule(a),{a1,a2}\{a})
(attackers([;r4;¬〈r2〉],{a1,a2}) = /0)
= {r3}∪{r4}
Figure 3.9: Application of deactivate′ for Example 29
Proof. In Definition 46, the recursive call to deactivate′ is with a set strictly smaller
than the original set A (namely the set A \ {a}), so deactivate′ terminates. In each
recursive step, exactly one rule is added (r′).
3.4.2.2 The deactivate Operation Works as Intended
The key to the following results is that deactivated rules are attacked asymmetrically,
by an argument with a premise-less defeasible rule. We first show that deactivate be-
haves as expected, that is, after applying deactivate(r,KB), there are no (credulously
or sceptically) acceptable arguments a with r ∈ rules(a). For that we require a result
about deactivate′ (Definition 46):
Proposition 17. Let r be a rule and let A be a set of ASPIC+ arguments such
that topRule(a) is defined for all a ∈ A. Let KB = deactivate′(r,A) and let A′ =
arguments(KB). For every argument a ∈ A, if topRule(a) = r then there exists an
argument b ∈ A′ such that
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1. b attacks a and
2. b is sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′)
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over the number of elements in A, the set of
arguments. In case |A|= 0, A= /0 so there are no arguments a∈ A with topRule(A) = r.
The actual induction proof starts with |A| = 1. Formally: Let A be a set of arguments.
For every n≥ 1 and for every rule r: Let A′ = arguments(deactivate′(r,A)). If |A|= n
then for every argument a ∈ A, if topRule(a) = r, then there exists an argument b′ ∈ A′
such that b′ attacks a and b′ is sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′).
Base case (n = 1) If |A| = 1 then A has exactly one argument, A = {a}. Let s =
topRule(a). If s 6= r then the claim holds trivially. Let r′ =⇒¬〈r〉, let b = [;r′;¬〈r〉].
By Definition 46, b ∈ A′. If s = r then b attacks a, and a does not attack b, so the claim
holds.
Induction step (n = k+ 1) Let a ∈ A such that topRule(a) = r. Let r′ =⇒ ¬〈r〉,
let b = [;r′;¬〈r〉]. By Definition 46, b ∈ A′, and b attacks a. It remains to show
that b is sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′). Either there exists an argument
a′ ∈ A such that a′ attacks b or not. If no such a′ exists, then b is sceptically ac-
ceptable and the claim holds. So we assume there is an a′ ∈ A such that a′ attacks
b. Then a′ ∈ attackers(b,A), so by Definition 46, deactivate′(topRule(a′),A \{a′}) ⊆
deactivate′(r,A). Let A′′ = arguments(deactivate′(topRule(a′),A \ {a′})). By the in-
duction hypothesis we know that there exists an argument b′ ∈ A′′ such that b′ is
sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′′). b′ ∈ A′ by Definition 46. We now show
that b′ is sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪ A′), which in turn means that b is
sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A ∪ A′), since b′ attacks a′. By Definition 46,
A′ = A′′ ∪ {a′}, so A∪A′ = A∪A′′ ∪ {a′} – in other words, the only difference be-
tween argGraph(A∪A′) and argGraph(A∪A′′) is the single argument a′. By Definition
46, b′ = [;⇒¬〈topRule(a′)〉;¬〈topRule(a′)〉], and because 〈·〉 is injective (by Cond. 2
on page 33), a′ does not attack b′, so b′ is sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′),
so b is also sceptically acceptable in argGraph(A∪A′).
The correctness proof of deactivate now follows directly from the correctness of
deactivate′, established in Propage 17.
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Proposition 18. Let r be a rule and let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base . Let E ∈
E = Σpr(argGraph(deactivate(r,KB))). Then, for all arguments a ∈ E : 〈r〉 /∈ rules(a)
Proof. By Definition 47, deactivate(r,KB) = KB∪ deactivate′(r,arguments(KB)), so
the claim follows from Propage 17.
Deactivating a rule that is already deactivated has no effect (that is, deactivate is
idempotent).
Proposition 19. For all knowledge bases KB = (R,K ) withK = /0 and for all rules
r, the following equation holds:
deactivate(r,KB) = deactivate(r,deactivate(r,KB))
The proof of Propage 19 can be found on the next page (page 92).
3.4.2.3 The deactivate Operation is Reversible
Further, every deactivation can be reversed. By reverse we mean that its effects can
be undone without deleting any knowledge – simply by adding knowledge, just like
the deactivate operation itself. Before we define reactivate in Section 3.4.3, we will
give one more result to show that an operation with the semantics of reactivate can be
defined.
Consider this situation: An initial knowledge base KB1 with a rule r, a second
knowledge base KB2 = deactivate(r,KB1) and a third knowledge base KB3 such that
KB3 contains KB2 and KB3 = reactivate(r,KB2) – that is, r is reactivated in KB3.
Any argument that used r in G1 = argGraph(KB1) should have the same status
(acceptability) in G3 = argGraph(KB3). However, G1 6= G3, because deactivating and
reactivating r left a trace in form of arguments and attacks. The preferred extensions
that existed in G1 will become subsets of preferred extensions in G3. Conversely, every
preferred extension in G3 subsumes a preferred extension from G1.
We call this relation of subsets a linear extension (see Definition 22 on page 39).
The following result shows that a linear extension of the preferred extensions of G1 can
always be obtained by adding knowledge to KB2. In other words, the status-changing
effect of deactivate, which resulted in KB2, can be reversed without losing the addi-
tional knowledge generated by deactivate in KB2.
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Proof. Let KB be a knowledge base and let r be a rule.
= deactivate(r,deactivate(r,KB))
(Definition 47, resolving the inner term deactivate(r,KB))
= deactivate(r,KB∪deactivate′(r,arguments(KB)))
(Definition 46; Let r′ =⇒¬〈r〉; Let b = [;r′;¬〈r〉]; Let A = arguments(KB))
= deactivate(r,KB∪{r′}∪
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A)
deactivate′(topRule(a),A\{a}))
(Let KB′ =
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A) deactivate′(topRule(a),A\{a}) )
= deactivate(r,KB∪{r′}∪KB′)
(Definition 47 )
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′∪deactivate′(r,arguments(KB∪{r′}∪KB′))
(Let A′ = arguments(KB∪{r′}∪KB′) )
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′∪deactivate′(r,A′)
(Definition 46 )
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′∪{r′}∪
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A′)
deactivate′(topRule(a),A′ \{a})
(Definition 46; attackers(b,A′) = attackers(b,A),
because attackers(b,arguments({r′}∪KB′)) = /0 and by Propage 3)
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′∪{r′}∪
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A)
deactivate′(topRule(a),A\{a})
(Definition of KB′)
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′∪{r′}∪KB′
(Simplification)
= KB∪{r′}∪KB′
(Definition of KB′ )
= KB∪{r′}∪
⋃
a∈attackers(b,A)
deactivate′(topRule(a),A\{a})
(Definition 46 )
= KB∪deactivate′(r,A)
(Definition 47 )
= deactivate(r,KB)
Figure 3.10: Proof of Propage 19
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Proposition 20. Let r be a rule and let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base. Let KB′ =
deactivate(r,KB). Then there exists a knowledge base KB′′ such that KB′ ⊆ KB′′ and
Σpr(argGraph(KB′′)) is a linear extension of Σpr(argGraph(KB))
Proof. (Sketch) The reversal operation is similar to the original deactivate, except that
this time the rules r′ are the ones that are deactivated.
The definition of deactivate (Definition 47) has the advantage that it can easily be
reversed by adding even more formulae to the knowledge base. Instead of deactivating
the users and defenders of r, we simply have to deactivate the rule that deactivates r.
Definition 48. Let r be a rule and let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base.
reactivate(r,KB) = deactivate(⇒¬〈r〉,KB)
Example 30. Recall the knowledge base KB′ from Example 28 on page 86: KB′ =
({⇒ a,r1,r2,r3,r4}, /0) with
r1 = a⇒ b r2 = a⇒¬b
r3 = b⇒ c r4 =⇒¬〈r2〉
Rule r4 is the result of deactivating r2. We can reactivate r2 as follows:
KB′′ = reactivate(r2,KB′) = deactivate(⇒¬〈r2〉,KB′)
(⇒¬〈r2〉= r4)
= deactivate(r4,KB′)
(Apply Definition 47)
= KB′∪{⇒ ¬〈r4〉}
The resulting argument graph is shown in Figure 3.11. There are two preferred ex-
tensions, E1 = { f ,c,a} and E2 = { f ,b,d,a}. In the original graph based on KB,
before r2 was deactivated and reactivated, there were two preferred extensions: {a,c}
(subset of E1) and {a,b,d} (subset of E2). Since every preferred extension in the orig-
inal graph is subsumed by a preferred extension in KB′′, and likewise every preferred
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a
b
c
d
ef
Figure 3.11: Argument graph for reactivation, see Example 30
extension in KB′′ subsumes a preferred extension of the original graph, it holds that
Σpr(argGraph(KB′′)) is a linear extension of Σpr(argGraph(KB)), as per Propage 20.
The argument of deactivate in Definition 48 is exactly the rule that was added by
deactivate before. An application of reactivate(r,KB) will result in (at least) one new
rule
r′ = ⇒¬〈⇒ ¬〈r〉〉
The new rule r′ is interesting, because it looks like a double negation of (the applica-
bility of) r. Its meaning however is different from double negation in classical logic,
because from the inclusion of r′ in a knowledge base we cannot infer that r is available
(i.e. r ∈R).
3.4.3 Enforcing a Point of View
Before we end this section we will enhance the definition of reactivate (Definition 48)
to define an enforce operation - a function that takes a set of arguments A and disables
their attackers, so that A becomes a subset of the grounded extension (if there are no
attackers of A, it is already a subset of the grounded extension).
Definition 49 (Enforce). Let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base, let A = args(KB) and
let B⊆ A.
enforce(B,KB) = KB∪
⊔
a∈attackers(B,A)
deactivate(topRule(a),KB)
Proposition 21. For all ASPIC+ knowledge bases KB and for all A⊆ args(KB), KBv
enforce(A,KB)
Proof. (Sketch) deactivate (Definition 47) only uses the set union operation ∪ and
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enforce (Definition 49) is the union of a repeated application of deactivate, so the orig-
inal knowledge base KB is always part of the result enforce(A,KB).
Furthermore, if the set of arguments A is conflict-free, then A will be a subset of
the grounded extension after applying enforce(A,KB). This is the defining property of
enforce.
Proposition 22. For all ASPIC+ knowledge bases KB and for all B ⊆ args(KB), if
attacks(B) = /0 then B⊆ Σgr(argGraph(enforce(B,KB)))
Proof. Let KB be an ASPIC+ knowledge base, let (A,Att) = argGraph(KB) and let
B ⊆ arguments(KB) such that B is conflict free, that is B×B∩Att = /0. Let KB′ =
enforce(B,KB) and let (A′,Att ′) = argGraph(KB′). Let {E}= Σgr(A′,Att ′).
Proof by contradiction. Assume there is an argument a ∈ B such that a /∈ E. Then
there exists an argument b ∈ A′ such that (b,a) ∈R ′ such that there is no c ∈ E with
(c,b) ∈R ′ (i.e. b is not attacked by the grounded extension). Since b ∈ attackers(B)
andK = /0, we know b = [. . . ;r;c] for some rule r.
Then deactivate(topRule(b),KB)= deactivate(r,KB)⊆KB′. By Propage 17 there
is an argument c∈ arguments(KB′) such that c attacks b and c is sceptically acceptable.
This contradicts the assumption that b is not attacked by an argument in the grounded
extension, so the claim holds.
The function enforce(A,KB) is a convenient way of “promoting” a conflict-free
set of arguments to be sceptically acceptable by adding rules to an ASPIC+ knowledge
base.
3.4.4 Accepting a Decision
In this section we demonstrate how enforce can be used to “make a decision” – more
specifically, to update a knowledge base after a decision has been made by the design
team. This is achieved by making the selected option and its consequences part of the
grounded extension.
Accepting a decision involves two steps. First, after choosing an option O, we
need to determine which of the possible worlds in possibleWorlds(D,O) best models
the actual circumstances. This means we have to select a preferred extension E ∈
Σpr(argsD(O),attacks(argsD(O))). Then, we use the enforce operation (Definition 49)
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to extend D’s knowledge base so that it contains the knowledge to make all arguments
in E sceptically acceptable.
Definition 50 (Making a Decision). Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame, let O ∈ O
be an option, and let E ∈ Σpr(argsD(O),attacks(argsD(O))).
decideD(O,E) = enforce(E,K∪O)
Definition 50 produces a new knowledge base K′. Because of the way deactivate
is defined in Definition 47, K ⊆ K′, and because of Propage 22, the chosen set of
arguments E is part of the grounded extension of the result.
Proposition 23. Let D = (K,C,R) be a decision frame, let O ∈ O be an option, and
let E ∈ Σpr(argsD(O),attacks(argsD(O))). Let KB′ = enforce(E,K∪O) and let {E ′}=
Σgr(argGraph(KB′)). Then E ⊆ E ′.
Proof. Since E is a preferred extension, E is conflict-free, so by Propage 22, E is a
subset of the grounded extension of KB′, so the claim holds.
Example 31. Assume that we decide to go with option O1 from Example 17 - that is,
with O1 = {mat(bb,s−t),¬shim(t),varnish(t,2)}. We also learned that out of the
two possible worlds E1 and E2, the first one was correct - so the oversized bolts do not
damage the structure (through microscopic fractures). We want to adjust the knowledge
base C to reflect our decision, and the consequences it had. Recall that the arguments
are E1 = {a1,a3,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9} as shown in Table 3.7 below. We therefore compute
decideD(O1,E1) = enforce(E1,K∪O1)
= K∪{⇒ ¬〈r2〉,⇒¬〈r4〉}
The two added rules⇒¬〈r2〉 and⇒¬〈r4〉 effectively deactivate the second possible
world E2. We can now use this knowledge base in any subsequent decisions, allow-
ing us to re-use both the justifications for choosing O1 and the knowledge that of all
possible worlds it was E1 which was correct.
The example was based on the assumption that we learned which of the possible
worlds was the real one. This allowed us to choose one of the preferred extensions and
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enforce it, as in the definition of decide. However, even if we had had this information,
we could have used decide to enforce the arguments of the grounded extension to the
knowledge base.
3.5 Related Work
Decision making with argumentation has been the focus of much recent work (see
Carstens et al. [69] for a survey). The existing work on argument-based decision mak-
ing primarily covers multi-criteria decision analysis. The literature can be divided into
two parts: Some approaches [70, 23, 31] start with an existing (multi criteria) decision
making formalism and translate it into an argumentation system. The second category
is work that extends an argumentation system with notions of options and arguments
for and against those options (e.g. [33, 28, 29]), often involving a representation result
with existing decision making formalisms.
Our work falls into the second category. While we base our model on an analysis
of MCDM and DM, the data (input) of a concrete decision problem is not required to be
formulated as an MCDM or DM problem. We also have two representation results, one
for the DM case (Propage 7) and one for the MCDM case (Theorem 1), but in contrast
with the existing work it contains a novel decision rule based on argumentation-specific
properties (smaxmin), making it strictly more powerful than approaches that achieve
exactly the same results as the non-argumentative systems they are based on. In addi-
tion, we address additional requirements related to decision processes: Re-usability of
formal models, and the ability to automatically determine the consequences a decision
has on subsequent decisions. This is the content of the next chapter. In the following
we will review some existing work in detail.
Table 3.7: Arguments to be enforced in Example 31
Name Content
a1 [a8,a3;r1;balanced(t)]
a3 [a5;r3;¬damaged(t)]
a5 [;r5;¬microscopic fractures]
a6 [a7;r6;bolts strong]
a7 [mat(bb,s−t)]
a8 [¬shim(t)]
a9 [varnish(t,2)]
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3.5.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
3.5.1.1 Decision Making With ABA
The ABA argumentation system has been used as the foundation for argument-based
decision making in several papers by Matt et al. [31] as well as Fan, Toni et al. [24,
70, 30].
In [70], decisions are modeled using structured arguments in the ABA system [47].
Here the argumentation formalism is used only as an interpretation of the actual deci-
sion model, which consists of a set of decisions, a set of goals and two tables relating
decisions to goals. The proposal takes up ideas from earlier work on decision making
with ABA [31]. It is extended to cover preferences over sets of goals (as opposed to
just individual goals) and applied to an extensive case study from the medical domain
in [24]. In [30], a similar ABA-based decision framework is used for collaborative
decision making with two agents, each with a set of goals and decisions.
The paper [31] uses ABA for multi-criteria decision making. Three decision rules
are discussed: (Weak) dominance, degree of admissibility, and relative value of a de-
cision. Dominance is the usual weak dominance principle where option A dominates
option B if every one of the goals provided by B is also provided by A. A multi-criteria
decision making system is given and translated to ABA in a way that dominating deci-
sions result in admissible arguments.
Degree of admissibility takes into account how many of an argument’s incoming
attacks are symmetric. The ratio of symmetric attacks within all attacks is called degree
of admissibility. Since dominant decisions are admissible and admissible decisions
always have the highest degree of admissibilty (namely 1), this second decision rule
increases the decisiveness for non-dominant options.
The last decision rule, relative value, combines degrees of admissibility with nu-
merical weights of goals. Such weights can be used to distinguish goals and play a role
similar to the ranking of consequences ≤C in our framework.
The argumentation formalism of [31] is ABA and the decision problems it solves
are for MDCM only. These differences notwithstanding, the second decision rule it
introduces (degree of admissibility) seems to be promising for our approach too, as it
potentially allows for a greater decisiveness than the traditional dominance principle in
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multi-criteria decision making. The extension of our framework to handle multi-criteria
decision making alongside decision making with uncertainty is a subject of future work.
Comparing our system with the more recent work by Fan et al. [70], their decision
rules are defined on the table-based decision model only,4 which means that the expres-
siveness gained from using an argumentation formalism is not put to use in the decision
making. Therefore the value added by the argumentation system is that decisions are
explained by arguments. However, those arguments always have the same structure
because of the translation into ABA. The use of argumentation does not enable any
decision rules in addition to the ones defined on the tabular model.
3.5.1.2 Other Approaches
Dimopoulos [29] covers multi-criteria decision making with argumentation, introduc-
ing a new decision rule called regime. Under this rule, an option A1 is preferred over an
option A2 if the criteria in which A1 outranks A2 are more important than those in which
A2 outranks A1. The regime rule is applied to decision making with abstract arguments.
Applying the regime rule to our decision making framework is left for future work.
At first sight, the rule seems more interesting than, for example, strict and weak domi-
nation, because it allows to make more comparisons (i.e. it is more decisive).
An interesting approach to argumentation in decision making is presented by
Visser [23]. An existing formalism for qualitative multi-criteria decision making, QPS
(Qualitative Preference Systems) is translated to an argumentation language. The aim
of a QPS is to determine preferences between outcomes, using a combination of primi-
tive criteria and compound criteria. The latter are divided into cardinality criteria (pre-
ferring an outcome if it meets a larger number of criteria) and lexicographic criteria
(preferring an outcome if it meets a single more important criterion).
The argumentation language in which QPS are modeled has a fixed set of primi-
tives and inference rules. The primitives can be used to describe the QPS (for example,
to say that c is a cardinality criterion with subcriteria c1,c2). The inference rules cod-
ify how preferences are derived in QPS. Arguments about preferences are built from
an object language and inference rules and evaluated using dialectical trees. The cor-
respondence between preferences in QPS and preferences in the argumentation system
4In fact the translation of the table-based model into ABA depends on the choice of decision rule
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is proved.
The second part of the paper [23] concerns reasoning with background knowledge.
It adds domain-specific rules to the object language and a defeasible modus ponens
inference rule to the meta language.
To compare the work of [23] with our own work, we first discuss the differences in
the argumentation formalisms. Our proposal uses ASPIC+ whereas [23] uses a custom
language for expressing preferences. The two works also have different semantics as
we use Dung’s argument graphs whereas [23] uses dialectical trees.
Further differences between the two proposals can be found on a more conceptual
level. [23] is a multi-criteria approach whose input is a set of preferences over outcomes
and a hierarchy of criteria, from which a larger set of preferences over outcomes is
derived. We on the other hand propose a system for decision making with uncertainty
that takes as input an ordered set of consequences and some background knowledge
describing how those consequences may come about, and produces as output a ranking
of options. The focus of [23] is on how to produce the ordered set of consequences,
which we assume to exist already.
The approach by Baroni et al. [71, 72] is closely related to our proposal because
it covers the same domain, namely engineering debates. In [72] a new argumentation
system is developed which combines bipolar argumentation with the IBIS framework
for design documentation. Their method assigns a numeric score to each option by
using a scoring function, a concept similar to the aggregate function we saw in multi-
criteria decision making. The aggregate function proposed in [72] can potentially be
applied to our own work as well. Conversely, our approach extends to decision making
with uncertainty (about the state of the world), which is not covered by theirs.
Evripidou et al. [73] describe a system for collaborative decision support in de-
sign. The system combines argumentation theory with case based reasoning and ontol-
ogy techniques to provide a comprehensive platform for analysing debates of individual
issues and retrieving relevant information from past decisions.
3.5.2 Decision Making With Uncertainty
Decision making with uncertainty in the context of abstract argumentation has been
studied in several papers by Amgoud and Prade [33] and Amgoud et al. [28].
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Besides the fact that we require a logic-based argumentation framework – in order
to be able to make inferences (see page 42 in Chapter 2) – there are several differ-
ences in the interpretation of possible worlds and how they relate to the acceptability
of arguments, which we are going to explain in detail.
In [28], abstract argument graphs are used for a decision making system with
uncertainty. In their system, there are two distinct sets of arguments: practical argu-
ments and epistemic arguments. Epistemic arguments represent the possibly inconsis-
tent knowledge from which practical arguments for options are made upage All prac-
tical arguments are in a positive relation to options, that is, they are arguments pro
but never arguments con. Practical arguments cannot support more than one option,
which is reflected in the attacks relation between practical arguments: If two practical
arguments support two different options then they attack each other. This leads to an
argumentation system that (in its practical arguments) has symmetric attacks only.
Every option is assigned a status of sceptical, universal, argued, credulous, rejected
or non-supported. This status is determined by the status of practical arguments in
favour of that option. The status of practical arguments in turn is determined by the
number and kind of extensions an argument belongs to. For example, a sceptically
accepted argument belongs to every preferred extension. This implies that a system
with symmetric attacks only does not have any sceptically accepted arguments (unless
the attacks relation is empty).
Attacks are turned into defeats using a preference relation over arguments, which
results in the resolution of symmetric attacks unless the two arguments involved cannot
be compared. The preference relation has great impact on the extensions of the argu-
ment graph and thus on the ranking of options. In spite of its importance, the preference
relation is not formally specified. In the examples, preferences between arguments are
derived from (a) preferences of goals and (b) likelihood of states of the world, but this
is done ad hoc (as evidenced by the fact that neither states of the world nor goals play
a role in the formal definitions).
The approach [33] deals with uncertainty and preferred extensions. It does so by
using preferred semantics (unless stable extensions exist) and defines arguments to be
acceptable if they are in every extension. However, this is problematic if a mutual
attack cannot be resolved. Consider the classical “umbrella” example: It may rain or it
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may not rain with equal likelihood and we have to decide whether to take an umbrella.
Apart from the two goals “staying dry” and “not carrying extra weight” we want to
look respectable because we are going to a funeral. Unfortunately we only have a
colourful children’s umbrella. Now there are two arguments for leaving the umbrella
and only one for taking it, so intuitively we would decide against taking the umbrella.
If we modeled the decision using the system of [33], both options would have the
same number of arguments pro: zero. This is because neither argument pro is in every
preferred extension.
Of course one can usually determine whether it is more likely to rain or not, but
in complex decision problems the probabilities or even relative likelihoods are often
impossible to assign. In that case it is common to assume equal probabilities for all
outcomes, a principle known as “tallying” (which we applied in Section 3.3.5 on deci-
sion rules).
In order to represent multiple possible worlds in the system of [33], they would
have to be made part of the options. This has two disadvantages: There is a growth of
the number of options (e.g. two possible actions to choose from and two possible states
of the world result in four options) and, since arguments are for or against options, they
can now be for or against states of the world, conflating the original problem of decision
making with the tangential problem of determining the state of the world. In contrast,
our system uses preferred extensions to separate states of the world from options.
By delegating the definition of this preference relation, the system of [28] therefore
fails to answer the question of how goals, knowledge and possible worlds influence the
ranking of options.
In summary, the proposal [28] differs from our approach in the following ways.
(1) We instantiate arguments with knowledge whereas they use abstract arguments.
(2) We explicitly consider consequences (goals) and have a formal notion of states of
the world. (3) The ranking of options in our system is ultimately determined by the
knowledge available and by the ranking of consequences (goals), whereas in [28] it is
determined by a preference relation over arguments that has to be supplied as the input.
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3.5.3 Qualitative Decision Theory
Qualitative decision theory is not concerned with formal methods of argumentation,
but we review it here briefly because it highlights some of the limitiations of the non-
numeric approach to decision making under uncertainty. In particular we review the
work of Didier Dubois et al. on qualitative decision theory ([74, 54, 75]).
In Dubois et al. 2002 [54], a purely symbolic approach to decision making under
uncertainty is investigated. Symbolic in this context means that neither the probabilities
of possible worlds, nor the decision maker’s preferences are quantified (our approach
falls into the same category). The article compares the symbolic approach with the
probabilistic approach to decision making under uncertainty, and comes to the rather
negative conclusion that “purely symbolic approaches to both rational and practically
useful criteria for decision making under uncertainty have serious limitations in terms
of expressive power” [54, page 483], because the necessary rationality conditions im-
pose great limitations on the likelihood ordering of possible worlds.
In a subsequent journal article [75] Dubois et al. extend the qualitative decision
making framework introduced in [54] to a full-fledged axiomatic approach to qualita-
tive decision theory with preference relations and comparative uncertainty.
It is clear from [54, 75] that a purely symbolic “version” of Savage’s [10] decision
theory is either very limited in the models it admits, or produces undesirable output (i.e.
with an intransitive ordering of actions). The natural question to ask now is whether
our own decision making framework is open to similar criticism. We can answer it by
comparing our approach to qualitative decision theory in Dubois’ sense in more detail.
The decision framework in [54] tries to stay as close as possible to Savage’s original
definitions by replacing the requirement for quantified probabilities and preferences
with a (weaker) requirement for orderings on both dimensions. As a result, there is a
two-tiered model of probabilities, where possible worlds are sets of atomic events, and
it is the ordering of events that determines the ordering of possible worlds (possibly
resulting in cycles such as a > b > c > a). In our system we adopt a different notion
of possible world: It is the set of preferred extensions of an argument graph G (see
Definition 32). Possible worlds in our work are therefore an epistemic concept, based
purely on the acceptability of sets of arguments. Further, we do not assume an ordering
of possible worlds - the only place where we make assumptions about the elements of
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a possible world is in Section 3.3.5.1 where the number of possible worlds in which an
argument is acceptable is taken as a measure of the strength of that argument. By re-
moving the need to partially order events (as the constituent parts of possible worlds in
Dubois’ sense) we avoid the problem of circularities in the ordering of actions, because
we do not need to combine the two scales, events and preferences. In probabilistic
decision theory, this “combination” of the two scales is achieved through multiplica-
tion, resulting in expected utilities. In qualitative decision theory, the “combination” is
exactly what causes the inconsistencies mentioned above.
3.5.4 Enforcement
The issue of enforcement has been addressed both on the level of abstract argumenta-
tion (e.g. [65]) and in terms of concrete argumentation systems [76].
Cˇyras and Toni [76] address enforcement indirectly, as part of an investigation of
non-monotonic inference properties in ABA. They define two properties – cumulative
transitivity and cautious monotonicity – and study them under different semantics in
ABA. The paper then deals with confirmation of assumptions, which means deleting
an assumption ψ from the set of assumptions and adding a defeasible rule with conclu-
sion ψ instead. The difference to our work is that we are interested in purely additive
information changes, i.e. achieving status change without the deletion of arguments.
On the other hand, we only consider two semantics (grounded and preferred), and did
not study cumulative transitivity and cautious monotonicity in our setting.
3.5.4.1 Argumentation-Based Belief Revision
Enforcement is also related to belief revision. Within argumentation, belief revision has
been addressed for abstract argumentation [67, 77, 78], agent-based argumentation [79,
80], probabilistic argumentation with DeLP [81, 82] and possibilistic argumentation
with fuzzy labels [83].
Belief revision in abstract argumentation is achieved by modifying the set of ar-
guments or the set of attacks of an abstract argument graph. Since the arguments in
abstract graphs are devoid of content and their only interaction is captured in the at-
tacks relation, one can add arguments and attacks as required, and the challenge for
belief revision approaches is to find the best (usually minimal in some sense) of all
possible changes that achieve the desired goal.
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In our approach, we work with structured arguments in the ASPIC+ framework.
The graph of arguments and attacks is a product of the knowledge base, and so any
changes to it have to be expressed as changes to the knowledge base. This is why we
imposed a number of constraints on the ASPIC+ systems used in this thesis (see Section
2.3.2 on page 32). Our contribution to the field is therefore to establish the parameters
that allow enforcement in ASPIC+.
3.5.4.2 Dynamics of Argumentation Systems
Our development of enforce and related operations was driven by the requirement to
change the status of a set of arguments from credulously accptable to sceptically ac-
ceptable. The change of status of an argument after updating an argumentation system
has been researched under the term argument dynamics [84], or dynamic argumenta-
tion frameworks [85]. Similar to the work on belief revision discussed above (a lot
of builds upon argument dynamics), these approaches focus abstract argumentation or
DeLP [86, 87]. While our work is aimed at (a subset of) the ASPIC+ system, it would
be interesting to compare it with prior work on DeLP and ultimately position it in the
framework of belief revision, similar to the approach taken in [81].
3.6 Conclusion
We will now discuss how ADF meets the five requirements that were set in section
3.2.4, and then review how the developments of this chapter prepare us to analyse
decision processes, sequences of decisions, in the next chapter.
3.6.1 Discussion
In Section 3.2.4 we laid out five shortcomings of the traditional, non-argumentation
based approach to decision making in light of knowledge reusability. Our decision
framework ADF addresses these five points:
1, Opaque resoning process Preferred decisions in ADF are backed by arguments.
Those arguments are part of grounded extensions of an argument graph generated from
a knowledge base and are therefore based on a formal model of the domain. This
model is part of the ADF, which means outside of that knowledge base, no additional
information is needed to reproduce the reasoning process.
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2, Local optimum With the notion of recommended decisions in ADF, a decision
maker does not have to enumerate the possible decisions manually. Rather, they are
the decisions are defined by the knowledge base. The problem of identifying possible
decisions has thus been replaced by the problem of modeling the domain.
3, Proprietary documentation formats Since ADF relies on a formal language with
an inference mechanism, it may easily be transformed to any logic-based model of
knowledge, for example an ontology. Ontologies, which are based on description log-
ics, are a widely used method of recording domain knowledge. Conversely, domain
knowledge from an ontology can be transformed into ADF rules. Williams and Hunter
[25] describe how knowledge from an ontology can be used in the argumentation pro-
cess.
4, Manual analysis With the domain knowledge represented as rules used in argumen-
tation, automated decision analysis is possible as discussed in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.
5, Costly retrieval of documentation For ADF systems, the problem of re-evaluating
previous decisions depends mainly on the data structure chosen for the knowledge base,
because it is sufficient to retrieve the relevant rules and assumptions from previous
decisions. It is not necessary to perform the entire analysis again.
In Section 3.2.3, we presented decision reusability and claims management as
two use cases for documentation in the aerospace industry. Both require a formal,
structured documentation of decisions. If an argumentation based system is used for
decision making, then the documentation could be generated by the same system with
no additional cost, since the arguments used by the system to evaluate decisions are,
at the same time, formal justifications of decisions. Because they are structured (as
determined by the contents of the knowledge base), they can easily be converted into a
structured format for documentation, for example an ontology.
In this chapter we developed an argumentation-based model of decision making
that combines decision making with uncertainty with multi-criteria decision making.
We now have the building blocks needed to model sequences of decisions: We can
evaluate options according to how well they meet our criteria under scenarios, and we
can adjust our knowledge base after making a decision.
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3.6.2 Future Work
The interplay between the logic based on which arguments are formed, and the ac-
ceptability of arguments – as determined by argument graph semantics – looks to be
a promising area for future work in argumentation in general [88], and this is also the
case for our application of the theory in the domain of decision making.
We see opportunities for future work mainly in the area of decision making with
uncertainty (Section 3.3.4). First, we want to extend our notion of possible worlds
(Definition 32) with a degree of probability - whether qualitative as in the work of
Dubois [75], or quantitative, using classical probability theory or one of the weaker
alternatives proposed in the AI literature. Since possible worlds in our understanding
are the same as preferred extensions and thus sets of arguments, assigning probabilities
to them may create an interesting dynamic with the underlying knowledge base. This
work can build on recent proposals for probabilistic argumentation (e.g. [60, 61]).
A second and related concern is the relationship between probabilities of possible
worlds, and the utilities of goals. In the purely symbolic setting of [54], this relationship
was the source of some problems related to the consistency of the system’s output. It
would be interesting to investigate if the fact that our decision problems are generated
from a knowledge base allows us to solve some of those problems, based on the fact
that arguments (and extensions) are internally consistent.
In the area of multi-criteria decision making (Section 3.3.3), we want to improve
the definition of satD (Definition 29), the function determining how many criteria are
met. In this thesis, sat simply returns a set of criteria that are achieved by a given
option, and does not distinguish the criteria any more. Therefore, the notion of domi-
nated options (Definition 30) can only be applied if an option O satisfies all of another
option O’s criteria, which seems to be relatively rare in practice. We want to consider
additional means of summarising the outcome of an option, similar to the way an ag-
gregation function agg can be defined in the traditional approach to MCDM (Definition
23).
In the area of enforcement and deactivation of rules, we are planning to compare
our proposal with the work on enforcement in abstract argumentation [65, 66, 67, 68],
and to position them within the wider field of belief revision.
Chapter 4
Argument-based Decision Process
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we developed an argumentation-based model for decision making, tak-
ing into account the need to balance several criteria as well as uncertainty about the
outcome of options. In our framework we also have the ability to adjust a knowledge
base once a decision has been made, so that knowledge which used to be only one of
several options becomes part of the “safe” core of the knowledge base (the grounded
extension).
Let us now take a step back and take another look at our goals set out in the intro-
duction. We want to describe not just individual design decisions, but entire processes
consisting of many decisions.
A lot of uncertainty exists in design processes [6], not only on the level of indi-
vidual decisions (which we considered in Chapter 3), but also on the process level –
for example, it is not clear what requirements will exist at the end of the process, be-
cause they change frequently. For example, the design of a new car should combine
new technological advancements (efficient engines, computer-assisted driving and so
on) with the aesthetic language that has already been established as part of the car’s
brand. It also has to meet a target price and profit margin. It is common for decisions
to be reconsidered at later stages, when more knowledge has become available. In the
car example, new knowledge could take the form of changed commodity prices or tax
breaks in some countries.
In this chapter we will extend our decision model by looking at decisions in con-
text, taking decision frames (see Chapter 3) as the building blocks of decision pro-
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cesses. We view decision processes as sequences of decisions that are related by a
common goal, or set of requirements, that they work towards fulfilling. When record-
ing the results of decisions (which options were chosen) we therefore record not only
the actual choices that were made, but also the justifications for making them, in the
form of arguments. In argumentation-theoretic terms, we record the preferred exten-
sion of a decision frame. As a consequence, every decision outcome on its own is
conflict-free. By combining the knowledge from two decision outcomes we may get
conflicts that tell us if the outcomes are incompatible.
The main contribution of this chapter is an argumentation-based model of decision
sequences based on a simple notion of decision outcome and designed to be compatible
with argument extraction techniques from natural language processing (see. Section
4.5.1 for details). The chapter is organised as follows. We begin by introducing a
use case that serves as a guide through the definitions and results. In Section 4.3, we
develop the model of decision processes and their properties. In Section 4.4 we analyse
the impact of changing a decision, by choosing a different option. Section 4.5 describes
a graph-based interpretation of decision sequences, which is useful for displaying them
graphically. We conclude with a short review of related work and a discussion (Section
4.6).
4.2 Use Case
In this section we describe the use case that motivated our work on decision processes,
expanding on the design problem introduced in Chapter 3, page 52. While the details
of the design problem are fictional, its general structure was developed as part of my
work on project DEEPFLOW. During this project, my colleagues at SAP and I created
the use case with the help of aerospace engineers at Bombardier Belfast and several
resources on engineering design [2, 5, 1]. As a consequence, the structures of this use
case and the issues it highlights are typical of large engineering projects, even though
its scope is small.
The task we are modeling is to design a component that is used in the wing of
an airplane. The design process consists of two stages, initial design and detailed de-
sign. The choices made in the initial design stage influence the options available in the
detailed design stage.
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In the examples, the detailed design stage will have constraints that are unsolvable,
so the preliminary design has to be changed. This illustrates how our model reflects the
non-linear nature of design processes.
4.2.1 Overview
Two metal components are to be joined by a connecting piece, forming a T-shape. The
connector itself is L-shaped and will be used on either side of the T (see Figure 3.1 on
page 52). It has two or more holes for attaching it to the two components with bolts
or screws. We have to choose a material for the connector and decide how to attach
it to the components (size and number of holes, screws or bolts, whether to insert a
protective layer between the connector and each component).
Our design has to meet some requirements. In order to function in adverse envi-
ronments, the connector’s mechanical properties (tensile strength etc.) should change
as little as possible even in low temperatures. It should withstand corrosion and strong
mechanical pressure exercised by either of the two components. In addition to these
external (imposed by the customer) requirements, there is an internal requirement that
the connector can be produced with the existing machinery in our factory. Finally there
are three dimensions in which the design should be optimised: Cost (low), production
time (short) and weight (low).
4.2.2 Stage 1: Preliminary Design
In the first stage, the material of the connecting piece has to be chosen. The dimen-
sions of the connector are determined by the two components it connects and cannot
be changed. Components like the one we are designing are usually made from a ma-
terial such as aluminium, aluminium-based alloys, or composites. Each material is
represented by a literal (al, alloys, composites).
The requirements are expressed as a set of literals, too. The component should be
strong and corrosion resistant.
We use defeasible rules to model our knowledge about the pros and cons of each
option. Aluminium is cheap and strong, but it results in a high weight. Alloys are not
as cheap as aluminium, but they have good corrosion resistance and alloy components
can be integrated easily. Finally, composites are expensive (because they are relatively
new), but their weight is low.
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Having weighed the options against each other we choose al as the material. In
this case study, however, our primary concern are not the individual decisions - the
framework for modeling them is the subject of the previous chapter (Chapter 3). The
aim in this chapter is to analyse the interplay of several decisions that were made in
sequence. For this reason, the knowledge base in stage 1 is relatively simple, and
detailed models will not even be given for subsequent stages. Instead, we only look at
the outcome of each stage, and the knowledge that was used to justify it.
Stage 1 is modeled in Example 32 on page 114 and its outcome in Example 33 on
page 117.
4.2.3 Stage 2: Detailed Design
In a real-world design environment, the stages of the design process would be carried
out by separate teams, each with its own area of expertise. For example, what has been
described as stage one in this case study would be the work of a structural engineering
team and stage two would be handled by specialists in electromagnetic behaviour of
the components. This enables companies to divide the work by domain rather than by
component, which would require every team to have expertise in all domains.
The second stage of the process continues with the design chosen in stage one and
implements it in greater detail. In this example, the outcome of the first stage was to
choose alloys as the material for the connector. The next problem is how to attach the
connector to the two components. There are two options, bolts or screws. If bolts are
used, then we also need to place a shim between the L-shape and one of the components
(as shown in Figure 3.1 on page 52), because there bolts alone would not be strong
enough. As a result, there are two options O2 = {O4,O5} with O4 = {bolts,shim}
and O5 = {screws,no shim}.
When connecting two components with different electromagnetic properties, there
is a risk of sparks (and therefore fire) in the event of a lightning strike, caused by
the transition of an electric charge from one component to another. We therefore try
to achieve good electromagnetic capabilities (EMC) in order to minimise the risk of
sparks: R2 = {good EMC}.
In this stage, we do not use the same knowledge base as in the previous stage,
since the work is carried out by a different group of engineers. We focus on the
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electromagnetic capabilities of different materials. K2 = {screws ⇒ two holes,
alloys⇒ one hole}. The use of bolts makes aluminium more susceptible to cor-
rosion:
bolts⇒¬〈al⇒ non corrosive〉 (4.1)
Additionally, we define different numbers of holes to be contradictory: one hole =
{two holes,three holes, . . .} and so forth.
When the outcome of this (the second) stage is combined with that of the first
stage, some of the earlier arguments are no longer acceptable because of the knowledge
that was added here. Example 34 on page 118 contains the outcome of this stage,
including the added knowledge.
4.2.4 Stage 3: Preliminary Design Revisited
The outcome of the previous decision stage was that some of the original arguments
in favour of choosing al are no longer acceptable, because they were attacked by ar-
guments from knowledge related to the choice of bolts for fastening the two compo-
nents. In Stage 3, we reject bolts because of those consequences, and choose screws
instead. With this choice there are no corrosion problems, and the arguments in favour
of screws are compatible with the earlier ones for choosing aluminium. The transi-
tion from stage one to three – hypothetically, assuming we skipped stage two – is an
example of a monotonic decision sequence, which means that the design has been fur-
ther specialised (by adding more formulae to the chosen option) and that there are no
conflicts in the arguments supporting it. Monotonic decision sequences are discussed
in Section 4.4.4.1.
4.2.5 Stage 4: Another Process Running in Parallel
While the materials and the mode of attachment are being finalised in stages 1 and 3,
a different engineer designs the shape and dimensions of the components. This task
could be an entire design process in itself, but for the purposes of this use case we only
consider the final outcome represented by a single formula: length(s2) = 25cm. The
length of s2 does not affect the previous decisions in any way. Example 34 on page 118
demonstrates how our system handles parallel sub-processes.
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4.2.6 Stage 5: Joining the Two Processes
At this stage the two parallel decision processes (structural design of the components
in stages 1 to 3 and their protective coating in stage 4) are combined into one final
design. It has now become apparent that screws, while still an acceptable option, do
not achieve the property of good EMC. Therefore, the outcome of joining the two deci-
sion sequences is {length(s2,25cm),al,no coating,screws}. This makes stage 5 a
monotonic continuation of stage 4 but a weakening of stage 3 (since good EMC is not
achieved anymore). See Section 4.4.4.2 for a formal definition and example.
4.2.7 Conclusions Drawn from Use Case
The use case highlights several characteristics of decisions in the engineering design
processes and their documentation. First, it is possible for decisions to be reversed if
they turn out to have undesirable consequences later on in the process. This was the
case for decision 2, which was reverted in decision 3. If a decision is reversed then
the old design documents still exist, but they are superseded by documents for the new
decision. A formal model of decision processes must be able to deal with the changing
status of decisions (and their supporting arguments) over time.
Secondly, by using design documentation to justify an option, we create an im-
plicit constraint on future decisions, namely that their justifications do not conflict with
the justifications of the current decisions. Decision 2 violated this constraint, because
rule 4.1 removed the support for an argument in favour of the outcome of decision one,
weakening the justification of decision 1.
Thirdly, decision processes are not always linear, but may comprise several sub-
processes which are executed in parallel (e.g. by different teams or contractors) and
eventually merged into the overall design. The merging of sub-processes was shown in
decision 5, which integrated decisions 4 and 3. This lead to a revision of decision 3,
where the argument for good EMC was no longer acceptable.
4.3 A Model of Decision Processes
In this section we consolidate the notion of decision outcomes (which are always
conflict-free) with our assumption that knowledge in decision processes grows mono-
tonically (including conflicts, which are resolved by rejecting some assumptions).
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An additional benefit of the technique developed here is that it produces diagrams
which can be seen as visualisations of decision processes.
When modeling decision processes we have to be careful not to conflate two dis-
tinct concepts: A specific “path” or sequence of decisions taken (a description of how
the design arrived at a certain point in the design space) and all possible paths or se-
quences of decisions, i.e. the entire design space. Since we want to analyse past de-
cisions, our model will focus on individual sequences of decisions. That way we do
not have to formalise the entire design space, but only a trace of the options that were
actually chosen and the reasoning behind decisions.
Decision sequences consist of stages. Each stage consists of a decision frame
(K,C,R) (as defined in Chapter 3, page 54) and the set of options available at that
stage. In the previous chapter, options in a decision frame were defined to be ASPIC+
knowledge bases.
Definition 51 (Decision Stage). A decision stage is a tuple S = (K,C,O,R) where
1. (K,C,R) is a decision frame (Definition 27, page 54)
2. O is a set of options
As the decision process unfolds, the wing component in our example and the
“product” in the general case are being specified in more and more detail. In our model,
the product at a specific stage is captured by the union of all options that have been
taken until that stage.
If the process is straightforward without any errors or backtracking then the knowl-
edge that makes up the product increases monotonically from start to finish. However,
the decision processes we are interested in are iterative and therefore may involve many
changes to the design, so the knowledge in their corresponding decision sequences does
not increase monotonically.
Example 32. The first decision stage (see Section 4.2.2) is defined as S1 =
(K1,C1,O1,R1) with the contents given below. The set of consequences C1 contains
values such as low weight. In S1, there is no inconsistency because none of the options
O1 to O3 contain knowledge that results in conflicting arguments. In the terminology
4.3. A Model of Decision Processes 115
established in Chapter 3, we have a multi-criteria decision problem but not a decision
problem with uncertainty.
K1 = {al⇒ high weight,
composites⇒ low weight,
al⇒ strong,
composites⇒ high cost,
composites⇒ corrosion resistant,
al⇒ non corrosive,
non corrosive⇒ corrosion resistant,
alloys⇒ medium cost,
alloys⇒ easy integration}
C1 = {low weight,high weight, . . .}
O1 = {O1,O2,O3}
O1 = {⇒ al}
O2 = {⇒ alloys}
O3 = {⇒ composites}
R1 = {strong,corrosion resistant}
Comparing the arguments for each option, we can see that O2 = {⇒ alloys} yields
the best results, because with it we can claim medium cost and easy integration.
4.3.1 Outcome of Decision Stage
The purpose of this section is to find a suitable representation of the outcome of a
decision stage. The representation should closely model the body of knowledge that
makes up the product – that is, it should contain the options that were chosen as well
as arguments for choosing them.
It should also comply with our observation that the design passes through several
intermediate stages, each with its own specialist knowledge. Only parts of that spe-
cialist knowledge are passed on to the next stage. Therefore, we cannot simply define
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decision outcomes to be the same as decision stages (that is, as Definition 51).
We will include only a subset of the knowledge of a decision stage in its decision
outcome. If an option O was chosen at a decision stage S then the outcome of S for O
includes O itself plus exactly the knowledge (set of defeasible rules) that is necessary
to create the arguments in the preferred extension that contains arguments in favour of
O. Formally:
Definition 52 (Outcome of a Decision Stage). Let S = (K,C,O,R) be a decision stage
and let O ∈ O . The outcome of S for O is an ASPIC+ knowledge base Res where
Res⊆ K∪O such that
1. There exists a preferred extension E ∈ Σpr(argGraph(K ∪O)) such that E =
args(Res) and
2. Res is the minimal knowledge base (with respect to ⊆) fulfilling Cond. 1
To distinguish decision outcomes from ASPIC+ knowledge bases in general, we
will refer to them using variations of the variable Res (instead of KB). The notation
(Res1, . . . ,Resn) will be used for sequences of decision outcomes, where each Resi is a
decision outcome. .
The outcome Res of a decision stage is non-empty if args(Res) 6= /0. Note that
every outcome of a decision stage is an ASPIC+ knowledge base, so the argument
graph argGraph(Res) can be computed. Its attacks relation will always be empty, as
shown next.
Proposition 24. If Res is the outcome of a decision stage and (A,Att) = argGraph(Res)
then Att = /0.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that the attacks relation Att is not empty, so there
is an (a1,a2) ∈ Att. Then there are two arguments a1,a2 ∈ A such that a1 attacks a2,
so A attacks itself. This contradicts Definition 52 Cond. 1, by which A is a preferred
extension of some argument graph and therefore a conflict-free set.
According to Definition 52, every outcome Res of a decision stage (K,C,O,R)
subsumes one of the options O ∈ O , that is O ⊆ Res. We will use the function
option(Res) to refer to this option O specifically.
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Example 33. In decision stage S1 (Example 32), we get the following decision result
for O1 = {⇒ al}, aluminium:
Res1 = {⇒ al,r1,r2,r3} with
r1 = al⇒ strong
r2 = al⇒ non corrosive
r3 = al⇒ high weight
This corresponds to the outcome of stage 1 described in Section 4.2.2 on page 110.
An important property of two decision outcomes Res1,Res2 is that any inconsis-
tency (attack) in the argument graph of Res1∪Res2 originates from an argument in Res1
(respage Res2) and targets an argument in Res2 (respage Res1). In other words, taking
the union of two decision outcomes does not introduce “internal conflicts” in either of
them, and all conflicts involve one argument from each of Res1 and Res2.
Proposition 25. Let Res1,Res2 be two outcomes of decision stages and let (A,Att) =
argGraph(Res1 ∪Res2). For every (a,b) ∈ Att, a ∈ args(Res1) and b ∈ args(Res2) or
vice versa.
Proof. By contradiction. Let Res1, Res2 be two outcomes of decision stages and
let (A,Att) = argGraph(Res1 ∪Res2). Let (a,b) ∈ Att and assume a,b ∈ args(Res1)
(w.l.o.g.) This directly contradicts Propage 24.
Proposition 26. Let Res1, Res2 be two outcomes of decision stages and let G =
(A,Att) = argGraph(Res1∪Res2). Then,
args(Res1)∩args(Res2)⊆ Σgr(G)
Proof. Let Res1, Res2 and G be as required. Let A1 = args(Res1) and let A2 =
args(Res2). Let a ∈ A1 ∩A2. Either a has an attacking argument b with (b,a) ∈ Att
or not. Assume there is a b ∈ A such that (b,a) ∈ Att. Since a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2 (by Propage
25). But a ∈ A1∩A2, so a ∈ A2 and b ∈ A2, contradicting Definition 52 Cond. 1 which
implies that both A1 and A2 are conflict-free.
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Decision outcomes (Definition 52) contain exactly the knowledge that is required
to justify a decision, that is, to produce all the arguments in favour of the option that was
chosen. Decision outcomes on their own are conflict-free, but the union of two decision
outcomes may be inconsistent. In the remainder of this section we will study decision
outcomes as building blocks of decision sequences, that is, of the many decisions that
together form a design.
4.3.2 Embedding Decisions Results
Decision outcomes do not exist in a vacuum. They are part of a design process that is
ultimately driven by a goal, namely to meet a set of requirements within the constraints
of time and budget. As a result, the decisions made at each stage (and their supporting
arguments) have an effect on subsequent decisions.
Our definition of decision outcomes (Definition 52) can express such correlations
only in a limited way: Because each individual decision outcome is conflict-free, argu-
ments may be re-used in later stages, but only in the same polarity (that is, the system
cannot express the phenomenon that an argument in favour of one decision outcome
can also act as an argument against another decision outcome). Nonetheless, Defini-
tion 52 is a suitable representation of design documents, as seen in Section 4.5.1. The
decision processes introduced in this section should therefore seen as a second layer on
top of the individual decision stage. The purpose of this layer is to draw connections
between decisions, and the purpose of the lower (decision making) layer is to assess
individual decisions.
4.3.2.1 Embeddings by Example
Let us look at a bigger example to illustrate the points made above.
Example 34. The decision outcome Res2 documents a decision that was made after
Res1.
Res2 = {⇒ al,⇒ bolts,⇒ shim,r1,r4,r5}
r4 = bolts⇒¬〈al⇒ non corrosive〉
r5 = shim,bolts⇒ good EMC
We can see that ⇒ al ∈ Res2, so the decision for aluminium made earlier is still re-
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spected in the design, but rule r2 is missing from Res2. This indicates that, with the
additional knowledge available at stage 2, arguments based on r2 are defeated. The
new rule r4 in fact deactivates rule r2 so arguments that use it are not (sceptically or
credulously) acceptable.
Suppose the result Res1 from Example 33 is not followed by Res2, but by Res3
(below) instead, after the choice of adding bolts,shim was rejected because it resulted
in attacks on arguments based on rule r2. In Res3, we choose not to apply a coating
because aluminium is corrosion-resistant without coating. Also we use screws instead
of bolts for attaching the structure.
Res3 = {⇒ al,⇒ no coating,⇒ screws,r1,r2,r3,r6,r7} with
r6 = al,no coating⇒ corrosion resistant
r7 = al,screws⇒ good EMC
Independently of decisions one to three (with results Res1 to Res3), the length of the
component s2 (cf. Figure 3.1 on page 52) was decided:
Res4 = {⇒ length(s2,25cm),r8}
r8 = length(s2,25cm)⇒ weight(s2,450g)
And, lastly, the two separate decision sequences (Res1,Res2,Res3 and Res4) are
combined in the final decision Res5.
Res5 = {⇒ length(s2,25cm),⇒ al,⇒ no coating,⇒ screws,r1,r2,r3,r6,r9}
r9 = length(s2,≤ 30cm)⇒¬good EMC
Note that the conclusion of r9 is ¬good EMC, which directly contradicts the claim of
a12 (good EMC). Therefore a12 and a15 attack each other, so they cannot be in the same
conflict-free set, so at most one of the two arguments can be part of a decision outcome.
For the outcome Res5 in particular, a15 is included so a12 is excluded.
To summarise the decision process Res1 to Res5, Table 4.1 lists all arguments
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Table 4.1: Arguments in the example decision process. The column “Decision Results” gives
the decision results in which an argument is included.
Name Argument Decision Results
a1 [⇒ al;al] Res1,Res2,Res3,Res5
a2 [a1;al⇒ strong;strong] Res1,Res3,Res5
a3 [a1;al⇒ non corr.;non corr.] Res1,Res3,Res5
a4 [a1;al⇒ high weight;high weight] Res1,Res3,Res5
a5 [⇒ bolts;bolts] Res2
a6 [a5;bolts⇒¬〈r2〉;¬〈r2〉] Res2
a7 [⇒ shim;shim] Res2
a8 [a5,a7;shim,bolts⇒ good EMC;good EMC] Res2
a9 [⇒ no coating;no coating] Res3,Res5
a10 [a1,a9;r6;corrosion resistant] Res3,Res5
a11 [⇒ screws;screws] Res3,Res5
a12 [a1,a11;r7;good EMC] Res3
a13 [⇒ length(s2,25cm);length(s2,25cm)] Res4,Res5
a14 [a13;r8;weight(s2,450g)] Res4
a15 [a13;r9;¬good EMC] Res5
produced at any stage. The column “Decision Results” gives the decision results in
which an argument is included (that is, the decision results from which the argument
can be formed). Many arguments appear in more than one decision result.
The knowledge on which decisions are based often increases monotonically dur-
ing the design process. In Example 34, options and rules of Res1 are a subset of those
of Res3 and therefore args(Res1) ⊆ args(Res3). This is not the case for all decision
results as earlier arguments may disappear. For example a12 ∈ args(Res3), but a12 /∈
args(Res5), even though the knowledge base representing the actual design – as deter-
mined by the option function – increased monotonically, option(Res3)⊆ option(Res5).
How can the apparent disappearance of knowledge conform with our claim that
knowledge increases monotonically in decision processes? The answer to this question
lies in our definition of decision outcomes in Section 4.3.1. There, we defined decision
outcomes as the logical equivalent of design documents, which means that they only
contain enough knowledge to justify (make arguments for) the current decision, not
all previous decisions. However, even though some knowledge is not written down in
a design document, it is not lost to the designers. In our formal model we are free
to include additional knowledge. This inclusion of background knowledge is the idea
behind the definition of embeddings (Definition 54).
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4.3.2.2 Properties of Embeddings
In the rest of this section we will state the conditions we would like to hold for a
embeddings, and in the next section (Section 4.3.3) we will address the question of
how to construct an embedding for a given decision sequence.
We first need to define the concept of increasing knowledge formally. A sequence
of ASPIC+ knowledge bases is monotonically increasing if each element is a subset of
its successor.
Definition 53 (Monotonically Increasing). A sequence (k1, . . . ,kn) of ASPIC+ knowl-
edge bases is monotonically increasing if and only if for all 1≤ i < n, ki ⊆ ki+1.
Even if a sequence of knowledge bases is montonically increasing, the set of (scep-
tically or credulously) acceptable arguments at each stage may not be increasing, be-
cause new counter-arguments may be introduced.
A monotonically increasing sequence of ASPIC+ knowledge bases is an embed-
ding of a sequence of decision results (of the same length) if the arguments of the
i-th decision result are sceptically acceptable in the graph of the i-th knowledge base.
Since this requires both sequences (the monotonically increasing sequence of knowl-
edge bases, and the sequence of decision results) to have the same length, we represent
embeddings as functions from decision results to ASPIC+ knowledge bases with the
following properties:
Definition 54 (Embedding of Decision Results). Let S=(Res1, . . . ,Resn) be a sequence
of decision outcomes (Definition 52). An embedding E of S is a function from decision
outcomes to ASPIC+ knowledge bases such that
1. For all i≤ n, Resi ⊆ E(Resi),
2. For all i≤ n, args(Resi)⊆ Σgr(argGraph(E(Resi))) and
3. For all i < n, E(Resi)⊆ E(Resi+1)
Let us look at the conditions of Definition 54 in detail. The first one says
that every decision result Resi in S must be subsumed by its corresponding result
E(Resi). Condition 2 ensures that, at every stage i in the design process, the ar-
guments that are sceptically acceptable in Resi are sceptically acceptable in E(Resi)
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also. Since every decision outcome Resi is conflict-free, its argument graph contains
no attacks, so Σgr(Resi) = args(Resi), and the condition could alternatively be stated
as “For all i ≤ n, Σgr(Resi) ⊆ Σgr(argGraph(E(Resi))).” Finally, Cond. 3, states that
(E(Res1), . . . ,E(Resn)) is monotonically increasing, that is, no rules are lost when pro-
gressing from E(Resi) to E(Resi+1).
A consequence of conditions 2 and 3 for our example (Example 34) is that any
embedding E of (Res3,Res5) must contain attacks in argGraph(E(Res5)), even though
Res3 and Res5 on their own are conflict-free. This is because argument a15 from Res5
attacks argument a13 from Res3, and by Definition 54 Cond. 3, a13 is also an argu-
ment of E(Res5). More generally, we find that embeddings of decision outcomes may
introduce conflict even though each outcome on its own is conflict-free:
Proposition 27. Let S = (Res1, . . . ,Resi, . . . ,Resk, . . . ,Resn) be a decision sequence
with i < k ≤ n such that the argument graph G = (A,Att) = argGraph(Resi ∪ Resk)
has a non-empty set of attacks, Att 6= /0. Let E be an embedding of S. Then,
argGraph(E(Resk)) is not conflict-free.
Proof. Let a ∈ args(Resi), b ∈ args(Resk) such that (a,b) ∈ Att (the proof for (b,a) ∈
Att proceeds similarly). Let G′ = (A′,Att ′) = argGraph(E(Resk)). By Definition 54
Cond. 2, a ∈ args(E(Resk)), and by Definition 54 Cond. 1, b ∈ args(E(Resk)). Since b
attacks a, (b,a) ∈ Att ′ so Att 6= /0.
Embeddings are mappings of individual ASPIC+ knowledge bases (see Definition
2.3.2.1 on page 33), but every embedding E also defines a mapping of sequences of
knowledge bases, obtained by applying E to each element in the sequence. We will use
embeddings mostly in the latter (sequence) sense, but define them in the former (ele-
ment) sense, because it simplifies proofs and it enforces the property that embeddings
of sequences of decision outcomes are really embeddings of their constituent parts.
With embeddings we can describe the relationship between individual design doc-
uments that are conflict-free and the aggregated knowledge in a design process that
may have conflicts. The remainder of this chapter will be spent constructing embed-
dings and exploring them from different angles.
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4.3.3 Embed and Extract
First we will look at the problem of producing embeddings. It is not obvious that ev-
ery sequence of decision outcomes has an embedding, because of conditions 2 and 3
of Definition 54, which imply that asymmetric attacks must be introduced during the
course of the decision process, because the accumulated knowledge grows monotoni-
cally (Cond. 3) while the grounded extension has no such constraint (Cond. 2), so it can
shrink as well as grow. Asymmetric attacks are introduced by deactivate (Definition
47), which we can use to compute a canoncial embedding of any decision sequence S.
Definition 55 (Embed). For any sequence of decision outcomes S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn),
the canonical embedding of S is defined as
embS(Res1) = Res1
embS(Resi+1) = enforce(args(Resi+1),embS(Resi)∪Resi+1)
Example 35, below, demonstrates another intuitive explanation of embeddings:
They reify preferences of arguments, but this preference information is based on a
sequence of argument graphs and not an ordering of the arguments themselves (or the
knowledge they are based on).
Example 35. If we wanted to obtain the overall knowledge expressed in Res3 and Res5,
we could simply take their union Res3∪Res5. However, when comparing the arguments
in those two decision outcomes, we see that Res3 has an argument a12 with conclusion
good EMC and Res5 has an argument a15 with conclusion ¬good EMC. These two argu-
ments are mutually exclusive, leading to a symmetric attack in argGraph(Res3∪Res5).
As a result, neither a12 nor a15 are part of Σgr(argGraph(Res3 ∪Res5)), even though
it is clear from the context of our example that Res5 supersedes Res3. For this rea-
son, Res3 ∪Res5 cannot be an embedding of Res5, because a15’s exclusion from the
grounded extension would violate Definition 54 Cond. 3. We therefore need to encode
the “preference” that a15 has over a12.
An embedding embS of the sequence S = (Res3,Res5) recovers this missing
piece of information by creating a new rule ⇒ ¬〈r7〉. In detail, the embedding of
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S = (Res3,Res5) is given by
embS(Res3) = Res3
embS(Res5) = enforce(args(Res5),embS(Res3)∪Res5)
= enforce(args(Res5),Res3∪Res5)
= enforce({a1−4,a9−11,a13,a15},Res3∪Res5))
= deactivate(topRule(a12),Res3∪Res5)
= deactivate(r7,Res3∪Res5)
= Res3∪Res5∪{⇒ ¬〈r7〉}
The new rule⇒¬〈r7〉, added in the last line, creates an object-level representation of
the fact that r7 is not applicable anymore. This fact was only implicit in the simple union
Res3 ∪Res5, leading to the presence of two preferred extensions in argGraph(Res3 ∪
Res5).
The following result shows that we are justified in calling embS a canonical em-
bedding of S, since it works for all sequences of decision outcomes S.
Theorem 5. If S is a sequence of decision outcomes then embS is an embedding of S.
Proof. Let S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn) be a sequence of decision outcomes. We will prove
that the three conditions of Definition 54 hold.
Cond. 1 Let i ≤ n. If i = 1 then embS(Resi) = Res1, so by Definition 55, Resi ⊆
embS(Resi). If i > 1, then
embS(Resi) = enforce(Σgr(argGraph(Resi)),embS(Resi−1)∪Resi)
{by Propage 21, page 94}
⊇ Resi
Cond. 2 We can distinguish two cases, i = 1 and i > 1.
(i= 1) Let a∈ args(Res1). embS(Resi) = Res1 (by Definition 55), so args(Res1) =
args(embS(Res1)) and because Res1 is a decision outcome, argGraph(Res1) is conflict-
free by Propage 24. Therefore the grounded extension of argGraph(embS(Res1)) con-
tains extactly the arguments in args(embS(Res1)), so a ∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res1))).
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(i> 1) If i> 1 then by Definition 55 case 2, embS(Resi)= enforce(args(Resi),embS(Resi−1)∪
Resi). args(Resi) is conflict-free by Definition 24, so we can apply Propage 22 and ob-
tain args(Resi)⊆ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Resi))).
Cond. 3 The final condition stipulates that (embS(Res1), . . . ,embS(Resn)) be
monotonically increasing, that is, for all k < n, embS(Resk)⊆ embS(Resk+1). Let k < n.
We distinguish two cases, k = 1 and k > 1.
Case 1. If k = 1 then
embS(Res2) = enforce(args(Res2),embS(Res1)∪Res2)
{ by Definition 55 Cond. 1}
= enforce(args(Res2),Res1∪Res2)
so by Propage 21, Res1 ⊆ embS(Res2) and therefore embS(Res1)⊆ embS(Res2).
Case 2 If k > 1 then
embS(Resk+1) = enforce(args(Resk+1),embS(Resk)∪Resk+1)
so by applying Propage 21, we directly obtain embS(Resk)⊆ embS(Resk+1).
We can also go the other way, from arbitrary sequences of ASPIC+ knowledge
bases to sequences of (conflict-free) decision outcomes, using the extract operation
defined below. It returns all the rules used by arguments in the grounded extension.
Definition 56 (Extract). For any ASPIC+ knowledge base KB, if Σgr(argGraph(KB)) =
{E} then
extract(KB) = {rules(a) | a ∈ E}
extract produces a conflict-free ASPIC+ knowledge base which contains exactly
the assumptions and rules necessary to construct all arguments in the grounded exten-
sion of argGraph(KB).
Example 36. Applying extract to the previous example (Example 35) yields the follow-
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ing:
extract(embS(Res5)) = extract(Res3∪Res5∪{⇒ ¬〈r7〉})
= {⇒ length(s2,25cm),⇒ al,⇒ no coating,
⇒ screws,r1,r2,r3,r6,r9,⇒¬〈r7〉}
extract(embS(Res5)) subsumes the original result Res5, adding the new rule⇒¬〈r7〉.
This added knowledge represents the tacit assumptions (knowledge that was implicitly
assumed) in Res5.
Example 36 demonstrated a property of extract. When we combine extract with
embS by calculating extract(embS(Resi)) for some decision sequence S and a result
Resi in S, the result contains all rules and assumptions in the original decision outcome
Resi.
Proposition 28. For every sequence of decision outcomes S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn) and
every Resi in S:
Resi ⊆ extract(embS(Resi))
Proof. Let S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn) be a sequence of decision outcomes and let
i ≤ n. Let Res′i = extract(embS(Resi)). Let r ∈ Resi. Since Resi is a deci-
sion outcome, it is minimal (Definition 52 Cond. 2), so there exists an argu-
ment a ∈ args(Resi) with r ∈ rules(a). As embS is an embedding of S (by The-
orem 5), a ∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Resi))) (Definition 54 Cond. 2). Then r ∈
rules(Σgr(argGraph(embS(Resi)))), so by Definition 56, r ∈ Res′i.
Embedding and extracting the first element of a sequence has no effect:
Proposition 29. For every decision sequence S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn),
extract(embS(Res1)) = Res1
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Decision outcomes
Decision process
conflict-free, not monotonic
monotonic, may have conflicts
extractembed
Figure 4.1: Conceptual relationship of decision processes and outcomes
Proof. Let Res1 be a decision outcome and let G = (A,Att) = argGraph(Res1).
extract(embS(Res1))
{By Definition 55 case 1}
= extract(Res1)
{Apply Definition 56, let{E}= Σgr(G)}
=
⋃
a∈E
assumptions(a)∪
⋃
a∈E
rules(a)
{By Propage 24, Att = /0, so E = A}
=
⋃
a∈A
assumptions(a)∪
⋃
a∈A
rules(a)
{a = args(Res1)}
= Res1
embS is not the only embedding of a decision sequence S, but it is the minimal
one in a certain sense. The two operations emb and extract can be seen as the link
between (conflict-free) decision outcomes and (conflicting) decision processes, as the
diagram in Figure 4.1 on page 127 shows. The combination of embedding a decision
sequence and then extracting is as a way of making tacit assumptions visible, as shown
in Example 36.
4.4 Impact Analysis
Because most design processes are iterative, it is often necessary to adjust a decision
that was made in the past. Such adjustments may have external reasons (for example,
because requirements changed) or internal reasons (the design needed to be improved).
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However, a past decision cannot be changed in isolation - subsequent decisions that
depend on it also need to be adjusted. As this section will show, our argumentation-
based model of decision sequences is well suited to analyse the impact of changed
decisions on the process.
In our terminology, if S = (Res1,Res2, . . . ,Resn) is a sequence of decision out-
comes and a change is made by replacing the second decision Res2 with Res′2, then any
embedding E of S has to be adjusted (in order to meet Cond. 1 of Definition 54). By
comparing the “new” embedding embS′ with the old embedding embS, we get an idea
of the impact the change has made.
The actual comparison of the two embeddings is done element-wise, by comparing
the argument graphs of embS(Resi) and emb′S(Res′i), where Resi and Res′i are the ith
decision outcomes of S and S′ respectively.
What is meant by comparing two decision outcomes? In Chapter 3, an argumenta-
tion-based technique for comparing options for a single decision was introduced, based
on the relative merits of each option (for example, how well it meets the requirements).
There, we evaluated each decision on its own, without considering the potential impact
on other, related decisions. In this chapter, we are interested in the impact that choosing
one decision outcome over the other has. That is, the comparison is based on the
difference between two decision outcomes Res and Res′, and not on the pros and cons
of each individual option (as in Chapter 3). This difference in turn is determined by
how many of the arguments that are accepted in subsequent decision stages would be
invalidated (and thus would have to be changed) if we changed our decision from Res
to Res′. The following example clarifies exactly what the difference between decision
outcomes is:
Example 37. Consider the decision outcome Res1 and Res2 with
Res1 = {⇒ a,⇒ b,⇒ c, Res2 = {⇒ b,⇒ c,⇒ d,⇒¬〈a∧b⇒ g〉
a⇒¬d,b∧c⇒ f,a∧b⇒ g} b∧c⇒ f,d⇒ e,}
Each of the outcomes Res1 and Res2 on its own results in a conflict-free argument
graph, as required in Definition 52. However, their union Res1∪Res2 yields an argu-
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Table 4.2: Arguments in Example 37
Name Argument Name Argument
a1 [⇒ a;a] a6 [a2,a3;b∧c⇒ f;f]
a2 [⇒ b;b] a7 [a4;d⇒ e;e]
a3 [⇒ c;c] a8 [a1,a2;a∧b⇒ g;g]
a4 [⇒ d;d] a9 [¬〈a∧b⇒ g〉]
a5 [a1;a⇒¬d;¬d]
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a8
a9
Figure 4.2: Conflicts after a decision was changed (Example 37)
ment graph with two preferred extensions, as shown in Figure 4.2, with arguments in
Table 4.2.
The difference between Res1 and Res2 is manifested in six arguments: a1,a5 and
a8 are present in Res1 and absent from Res2, and a4,a7 and a9 are present in Res1 and
absent from Res2.
Example 37 indicates that there are two kinds of change that can be made to a
decision outcome. The first kind involves adding or removing arguments that justify a
decision, and it arises from a change in the decision maker’s knowledge. In Example
37, this kind of change is the reason why some of r1’s arguments are missing in r2 (e.g.
argument a4) and vice versa.
The acquisition of new knowledge is a necessary, but not a sufficient reason for
actually choosing a different option. It may be that the new knowledge simply rein-
forces the reasons for making the original decision. We therefore have to consider a
second kind of change, the act of “changing one’s mind” - accepting a position that is
inconsistent with the previously accepted position, thereby rejecting the old point of
view in favour of the new. Since each decision outcome is in itself consistent, this sec-
ond kind of change always implies the first kind (adding new arguments). This result
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is formalised in Propage 34.
In the following two sections, 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 (page 137), we will analyse both
kinds of change in terms of our formal model of decision processes.
4.4.1 Impact Analysis Based on Argument Strength
In the argument graph in Figure 4.2, a8 is rejected (attacked by the grounded extension),
and a7 is only acceptable in one of the two preferred extensions, even though both
arguments were undisputed as part of their respective decision outcomes (Res2 and
Res1).
In other words, a8 and a7 are weaker in the graph of Res1∪Res2 than they were
before. The fact that the acceptability of some arguments has changed (a8 became
unacceptable and a7 became credulously acceptable) by itself does not tell us much
about the impact of choosing Res2 over Res1, because arguments from both the old,
rejected outcome (Res1) and the new outcome (Res2) are weakened by the change.
With our model of decision processes we can quantify this change, and tell whether the
overall strength of our arguments increased or decreased as a result of it.
4.4.1.1 Argument Strength
Argument strength can be interpreted in two ways (cf. Besnard and Hunter [18]). The
first interpretation, which is shared among others by the ASPIC+ system (see the dis-
cussion preceding Definition 11 on page 31), treats argument strength as an external
property, as meta-data that is supplied as a parameter to the argumentation system.
We call this the extensional interpretation of argument strength. The second approach
treats argument strength as a function of a set of arguments. That is, the strength of
an argument is defined entirely by its relationship with other arguments, and can thus
be computed without requiring any additional information. We call this the intensional
interpretation of argument strength.
Throughout the thesis we have tried to minimise the number of parameters to our
system. For example, in Chapter 3 we chose to represent different possible worlds as
the preferred extensions of an argument graph, rather than an explicit list of possible
worlds with a mapping to the formulae that hold in them. In the same spirit we choose
the intensional interpretation of argument strength. Specifically, we are going to use the
game-theoretic measure introduced by Matt and Toni [55]. In [55], the strength of an
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argument is defined to be its expected pay-off in a game of argumentation strategy (in
the game-theoretic sense). Their approach suits our purposes for several reasons. First,
it is defined on abstract argument graphs, so we can adopt it without any additional
definitions (other than the measure itself). Second, the measure is fine-grained enough
to assign different strength to arguments with the same acceptability status (for exam-
ple, one credulously acceptable argument might have the strength 0.45 and another one
might have 0.33). This fits our requirement for the impact measure to provide more
data than just acceptability. Finally, because the measure considers no information be-
yond arguments and their attacks, it allows us to meet our requirement to quantify the
impact of changing a decision on the justifications of the design (as opposed to, say,
the quality of the design) as discussed in the first chapter of the thesis.
We will now introduce the measure by Matt and Toni in Section 4.4.1.2 below.
In the following section, we will use argument strength as a basis for measuring the
impact of choosing one option instead of another one.
4.4.1.2 A Game-Theoretic Measure
This section summarises the article by Matt and Toni [55]. Please refer to the original
article for a more detailed presentation. Our own contribution begins with Section
4.4.1.3 on page 133.
In the following we assume an argument graph G= (A,Att) as usual. The strength
of an argument a∈ A is the expected payoff of a game (G,a). The measure of argument
strength is centered around the notion of a set of strategies that can be adopted by the
opponent and proponent of a. A strategy is simply a set of arguments. The strategies
available to the proponent must include a, whereas the opponent is free to choose any
set of arguments.
Definition 57 (Pure Strategies [55]). The set of strategies for the proponent and oppo-
nent are {P | P⊆ A,a ∈ P} and {O | O⊆ A}, respectively.
The proponent is trying to defend a, so their strategies should be conflict-free. The
opponent’s strategies on the other hand should always attack a. It should also be in the
proponent’s interest to attack the opponent’s arguments and in turn avoid (counter) their
attacks.
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We will now introduce some notation that allows us to take into account the num-
ber of attacks from one set of arguments X against another one, Y : Y←XG = {(x,y) ∈
X×Y | (x,y)∈ Att}. The acceptability of a set of arguments X with respect to Y should
increase with the size of Y←XG and decrease with the size of X
←Y
G . This can be captured
by the following expression:
φ(P,O) =
1
2
(1+ f (|O←PF |)− f (|P←OF |))
for a monotonic increasing function f : N → [0,1[ such that f (0) = 0 and
limn→∞ f (n) = 1. For this thesis we will stay with the definition for f proposed in
[55]:
f (n) = 1− 1
n+1
The rewards of the game (G,x) for an argument x are defined as follows.
Definition 58 (Rewards of the Game [55]). If P is not conflict-free then the opponent
should pay to the proponent the sum rG(P,O) = 0. If P is conflict-free and O does
not attack P, then the opponent should pay him the sum rG(P,O) = 1. Otherwise, the
opponent should pay the proponent a sum equal to rF(P,O) = φ(P,O).
With the strategies and rewards of the game (G,x) defined, we can now turn to its
expected payoff, which is a measure of the strength of the argument x. The expected
payoff is determined by the game’s outcome in the long run, over a large number of rep-
etitions. We assume that each time the game is played, proponent and opponent choose
their strategies according to some probability distributions X and Y . The probability
of the proponent choosing the i-th strategy (Oi) is equal to xi, and that of the opponent
choosing the jth strategy (Pj) is y j. The proponent’s expected payoff1 is therefore
E = XT RY =
n
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
ri, jxiy j
The proponent can therefore expect to get at least minY XT RY . The proponent can
choose X so he will select X so that this minimum is as large as possible. The propo-
1XT denotes the transpose of vector X and R denotes the matrix ((ri, j))m×n where ri, j = rF(Pi,O j)
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nent’s mixed strategy is therefore
max
X
min
Y
XT RY
At the same time, the opponent chooses a strategy Y that minimises the proponent’s
expected payoff:
min
Y
max
X
XT RY
By the minmax theorem of Neumann [89], the two quantities have the same value v:
max
X
min
Y
XT RY = min
Y
max
X
XT RY = v
It is v, the value of the game, that is the strength of the argument x.
Definition 59 (Argument Strength [55]). The strength of an argument x in an argument
graph G is noted sG(x) and defined as the value of the (G,x) game of argumentation
strategy.
The strength of x as measured by sG(x) depends only on the argument graph G.
Moreover, it is determined entirely by the connected component (subgraph of G) that
contains x, which can make sG easier to compute in some situations. sG is bounded
between 0 and 1. sG(x) = 0 if and only if x attacks itself, and sG(x) = 1 if and only if x
is not attacked by any other argument.
4.4.1.3 Impact Measure
We can use the measure sG to assess the impact of changing a decision result Res1
to a different result Res2. Since the argument graph of Res1 is conflict-free, all of its
arguments have the same, maximum strength 1. The same is true for Res2 and its
arguments. Assuming args(Res1) 6= /0, the average strength of all arguments in Res1 is
thus always
∑a∈args(Res1) sargGraph(Res1)(a)
|args(Res1)| =
|args(Res1)|
|args(Res1)| = 1
However, the combination of Res1 and Res2 may result in attacks. For example, assume
that there are arguments a ∈ args(Res1) and b ∈ args(Res2) such that b attacks a in the
combined graph G= argGraph(Res1∪Res2), and there are no other attacks in G. Then,
sG(a) < 1, but for all other arguments a′ ∈ args(Res1 ∪Res2) \ {a}, sG(a′) = 1. The
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average strength of arguments for Res1 in G is therefore smaller than one, and the
average strength of arguments for Res2 in G is still equal to one. We interpret this
situation as having improved the justification of our design by switching from Res1 to
Res2. If the situation was reversed and a attacked b, then we would have worsened the
justification of our design, because we chose to switch from Res1 to Res2 in spite of the
counterargument against Res2.
Definition 60 (Average Strength). Let G=(A,Att) be an argument graph and let A′⊆A
such that A′ 6= /0. The average strength of A′ in G is defined as
avgStrength(A′,G) = ∑a∈A
′ sG(a)
|A′|
Example 38. For the decision outcomes Res1 and Res2 from Example 37 on page 128,
we get the following arguments.
args(Res1) = {a1,a2,a3,a5,a6,a8}
args(Res2) = {a4,a7,a9}
As shown in Figure 4.2 on page 129, a9 attacks a8, a5 and a4 attack each other and a5
also attacks a7. The argument graph of Res1∪Res2 is therefore G = argGraph(Res1∪
Res2) = ({a1, . . . ,a9},{(a9,a8),(a5,a4),(a4,a5),(a5,a7)}. The strength of the attacked
arguments (a8, a5, a4 and a7) according to Definition 59 is:
sG(a4) = 0.5 sG(a7) = 0.416
sG(a5) = 0.5 sG(a8) = 0.25
As a result, the average strength of arguments for Res1 is avgStrength(args(Res1),G)≈
0.79 and the average strength of arguments for Res2 is avgStrength(args(Res2),G) ≈
0.96. We conclude that in the debate over Res1 versus Res2, Res2 has the stronger
arguments.
We can now formalise our finding that all arguments within a single decision out-
come have the same, maximum strength.
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Proposition 30. For every non-empty decision result Res,
avgStrength(args(Res),argGraph(Res)) = 1
Proof. Let G = (A,Att) = argGraph(Res). Since Att = /0, sG(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A, so
the average is also 1.
Another characteristic of avgStrength for decision outcomes is that is always pos-
itive:
Proposition 31. Let Res1,Res2 be two non-empty decision results. Let G =
argGraph(Res1∪Res2).
Then avgStrength(args(Res1),G)> 0 and avgStrength(args(Res2),G)> 0.
Proof. Let Res1,Res2 be two non-empty decision results, let G1 = argGraph(Res1),
G2 = argGraph(Res2) and G = argGraph(Res1∪Res2).
Assume avgStrength(args(Res1),G) = 0. Then for all a ∈ args(Res1), sG(a) = 0.
Since sG(x) is 0 if and only if x is self-attacking, all arguments in args(Res1) are self-
attacking. This contradicts Propage 24 which says that argGraph(Res1) is conflict-free.
The proof for Res2 proceeds analogously.
To determine whether choosing Res2 over Res1 resulted in an overall strengthening
of the decision’s justification we can take the difference between the average argument
strength of the two.
Definition 61 (Strength-Based Difference of Decision Outcomes). Let Res1, Res2
be two decision outcomes, let A1 = args(Res1), A2 = args(Res2) and let G =
argGraph(Res1∪Res2). The strength-based difference between Res1 and Res2 is
strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) = avgStrength(A2,G)−avgStrength(A1,G)
Example 39. Recall that the average strength of the two results Res1 and Res2 in Exam-
ple 38 was avgStrength(args(Res1),G)≈ 0.79 and Res2 is avgStrength(args(Res2),G)≈
0.96. Their difference is therefore
strengthDiff(Res1,Res2)≈ 0.96−0.79 = 0.17
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Example 40. Let us look at the values for strengthDiff for the the three decision out-
comes Res1 to Res3. The results produce three sets of arguments, A1 to A3 (originally
defined in the running example introduced on page 118):
A1 = {a1, . . . ,a4}
A2 = {a1,a2,a5, . . . ,a8}
A3 = {a1, . . . ,a4,a9, . . . ,a12}
To compute strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) and strengthDiff(Res2,Res3), we need to look at
the argument graphs of Res1∪Res2 and Res2∪Res3, respectively.
For GI = argGraph(Res1 ∪Res2), we get GI = (AI,AttI) with AI = A1 ∪A2, and
AttI = {(a6,a3)}. For GII = argGraph(Res2∪Res3), we get GII = (AII,AttII) with AII =
A2∪A3 and AttII = {(a6,a3)}. The differences are therefore
strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) =
6
6
− 3.25
4
= 1−0.8125≈ 0.19
strengthDiff(Res2,Res3) =
7.25
8
− 5
5
= 0.90625−1≈−0.09
strengthDiff(Res1,Res3) =
8
8
− 5
5
= 1−1 = 0
The non-zero values of strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) and strengthDiff(Res2,Res3) are
caused by a6, which attacks a4 and thus reduces its strength to 0.25 in the graphs
of Res1∪Res2 and Res2∪Res3. When comparing Res1 with Res3, the average strength
of their arguments does not change. This indicates that Res3 is compatible with Res1 in
a way that will be discussed in Section 4.4.4 (page 149).
The value of strengthDiff is zero if there are no attacks in the combined knowledge
base.
Proposition 32. If attacks(Res1∪Res2) = /0 then strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) = 0.
Proof. If attacks(Res1 ∪ Res2) = /0 then for all arguments a ∈ args(Res1 ∪ Res2),
sG(a) = 1, so avgStrength(args(Res2),G)− avgStrength(args(Res1),G) = 1− 1 =
0.
To see that Propage 32 does not hold for the other direction, consider two deci-
sion outcomes Res1 and Res2 with arguments a ∈ args(Res1) and b ∈ args(Res2) such
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that in argGraph(Res1,Res2), a attacks b and vice versa. Then the average strength of
args(Res1) and args(Res2) is less than one, but equal (and therefore their difference, as
expressed in strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) is still zero).
strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) ranges from negative one to positive one. A positive sign
indicates that Res2 has stronger support since its average strength is higher, and a nega-
tive sign indicates the opposite. When comparing decision outcomes with strengthDiff
we thus get an indication of the general tendency of support (whether it improved or
worsened) as well as a numeric measure of the size of the change.
4.4.2 Impact Analysis Based on Knowledge Added or Removed
If we have a decision outcome Res1 and add knowledge to it, the result will be a de-
cision outcome Res2 with args(Res1) ⊆ args(Res2). When using abstract argument
graphs (A,Att), the only statements we can make about added or removed knowledge
(as opposed to conflict) are about the “argument” component A. In Dung’s theory,
the arguments in A are atomic, so any distance measure based on A must be a general
distance measure for sets.
We could take into account that the argument graphs considered here are pro-
duced from decision outcomes, essentially ASPIC+ knowledge bases. However, this
would create an asymmetry in our distance measures, because strengthDiff (Definition
61) does not take the underlying ASPIC+ knowledge base into account, and relies only
on the resulting argument graph. For this reason, we will use a simple set-based dis-
tance measure. The distance measure argDiff(Res1,Res2) essentially counts how many
arguments are only found in one of Res1, Res2.
Definition 62 (Argument-Based Difference of Decision Outcomes). Let Res1,Res2 be
two decision outcomes. The argument-based distance of Res1,Res2 is defined as
argDiff(Res1,Res2) = |args(Res1)∆args(Res2)|
Example 41. For the decision outcomes Res1 and Res2 from Example 37, we get
argDiff(Res1,Res2) = |args(Res1)∆args(Res2)|
= |{a1,a4,a5,a7,a8,a9}|
= 6
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The measure argDiff stays true to Dung’s formalism by not assuming any-
thing about the arguments other than the fact that they form a set. It is clear that
argDiff(Res1,Res2) cannot be zero if strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) is non-zero, because
each of Res1,Res2 is conflict-free.
Proposition 33. For any two decision outcomes Res1, Res2, if strengthDiff(Res1,Res2)>
0 then argDiff(Res1,Res2)> 0.
Proof. Let Res1, Res2 be two decision outcomes such that strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) >
0. Let G = (A,Att) = argGraph(Res1 ∪Res2) and let A1 = args(Res1) and let A2 =
args(Res2). Since strengthDiff(Res1,Res2)> 0, there must be at least one attack in Att,
so Att 6= /0. Let (a,b) ∈ Att and assume a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2 (without loss of generality,
by Propage 25). The argument graph (A1,Att1) = argGraph(Res1) is conflict-free (by
Propage 24), so b /∈ A1. Therefore, b∈ A1∆A2, so A1∆A2 6= /0 and argDiff(Res1,Res2)>
0.
Example 42. In terms of the running example from Section 4.3, we get the following
argument differences for the decision outcomes defined in Example 34.
argDiff(Res1,Res2) = |{a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8}|= 7
argDiff(Res2,Res3) = |{a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a10,a11,a12}|= 11
argDiff(Res1,Res3) = |{a9,a10,a11,a12}|= 4
While the strengthDiff values for Res1, Res2 and Res3 are relatively small (see page
136, Example 40), the difference in arguments between the outcomes varies consider-
ably. The design and its justification have evolved, while conflicting justifications have
been kept to a minimum, which can be interpreted as sign of a healthy decision process.
In the following section we will take a closer look at the interplay of strengthDiff
and argDiff.
4.4.2.1 Relationship between argDiff and strengthDiff
The two measures of impact correspond to the conflict-based (strengthDiff, Definition
61) and knowledge-based (argDiff, Definition 62) distance measures. The possible
results of comparing decision outcomes Res and Res′ with strengthDiff and argDiff,
can be grouped into four categories, forming an imaginary square:
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1. strengthDiff(Res,Res′) = 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′) = 0
2. strengthDiff(Res,Res′) 6= 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′) = 0
3. strengthDiff(Res,Res′) = 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′)> 0
4a. strengthDiff(Res,Res′)< 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′)> 0
4b. strengthDiff(Res,Res′)> 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′)> 0
The first case only occurs when Res = Res′. The second case is impossible to achieve
(see Propage 34 below). This leaves us with three interesting cases: Knowledge has
been changed, but there are no changes in argument strength (case 3), knowledge
changed, argument strength decreased (case 4a) and knowledge changed, argument
strength increased (case 4a).
Proposition 34. For any two decision outcomes Res,Res′, if argDiff(Res,Res′) = 0 then
strengthDiff(Res,Res′) = 0.
Proof. Let G = (A,Att) = argGraph(Res∪ Res′) and assume argDiff(Res,Res′) = 0.
Then args(Res) = args(Res′), so Res= Res′ (by the assumption that there are no unused
rules, see page 33). Since args(Res) is conflict-free, attacks(Res∪Res′) = /0, and we
can apply Propage 32 to get strengthDiff(Res,Res′) = 0.
We will now analyse each of the two remaining cases.
First, if strengthDiff(Res,Res′) = 0 and argDiff(Res,Res′)> 0 then either there are
no conflicts in argGraph(Res∪Res′), or the strength of Res’s arguments is exactly the
same as that of the arguments of Res′ (cf. the discussion of Propage 32 on page 136).
In either case, the added knowledge did not result in a strengthening of the decision’s
justification.
If however strengthDiff(Res,Res′) > 0, then the average strength of the ar-
guments of Res′ is higher (in Res ∪ Res′) than that of the arguments of Res. If
strengthDiff(Res,Res′) < 0, then the average strength of Res is higher, and switch-
ing from Res to Res′ resulted in a relative weakening of the reasons used to justify the
decision.
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Example 43. For decision outcomes Res1 and Res3 from Example 4.3 we get
strengthDiff(Res1,Res3) = 0 and argDiff(Res1,Res3) = 4, implying that their justi-
fications overlap (albeit not completely) but are not inconsistent. In our running
example, Res1 is followed by Res3, but this result shows that we could replace Res1
with Res3 without having to take a different stance on previously accepted arguments.
On the other hand, if strengthDiff(r,r′)> 0, the two decision outcomes are incom-
patible, and replacing r with r′ requires us to reject some assumptions that were made
originally.
Example 44. The two outcomes in Example 37 are not compatible, because
strengthDiff(Res1,Res2) = 2. If we replaced Res1 with Res2, we would have to re-
ject arguments a1, a5 and a8. This has implications for subsequent decisions that
were based on Res1: Any arguments which have a1, a5 or a8 as sub-arguments will be
incompatible with Res1’s replacement (Res2) and therefore have to be adjusted.
With strengthDiff and argDiff, we can get an idea of how different the justifications
of two decisions are. They bring us closer – as alluded to in the previous two examples
– to achieving our larger goal: To assess the impact of adjusting past decisions on the
overall decision process, not just on the immediately affected decision outcome.
4.4.3 Impact Analysis for Decision Sequences
The two measures of impact (Definition 61 and 62) each target a pair of decision out-
comes. However, when making a change to an earlier decision one is usually interested
in the consequences on all subsequent decisions, not just the one immediately affected.
In this section we will look at how the two impact measures can be applied to decision
sequences.
Let us assume we have a decision sequence S1 = (Res1,Res2, . . . ,Resn) and want
to replace Res1 with a different decision Res′1. The result is a new decision se-
quence S2 = (Res′1,Res2, . . . ,Resn), differing from S1 only in its first element. We
can now use strengthDiff or argDiff to compare S1 and S2 element-wise, by computing
strengthDiff(Res1,Res′1), strengthDiff(Res2,Res2), and so on. This approach is obvi-
ously no better than simply comparing Res1 and Res′1 directly, because the remaining
elements Res2, . . . ,Resn are the same in both sequences. However, even though com-
paring Res2 with Res2 with Res2 does not yield any insights, changing decision Res1
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to Res′1 potentially still affects Res2 and other subsequent decisions. For example, if
an argument a in Res2 depends on (that is, has as a sub-argument) an argument from
Res1 that is rejected in Res′1, then a suddenly becomes inconsistent with the previous
decision. The reason why this inconsistency is not flagged in our simple comparison
of S1 and S2 is that the impact of changing Res1 to Res′1 is not carried forward to the
remaining decision outcomes. In other words, subsequent outcomes such as Res2 may
depend on Res1 implicitly rather than explicitly.
In Section 4.3.2 we developed a toolkit for drawing out such implicit dependencies
in sequences of decision outcomes: The emb operation and its counterpart extract. By
applying emb and extract to the decision outcomes in S, we get a decision sequence S′
in which every element is different, not just the first one. So in order to assess the impact
of changing Res1 to Res′1, we still compare the two outcomes initially (for example by
computing strengthDiff(Res1,Res2), but subsequent comparisons are different. Instead
of strengthDiff(Res2,Res2) we compute strengthDiff(Res2,extract(Emb′S(Res2))) and
so on. By using the emb operation, we propagate the change through the entire se-
quence S.
In order for this approach to work for changes that do not involve the very first
decision outcome, we need to take the embedding of the original sequence. To get an
idea of the conflicts introduced by changing S to S′, with respect to the i-th outcome,
we compute the strengthDiff value of the embedding (in S) of Resi and the embedding
(in S′) of Res′i.
In the following definitions, we use the term impact measure to denote any func-
tion from pairs of decision outcomes to real numbers, such as strengthDiff and argDiff.
Definition 63 (Impact on Decision Outcome). Let S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn) and S′ =
(Res′1, . . . ,Res
′
n) be two sequences of decision outcomes and let µ be an impact mea-
sure. The impact of changing S to S′ on the i-th element is defined as
impactµ(S,S
′, i) = µ(extract(embS(Resi)),extract(embS′(Res′i)))
4.4.3.1 Example
We will dedicate the next few pages to a large example in which we illustrate the de-
velopments so far. Recall that we introduced several decision outcomes Res1 to Res5,
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four of which are repeated here (you can find the original definition in Example 33 on
page 117).
Res1 = O1∪K1 with Res2 = O2∪K2 with
O1 = {⇒ al} O2 = {⇒ alu,⇒ bolts,⇒ shim}
K1 = {r1,r2,r3} K2 = {r1,r4,r5}
r1 = al⇒ strong r4 = bolts⇒¬〈r2〉
r2 = al⇒ non corrosive r5 = shim,bolts⇒ good EMC
r3 = al⇒ high weight
Res3 = O3∪K3 with
O3 = {⇒ al,⇒ no coating,⇒ screws}
K3 = {r1,r2,r3,r6,r7}
r6 = al,no coating⇒ corrosion resistant
r7 = al,screws⇒ good EMC
Res5 = O5∪K5 with
O5 = {⇒ length(s2,25cm),⇒ al,⇒ no coating,⇒ screws}
K5 = {r1,r2,r3,r6,r9}
r9 = length(s2,≤ 30cm)⇒¬good EMC
In this example we will focus on the process (Res1,Res3,Res5) and change it to
(Res2,Res3,Res5) – that is, the first element of the process will be changed from Res1
to Res2. The original process (Res1,Res3,Res5) is straightforward because it produces
a monotonically growing set of options – in other words, the design is more and more
specialised but never reverted. As explained in Example 33, Res1 is not followed by
Res2 because some of the assumptions in Res1 would be invalidated by Res2. Res4 is
produced in parallel to Res3 and merged into the main process in the next step, Res5.
We can use impactµ to analyse the impact of changing S = (Res1,Res3,Res5) to S′ =
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(Res2,Res3,Res5).
The process involves quite a few arguments and complex calculations. In order to
make it easier for the reader to follow along, we have created a diagram of the entire
process in Figure 4.3 on page 145, and listed all arguments in Table 4.3 on the same
page.
How to read Figure 4.3 The diagram on page 145 shows two versions of the same
decision process, namely S = (Res1,Res3,Res5) and S′ = (Res2,Res3,Res5). Each col-
umn corresponds to a stage (for example, the leftmost column displays Res1 in S and
Res2 in S′). The three rows show arguments found only in S (top row), arguments found
in both processes (middle row) and arguments found in S′ only (bottom row). Arrows
between arguments indicate attacks, as usual.
It is important to note that the arguments shown are those of embS and embS′ ,
respectively - that is why we also see the three arguments aA, aB and aC, which were
not part of S or S′, but are a product of the enforcement operation: aA and aB attack
arguments a5 and a7, making explicit the fact that shim and bolts are incompatible
with our choice of screws in stage 2 and therefore have to be rejected. aC attacks
argument a12 (in order to enforce a15), because by choosing Res3 we accepted the
argument against good EMC and thus rejected our earlier argument a12 which stated the
contrary.
The diagram visualises a number of interesting properties of decision processes
and their embeddings. First, we can see that the arguments at each stage are consistent
- as evidenced by the fact that all “attacks” arrows are drawn across the boundaries of
a decision outcome.
Second, we made use of Definition 54 Cond. 1, which states that in an embedding
of a decision process, each stage must contain the knowledge of its predecessor. Be-
cause of this condition we only display arguments when they are first introduced, and
do not have to repeat them later on. To find out, for example, which arguments are part
of embS at stage three, we need to consider the first three columns in the top and middle
rows. To see which arguments are part of embS′ at stage two, we need to take the first
two columns of the middle and botton rows.
Third, the diagram illustrates how enforce works as part of the Embed operation.
This is indicated by aA to aC: If we take the argument graph for embS′ at stage two (con-
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taining arguments a1, a2, a5 . . .a12, aA and aB), we can see that its grounded extension
consists of {a1,a2,a9 . . .a12,aA,aB}. Specifically, it contains all of Res2’s arguments.
Without aA and aB, argument a11 would not be sceptically acceptable. It is however
sceptically acceptable in this case because of the use of enforce in the definition of
Embed (page 123).
Finally, we can see from the diagram what the result of extract is for any of the
stages in S or S′. For example, to get extract(embS′(Res2)) we have to look at the
middle and bottom rows (because they contain arguments for S′), and take the argument
graph for the cells in the first two columns (because Res2 is the second result, and each
stage contains all rules introduced at previous stages). We then take the grounded
extension of this argument graph to get the result of extract. In our case, the grounded
extension to consider is {a1,a2,a9 . . .a12,aA,aB}, so we can simply take the union of
the knowledge of those arguments to get extract(embS′(Res2)).
4.4.
Im
pactA
nalysis
145
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
embSonly
both
embS′only
a1 a2
a3 a4
a5a6
a8a7
a9
a10
a11
a12 a13a15
aA
aB
aC
Figure 4.3: Impact of changing from S to S′ – page 143
Table 4.3: Arguments for Section 4.4.3.1
Name Argument Attacks
a1 [⇒ al;al] -
a2 [a1;al⇒ strong;strong] -
a3 [a1;al⇒ non corr.;non corr.] -
a4 [a1;al⇒ high weight;high weight] -
a5 [⇒ bolts;bolts] a11
a6 [a5;bolts⇒¬〈r2〉;¬〈r2〉] a3
a7 [⇒ shim;shim] a11
a8 [a5,a7;shim,bolts⇒ good EMC;good EMC] a15
a9 [⇒ no coating;no coating] -
Name Argument Attacks
a10 [a1,a9;r6;corrosion resistant] -
a11 [⇒ screws;screws] a5,a7
a12 [a1,a11;r7;good EMC] a15
a13 [⇒ length(s2,25cm);length(s2,25cm)] -
a15 [a13;r9;¬good EMC] a12,a8
aA [⇒¬〈⇒ bolts〉] a5,a6,a8
aB [⇒¬〈⇒ shim〉] a7
aC [⇒¬〈r7〉] a12
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Impact Analysis To measure the impact of changing Res1 to Res2, we proceed step by
step through the decision sequence. First, we analyse the impact on the first element
using the strengthDiff(KB,KB′) measure. The diagram on page 145 is helpful here,
too: To see what KB and KB′ should be for this invocation of strengthDiff, we can
simply set KB (the “old” knowledge base) to contain the knowledge for all arguments
in the top left and middle left cells, and KB′ (the new knowledge base) to contain
all arguments in the middle left and bottom left cells. This results in the following
calculation:
impactstrengthDiff(S,S
′,1) = strengthDiff(extract(embS(Res1)),extract(embS′(Res2)))
(By Propage 29)
= strengthDiff(Res1,Res2)
(Cf. Example 40 on page 136)
≈ 0.19
Calculating the impact on the second element is a little more complex.
impactstrengthDiff(S,S
′,2) = strengthDiff(extract(embS(Res3)),extract(emb′S(Res3)))
(Definition 55 and Res1∪Res3 conflict-free)
= strengthDiff(Res1∪Res3,enforce(args(Res3),Res2∪Res3))
(Res1 ⊆ Res3)
= strengthDiff(Res3,enforce(args(Res3),Res2∪Res3))
(K23 := enforce(args(Res3),Res2∪Res3))
= strengthDiff(Res3,K23)
(G2 := argGraph(K3∪K23); see discussion below)
=
10.75
12
− 7.5
8
≈ 0.896−0.9375
≈−0.0415
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Here, we examine strengthDiff for Res2 and K23, which together result in the graph
G2 = (A2,Att2) = argGraph(Res2 ∪K23). As we can see in Figure 4.3, this graph
contains arguments A2 = {a1, . . . ,a12,aA,aB} and has the following attacks: a6→ a3,
aA→ a6, a5↔ a11, a7↔ a11, aB→ a7, aA→ a5, aA→ a8 and a11→ a8.
The value of strengthDiff(Res3,K23) is negative, because the average strength in
enforce(args(Res3),Res2 ∪ Res3) is lower than the average strength of arguments in
Res3 alone.
We can now compute the impact of changing Res1 to Res2 on the last element in
the sequence, Res5. The method is the same as in the previous two examples so we will
elide some intermediate steps.
impactstrengthDiff(S,S
′,3) = strengthDiff(extract(embS(Res5)),extract(embS′(Res5)))
(. . . ,G3 := (A3,Att3))
=
13.25
15
− 8.25
11
= 0.883−0.75
≈ 0.13
In the last step, the strengthDiff measure increased slightly, because one of Res3’s ar-
guments is defeated - namely a12 the arguments for good EMC, which was deactivated
in order to accomodate a15. The values 0.19 and 0.13 (first and third calculation) indi-
cate a rather large increase in the average strength of arguments (considering that the
strength is between zero and one). The impact on the second step, measured as -0.0415,
is smaller. This shows that changing S to S′ overall had a positive effect on argument
strength. To complete this example, we give the values for impactargDiff(S,S′, i)without
much detail:
impactargDiff(S,S
′,1) = |{a3, . . . ,a8}| = 6
impactargDiff(S,S
′,2) = |{a3, . . . ,a8,aA,aB}| = 8
impactargDiff(S,S
′,3) = |{a3, . . . ,a8,aA,aB}| = 8
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The knowledge-based impact (as measured with argDiff) of choosing Res2 over Res1 is
most strongly evident in the first two elements of the sequence, where it increases from
6 to 8. After that, the impact remains the same, because no additional arguments have
to be changed in Res5 to accomodate Res2.
4.4.3.2 Impact on Decision Sequences
In order to get an indication of the impact of change on an entire decision sequence, we
can simply take the sum of the impact on its elements.
Definition 64 (Impact on Decision Sequence). Let S = (Res1, . . . ,Resn) and S′ =
(Res′1, . . . ,Res
′
n) be two sequences of decision outcomes and let µ be an impact mea-
sure. The impact of changing S to S′ is defined as
impact∗µ(S,S
′) = ∑
1≤i<n
impactµ(S,S
′, i)
where S′ = (Res′1,Res2, . . . ,Resn) is the changed sequence.
Example 45. Given the results from Example 4.4.3.1, we can easily compute
impact∗strengthDiff(S,S
′) and impact∗argDiff(S,S
′):
impact∗strengthDiff(S,S
′)≈ 0.19−0.0415+0.13 = 0.2785
impact∗argDiff(S,S
′) = 6+8+8 = 22
Since these values on their own do not have a unit, they gain meaning only by compar-
ing the impact of several different changes. With argDiff, as with strengthDiff before,
the impact increases as we proceed in the decision sequence.
Before we conclude this section we will show that impactµ is well-behaved: If any
two decision sequences S,S′ have a prefix in common (that is, some initial decisions are
unchanged), then impactµ will only yield a non-zero value after the change was made.
Proposition 35. Let S,S′ be two decision sequences of the same length n, let T be a
decision sequence of length k with 1 < k < n such that T is a prefix of both S and S′. Let
µ be an impact measure with µ(KB,KB′) = 0 if KB = KB′. (identity property). Then
for all l ≤ k,
4.4. Impact Analysis 149
impactµ(S,S
′, l) = 0
Proof. Follows from Definition 63 and the fact that µ(Res1,Res2) = 0 if Res1 = Res2
(identity).
The impact measures developed in this section demonstrated the value of our two-
tiered model of decision sequences. Example 4.4.3.1 in particular shows how complex
argument graphs arise from relatively simple definitions such as decision outcomes,
embeddings and the two impact measures.
4.4.4 Progress in Decision Sequences
In the paragraphs above we developed two ways of measuring change in decision out-
comes, one based on knowledge that was added or removed, and one based on conflict
arising from a change of mind. We applied strengthDiff and argDiff to two outcomes
of the same decision, in order to gauge the difference in argument strength and number
between them.
Instead of analysing the difference between two outcomes of the same decision,
we are now going to look at the difference between two decision outcomes Res1 and
Res2 where Res1 was followed by Res2, instead of replaced by it, resulting in a char-
acterisation of the “progress” of a decision sequence. That is, we get an impression of
how the coherence (conflict-freeness) and justification of decisions evolves.
The difference between Res2 replacing Res1 and Res2 following Res1 is that in the
first case, the option represented by Res1 is not part of the eventual design anymore,
because Res1 was completely replaced by Res2. In the second case, both Res1 and
Res2 are part of the final design, and Res2 is not a revision of Res1 but a refinement
of it. When talking about decision outcomes in this section we will always use their
embeddings (see Section 4.3.2 on page 118) to ensure that all implicit assumptions are
included in the analysis.
Again, we characterise progress in terms of arguments, not for example in terms of
how many of requirements have been met and how many are still open. This approach
is a good demonstration of the unique contribution that an argumentation-based model
such as ours may bring to the management of engineering design processes.
In the following sections (4.4.4.1 to 4.4.4.3), we define three binary relations of
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outcomes: monotonic, weakening and alteration. These relations can be applied to
decision sequences by applying them to successive pairs of outcomes. For example, in
a decision sequence (Res1,Res2,Res3,Res4) we may find that the transition from Res1
to Res2 was monotonic, and the transition from Res2 to Res3 was an alteration. We then
express each of the three relations in terms of argDiff and strengthDiff.
4.4.4.1 Monotonic
Ideally, decision processes advance linearly towards their target, without any change of
requirements, reversals of decisions or other detours. The justifications of individual
decisions (i.e. the design documents) can be collated to an overall design without any
inconsistencies. Therefore, this kind of progress does not introduce any attacks on
previously accepted arguments, and results in conflict-free embeddings.
In our formal model, a monotonic transition from Res1 to Res2 has the property
that all of Res1’s arguments are part of the grounded extension of emb(Res2), that is,
they are still acceptable in Res2.
Definition 65 (Monotonic). A sequence of decision outcomes S=(Res1,Res2) is mono-
tonic iff
args(Res1)⊆ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res2)))
Example 46. (Res1,Res3) from Example 34 is monotonic.
An equivalent definition of monotonic is that the argument graph of embS(Res2)
has an empty attacks-relation, as the following result shows.
Proposition 36. A sequence of decision outcomes S = (Res1,Res2) is monotonic if and
and only if
attacks(argGraph(embS(Res2))) = /0
Proof. (⇐) Let S = (Res1,Res2) such that attacks(argGraph(embS(Res2))) = /0. Let
a ∈ args(Res1). By Definition 54 Cond. 1, Res1 ⊆ embS(Res1), and by Definition 54
Cond. 3, embS(Res1)⊆ embS(Res2), so a ∈ args(embS(Res2)).
Since attacks(argGraph(embS(Res2))) = /0, a ∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res2))).
Therefore S is monotonic.
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(⇒) Let S = (Res1,Res2) be a decision sequence such that S is montonic. Let G2 =
argGraph(embS(Res2)). Assume that attacks(G2) 6= /0 (Proof by contradiction). Then
there exist two arguments a1,a2 ∈ args(embS(Res2)) such that (a1,a2) ∈ attacks(G2).
Since both argGraph(Res1) and argGraph(Res2) are conflict-free, the attack (a1,a2)
must be such that
1. a1 ∈ args(Res1) and a2 ∈ args(Res2) or
2. a1 ∈ args(Res2) and a2 ∈ args(Res1) or
3. a1 or a2 were introduced by Definition 55 Cond. 2, reactivate.
In case (1), a1 ∈ args(G2) (by the assumption that S is monotonic, Definition 65). Then,
a2 is attacked by an argument in the grounded extension and therefore a2 /∈ Σgr(G2).
This violates condition 2 of Definition 54, so embS is not an embedding of S, which
contradicts Theorem 5.
In case (2), by Definition 54 Cond. 2, a1 ∈ Σgr(G2) and therefore a2 /∈ Σpgrr(G2).
This contradicts the assumption that S is monotonic (Definition 65).
In case of (3), there is an “underlying” attack (a2,a′2) by. Definition 48 which can
be reduced to case (1) or (2).
Proposition 37. If a decision sequence S = (Res1,Res2) is monotonic then
strengthDiff(Res1,EmbS(Res2)) = 0.
Proof. From Propage 36 we know that attacks(argGraph(embS(Res2))) = /0, and we
can apply Propage 32 to get strengthDiff(Res1,EmbS(Res2)) = 0.
The opposite direction of Propage 37 does not hold, because Propage 32 also only
holds for the “if-then” case (see the discussion on page 136 for a counterexample).
However, if Res1 and Res2 are embedded in some larger decision process
(. . . ,Res1,Res2, . . .) then their counterparts Res′1 and Res
′
2 are not necessarily conflict-
free anymore, because attacking arguments may have been introduced by earlier deci-
sions.
4.4.4.2 Weakening
The support for a decision Res1 is weakened in embS(Res2) if the option of Res2 sub-
sumes the option of Res1, but the arguments of Res2 defeat at least one argument of
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Res1. In this case, the design that was agreed on in Res1 has not been altered (only
specialised) in Res2, but its support is weaker.
Definition 66 (Weakening). In a sequence of decision outcomes S= (Res1,Res2), Res1
is weakened by Res2 if
1. option(Res1)⊆ option(Res2) and
2. ∃a ∈ args(Res1) such that a /∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res2)))
Example 47. In Example 34, the transition (Res1,Res2) is a weakening one, because
argument a3 = [a1;aluminium⇒ non corrosive;non corrosive] is not part of the
grounded extension of Res2’s embedding. It is attacked by argument a6.
In a practical application of the theory, occurrences of weakening should be
flagged to the user, because they imply that some of the arguments used to justify a
decision were attacked (invalidated) later on, even though the decision itself has not
been changed. Weakening may be an accidental side effect of decision making.
4.4.4.3 Alteration
As a generalisation of weakening (Definition 66), it is possible that an argument of Res1
is defeated in embS(Res2), without option(Res1)⊆ option(Res2).
Definition 67 (Alteration). A sequence of decision outcomes S = (Res1,Res2) is an
alteration iff
∃a ∈ args(Res1) such that a /∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res2)))
Example 48. In Example 34, the transition Res2,Res3 is an alteration, because the
arguments a5 = [bolts] and a7 = [shim] are part of Res2 but not of Res3.
The following result shows that any change in the option of a decision outcome
results in either an alteration or a monotonic transition.
Proposition 38. Let Res1, Res2 be two decision outcomes with option(Res1) 6=
option(Res2). Then (Res1,Res2) is either monotonic or an alteration, but not both.
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Proof. Let Res1 = (O1,K1) and Res2 = (O2,K2) be two decision outcomes with O1 6=
O2.
Monotonic or alteration... Either O1 ⊆ O2 or not. If O1 ⊆ O2, then either (a)
args(Res1)⊆Σpr(argGraph(embS(Res2))) or (b) args(Res1)*Σpr(argGraph(embS(Res2))).
In case (a), (Res1,Res2) is monotonic by Definition 65. In case (b), there exists an ar-
gument a ∈ args(Res1) such that a /∈ Σgr(argGraph(embS(Res2))). Then, (Res1,Res2)
is an alteration by Definition 67.
If O1 * O2 then there exists a literal l ∈ O1 such that l /∈ O2. Hence there is
an argument [l] ∈ args(Res1) with [l] /∈ args(Res2) and (Res1,Res2) is an alteration by
Definition 67.
... but not both Follows from the logical form of the two defitions.
In practical applications, alterations may be a sign of a healthy decision process,
because they occur if a previous error has been corrected (as shown in Example 48).
However, it is clear from the definition that every instance of weakening is also an
alteration, so any alterations should be analysed further.
4.4.5 Summary
In the beginning of this section we tried to evaluate the impact that changing one’s
mind has on past decisions. We studied the impact by comparing the decision process
before and after the change was made. We introduced two ways of measuring impact.
The first method is strength-based and it derives from the change in argument strength
(strengthDiff, Definition 61 on page 135). The second method is knowledge-based and
it counts the number of acceptable arguments added or removed through the change
(argDiff, Definition 62 on page 137). In Example 4.4.3.1 we demonstrated both meth-
ods in detail, using the case study introduced at the beginning of this chapter.
In the second part of this section, we looked at the difference not between deci-
sion sequences, but between their individual steps. We developed a set of properties
that characterise progress in decision sequences, namely monotonic, weakening and al-
teration. The distinction between monotonic and alteration is made purely on the status
of the arguments in the first outcome r1 - either all of them are still acceptable in r2
(monotonic) or they are not (alteration). Weakening as a subclass of alteration is per-
haps the most interesting kind of change from a practical perspective, because it may
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indicate that a decision has unintended consequences.
The three properties that characterise progress rely on the notion of decision se-
quences and embeddings, for making implicit conflicts and assumptions visible.
4.5 Practical Implications
In the last section of this chapter we explain how the theory may be put to use in a
practical application and show that our theoretical model implements part of the orig-
inal vision of project DEEPFLOW. This serves two closely related purposes: First, to
demonstrate a novel potentially very fruitful practical application of argumentation the-
ory, and second, to provide motivation for the research efforts still needed to remove
the obstacles that stand between the present theoretical model and its practical imple-
mentation.
4.5.1 Decision Outcomes Represent Design Documents
The outcome Res of a decision stage (Definition 52) forms a conflict-free argument
graph, as shown in Propage 24. This graph contains all arguments in favour of the
option. Res can be seen as the formal representation of a design document that describes
why a certain option was chosen. As we discuss in the introduction (Section 1.2.1 on
page 12), this is the typical structure of engineering design documents, which focus on
the reasons in favour of a particular option (arguments pro). Arguments against that
option are not given explicitly, only implicitly in form of counter-arguments supporting
the option. This is due to the rhetorical structure of design documents, which aims to
persuade the reader that the right option was chosen.
Our definition of the outcome of a decision stage (Definition 52) therefore has the
advantage that, in theory, tuples of option and relevant knowledge could be extracted
from design documents without having to include all available options and all the expert
knowledge that was utilised in the decision making. If we define decision processes as
sequences of decision outcomes Res then our definition matches the textual artifacts
produced by actual decision processes.
An important consequence of this finding concerns the use of Natural Language
Processing (NLP) techniques for extracting arguments from text: One should not look
for arguments, counterarguments, and counter-counterarguments within the same doc-
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ument, because most of the times the arguments in one document support the same
conclusion. Instead, one should focus on the “positive” relationship between arguments
in a single document (that is, the support or sub-argument relationship), and look for
inconsistencies in the combination of several documents, for example by embedding
them in a decision sequence (see Section 4.3.2).
4.5.2 Impact Analysis
It is common knowledge in engineering (and also in other industries such as program-
ming) that there is a positive correlation between the time it takes for mistakes to be
noticed and the cost of fixing them [90]. Using the methodology we developed in Sec-
tion 4.4, we can not only turn this truism into a formal proposition (see Propage 35)
but also, and more importantly, we can give an estimation of how many decisions are
affected by change, and even to what degree.
4.5.3 Visualising Decision Processes
Decision sequences (Definition 52) are one-dimensional since the position of each de-
cision outcome in the sequence is defined entirely by its predecessor and successor.
Decision outcomes embedded in a decision process may have relationships that are
more interesting, for example those examined in Section 4.4.4.
Figure 4.4: DEEPFLOW: Visualisation of a set of design documents.
The original plans for project DEEPFLOW included a visualisation of the set of de-
sign documents for an engineering project that would give an impression of the “health”
of the design – how many decisions have been reversed or are in conflict with other dec-
sions. A sketch of this visualisation is shown in Figure 4.4.
We see a set of design decisions, represented by circles in three different colours.
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In the DEEPFLOW specification, the meaning of the colours was given as follows.
• Green: “Good decision”, no conflicts with other decisions
• Yellow: “Decision Changed”, decision was changed by a later decision
• Red: “Conflict”, decision is incompatible with other decision
This classification of decisions maps directly to the three different kinds of progress
we identified in Section 4.4.4. Decisions followed by monotonic transitions can be
coloured green, those followed by alterations yellow and decisions that are weakened
by subsequent decisions can be coloured red. The arrows in the diagram indicate a
“follows’ relationship between options, so an arrow from A to B means that B follows
A – they are part of a sequence (. . . ,A,B, . . .).
The two dimensions of the graph in Figure 4.4 are time (x-axis) and organisational
responsibility (y-axis) - that is, which group (of engineers) was responsible for a deci-
sion. The very first decision, marked (1), was made by group D. It was subsequently
revised several times, most recently by group A, marked (2). The two red arrows are
an indication that groups A and B have based their recent decisions on conflicting as-
sumptions, and should get together and restore coherence. The graph also shows that
group C has made the most decisions, although three out of its four decisions have
been revised later on, as indicated by their yellow colour. If the obstacles described
in Section 4.5.1 can be overcome, then our theoretical model of decision processes is
able to produce such diagrams automatically from a set of design documents, giving a
high-level insight into the consistency of engineering design processes.
4.5.3.1 Characterising Decisions
The analysis so far has been based on sequences of decision outcomes, but not on the
different options that were considered for each decision. Due to the nature of design
documentation, having a record of those options that were discussed but ultimately
rejected is a much stronger assumption (see the discussion on page 154). In case we do
have access to this data we can enrich the visualisation with information about options
that were considered. For example, we can apply the decision rules from Section 3.3.4
(page 62) of the previous chapter to characterise the optimism of decision makers.
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4.5.3.2 Example
We will conclude this section with visualisation of the running example originally in-
troduced on page 118. The example concists of five decision results, Res1 to Res5. We
did not discuss the organisational structure in which the process took place, except that
decision Res4 was made in parallel to Res3, and both work streams were merged in
Res5. We will therefore assume two teams: Team A is responsible for decisions Res1,
Res2, Res3 and Res5, and team B is responsible for Res4 only.
The individual arguments of this process are shown on page 145. The diagram in
Figure 4.5 below shows what the process looks like in the DEEPFLOW visualisation.
Res1 and Res3 are yellow because they were altered by subsequent decisions (Res1 by
Res3 and Res3 by Res5). Res2 is red because it is a weakening of Res1.
Figure 4.5: Visualisation of example process.
4.5.3.3 Discussion
We started with a minimal representation of decision outcomes (in Definition 52, added
a notion of embedding them in the larger context of decision processes (Definition 54),
and then looked at the possible relationships of decision outcomes within embeddings
(Section 4.4.4). The three properties we identified – no changes, changed decisions,
unchanged decisions with weakened support – can be directly mapped to the three
categories that had been thought up for project DEEPFLOW, before any of the theory
was developed. We believe that this gives additional weight to the validity of our theory.
Of course, there are many problems to be solved before a collection of design
documents can be turned into the diagram in Figure 4.4, but our model of decision
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processes is a first step in that direction.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at using formal methods of ar-
gumentation for a model of engineering design processes that takes the history and
evolution of decisions into account. We can find related work in two areas: Design
rationale and measures of argument strength.
4.6.1.1 Design Rationale
Design rationale (DR) is a diagrammatic method for capturing the reasons “why an
artifact, or some part of it, is designed the way it is.” [91, page 1] Originating in
engineering design [9] it has been applied to various other areas including software
design [92, 93], architecture [94] and ontology engineering [95].
Each of the cited proposals has its own reference implementation, providing a
working definition of DR for a particular context. As a result, there is no consensus on
a generally accepted, formal definition.
Notion of Argument in Design Rationale One of the most profound differences be-
tween design rationale approaches on the one hand and models based on formal ar-
gumentation (including the one in this thesis) on the other hand is in the concept of
arguments. A significant proportion2 of DR implementations are based on the Issue-
Based Information System (IBIS [96]) with a “semi-formal graphical format for laying
out the structure of arguments” [91, page 5]. In IBIS, decisions are formulated as issues
with one or more associated positions, which in turn are supported to or contradicted by
arguments. Each position is either accepted (resolved) or rejected from the issue. The
format is called semi-formal because there is no information beyond this hierarchical
structure of issues, positions and argumentes. For example, it is not possible to infer,
say, conflicts between issues based on their arguments. The same applies to other DR
implementations, not based on IBIS. This limitation has been recognised as a major
drawback of design rationale (see Hu et al. [91, page 10] and Lee [8, page 84]).
The INFORAT system [9] is a notable exception because it adds the ability to
2About a third of those surveyed by Hu et al. [91]
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make inference over a design’s rationale – for example, it can flag that two conflicting
positions are supported by the same arguments. INFORAT captures the history of a
decision and it uses a list of argument schemes (called “standard claim vocabulary”),
so it is relevant both for the developments in this chapter (decision processes) and the
next (argument schemes and meta-argumentation). However, its reasoning capabilities
fall short of those of our model in several ways. First, arguments based on a standard
claim vocabulary can only be compared syntactically, and not based on an underlying
theory (for example, it is not possible to infer that one argument undermines another
in INFORAT). This also means that too many arguments may be flagged as conflicting,
because it is very well possible that the same argument may be used as support for
two conflicting options. In our system, this phenomenon would result in a non-empty
intersection of the two sets of arguments (preferred extensions) in support of the op-
tions. Second, although the concept of revising decisions exists in INFORAT, decisions
are still studied in isolation. In contrast, our model reflects the dynamics of decision
processes comprising many individual decisions, enabling for example impact analysis
as described in Section 4.4.
Producing Design Rationale Lee [8] lists the methods by which design rationale is
produced: Reconstruction (documenting decisions after the fact), record-and-replay
(recording all information produced in the design process), methodological byproduct
(following a specific design methodology which produces design rationale as an arti-
fact), apprentice (getting the system to ask questions about the process) and automatic
generation. Of these, reconstruction produces the highest quality output, but also im-
poses the highest additional effort on the design process. This classification can clearly
be applied to our own approach, as any of these methods could in theory be used to
produce formal knowledge bases. The discussion in the previous paragraphs supports
our view that the justification for a design should be extracted automatically, if at all
possible.
4.6.1.2 Measures of Argument Strength
The impact measure defined in Section 4.4.1.3 uses the change in argument strength
(Definition 61 on page 135) as a measure of the weakening or strengthening of a de-
cision justification after choosing a different option. It relies on the game-theoretic
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measure of argument strength by Matt and Toni [55].
When we introduced the notion of argument strength on page 130, we distin-
guished two kinds of strength: Extensional (argument strength is provided as input
to the system) and intensional (argument strength is derived from data that is already
in the system). One of the goals of our model has been to require as little input as
possible beyond the actual arguments that make up decisions, which is why we chose
the intensional approach to argument strength, with the specific proposal by Matt and
Toni [55].
Let us note here that most approaches to argument strength fall into the “exten-
sional” category. For example, the CARNEADES argumentation system [97] describes
argument strength with a partial order of arguments, similar to the ASPIC+ system in
its original form (cf. page 31). In the decision-making framework by Amgoud and
Prade [33], the strength of arguments pro and con an option is also given as a partial
order. The framework for evaluative arguments by Carenini and Moore [98], argument
strength is a function of evidence strength which in turn is derived from the preferences
of the reader. In the proposal by Dunne et al. [99], it is attacks that are weighted, rather
than arguments. In preference-based argumentation frameworks by Modgil [100], ar-
gument strength is based on preferences of the audience and the values promoted by an
argument. Argument strength has been explored in a number of other settings within
argumentation, such as compensation-based semantics [101]
Another approach is to equate the strength of an argument with its certainty. The
paper by Hunter [102] explores probabilistic argument graphs, graphs equipped with
a probability function of their arguments. In structured argumentation, the proposal
by Hunter [61] uses a probability distribution on sentences of the logical language to
derive probabilities of extensions of arguments. Krause et al. [103] define arguments
as proofs in a logic of argumentation, and represent uncertainty as a lattice over those
proofs. This approach allows for a number of different models of uncertainty.
Inconsistency In our model we define the impact of changing a decision to be the
change in argument strength of the decision’s support. Alternatively, we can define the
impact to be the change in inconsistency of the overall design. There exist a number of
ways to quantify inconsistency.
Hunter [104] proposes a measure of conflict for propositional belief bases. Their
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measure takes into account both the number of variables involved (contributing to) the
inconsistency, and the distribution of the inconsistency over formulae in the knowledge
base. A later paper by Grant and Hunter [105] also considers propositional belief bases.
Here, the concept of dilation is the basis for several inconsistency measures. Dilating
a formula means to look at the nearest neighbours of its models (for example, the
formula a∧ b has a single model {11}, whose nearest neighbours – differing in no
more than one truth assignment – are {11,01,10}, which is the model of a∨ b). The
amount of dilation required to reach a consistent belief base then forms the basis of the
inconsistency measures.
Besides these argumentation-specific measures of inconsistency (and argument
strength) there is a large body of work on inconsistency measures in general, for ex-
ample with probabilistic logics [106], fuzzy logic [107], propositional logic [108, 109].
In [110] the relationship of consistency gain and information loss is discussed, again
based on propositional logic, and it is established that inconsistency resolution by delet-
ing or changing formulae always leads to information loss. Our approach is based on
inconsistency resolution by expanding the knowledge base, which does not lead to
information loss (although the truth of this claim depends on the exact definition of
“information loss”).
The advantage of measuring inconsistency rather than argument strength is that
inconsistency is by definition a function of the knowledge base, and does not need to
be supplied as additional input to the system. Inconsistency measures therefore suit our
requirement of needing as little input data as possible, in addition to the actual design
justification.
Discussion While it seems natural to incorporate a notion of argument strength into
argumentation frameworks, extensional definitions of strength are problematic for our
use case, because they require additional information that often cannot be obtained
straightforwardly. For example, to reason about preferences we must have a formali-
sation of the audience’s preferences or values. Design documents do not contain such
data, so it would have to be supplied by means of annotation or meta-data. The his-
tory of design rationale (see page 158) has shown that requiring the user of a system to
manually formalise design documentation greatly inhibits the adoption of the system.
For this reason we have focused on intensional definitions of argument strength.
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When extracting arguments from text using natural language processing it is usu-
ally possible to quantify the certainty or plausibility that the formalisation accurately
represents the text. This data could be used as the basis for a probabilistic or possi-
bilistic argumentation framework. However, the certainty in this case would reflect the
quality of the argument extraction process, not of the strength of the extracted argu-
ments. Therefore this data is not a suitable basis for measuring the impact of change
on a decision sequence.
4.6.1.3 Argumentation-Based Planning
Our model of design decisions made by different teams over long periods of time bears
some resemblance to argumentation-based planning ([111, 112, 113], see [114] for a
recent survey), a research area motivated by the question how multiple agents, each
with its own knowledge and assumptions, can make a decision to achieve a common
goal through the exchange of arguments following some protocol – distinct from other
fields in agent-based argumentation [115] such as persuasion [116, 117], inquiry [118]
and recommendation [119].
The differences between our work and argumentation-based planning are twofold.
First, the collaboration between “agents”, or teams of engineers, in our setting is not
governed by a formal protocol (a set of rules specifying which moves are allowed at
a specific point in the game), and our model only captures the outcome of this collab-
oration, in the form of design documents and justifications. Second, our main goal is
to analyse decision processes that have already happened, for example by computing
the quality of decision justifications, or the impact that changing a decision could have.
Because of this, decisions in a valid decision sequence are not required to be optimal,
and our model cannot be used to determine decide whether an optimal solution for the
entire process exists (this is only possible for individual decisions, as covered in Chap-
ter 3, page 43). Instead, we aim to be able to represent a large number of possible
decision sequences and analyse them after the fact. In models of agent-based planning,
the goal is to arrive at a good decision that realises the agents’ goals.
4.6.1.4 Future Work
There are two main areas for future work. First, the theoretical underpinning of our
method for impact analysis should be solidified further by studying additional measures
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of impact. In this thesis we considered a strength-based measure and a measure of the
information contained in a model of decision processes. It would be interesting to
incorporate, for example, a notion of preferences or certainty of arguments, and to
derive an impact measure from those values.
Both of the measures we studied are based on abstract argumentation. This makes
our framework more general (because it is possible to use argumentation systems other
than ASPIC+), but it also means that we do not consider any information outside of
Dung’s argument graphs, for example about sub-arguments and supporting arguments.
We plan to investigate the use of non-classical logics, for example probabilistic or fuzzy
logics, which would allow us to utilise different measures of inconsistency such as the
ones proposed by Thimm [106] or Picado-Muin˜o [107].
The second area of future work is to turn this proposal into a practical application,
as outlined in Section 4.5. This involves two separate tasks: First, the automated extrac-
tion of arguments from text. While some progress has been made in this area (e.g. Bex
and Bench-Capon 2014 [120], Goudas et al. [121], Walton [122]), it is not possible yet
to extract arguments with an accuracy sufficient to enable the kind of analysis proposed
in this thesis. Second, we see a lot of potential in the visualisation of argumentative in-
formation, as explained in Section 4.5.3. The ability to produce visualisations such as
Figure 4.4 on page 155 is a major advantage of modeling decision rationale in a formal
language, a feature that is genuinely new and not possible with the software currently
used in the industry. Research work in this area includes usability studies with focus
groups, and an investigation of different layout/diagramming techniques.
4.6.1.5 Conclusion
Our argumentation-based model of decision processes consists of the two components
decision outcomes and embeddings.
Decision outcomes (Definition 52) capture the minimal knowledge that is required
to justify a decision, that is, to state all arguments in favour of the decision. A deci-
sion process, for example a engineering design process, can be seen as a sequence of
decision outcomes. Each decision outcome on its own is conflict-free, but the union of
several decision outcomes may be inconsistent.
The purpose of embeddings (Definition 54) is to draw out these inconsistencies.
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An embedding is a mapping of decision outcomes, which are conflict-free, to the more
general concept of ASPIC+ knowledge bases, which may or may not be conflict-free.
Embeddings encode a preference for later decisions over earlier ones, ensuring that the
latest decision outcome is always sceptically acceptable while retaining all arguments
from earlier decisions. Therefore, they ensure that arguments which are not acceptable
anymore (for example, because their assumptions no longer hold) are attacked by new,
“deactivating” arguments. Embeddings only add knowledge but never delete it, thus
making explicit any incompatibilities in the justifications of decisions. The relationship
between sequences of decision outcomes and their embeddings is made clear by Figure
4.1 on page 127.
In Section 4.4 of this chapter, we explored the properties of decision sequences
in two ways. First we developed a method for analysing the impact of changing an
earlier decision by looking at the number of new arguments and conflicts introduced
by the changed. In a similar way, we characterised the progress that has been made by
transitioning from one decision to the next. Both methods are agnostic of the underlying
domain (e.g. of engineering design) and only consider the justifications of decisions on
the level of arguments and attacks. The methods thus illustrate the unique advantages
that can be gained from a formalisation of decision outcomes in our logical framework.
The practical implications of our work were examined in Section 4.5. The two-
tiered model of decision outcomes and decision sequences is consistent with our find-
ings about real-world design documents (see Section 4.5.1). Each of those documents
on its own consistently explains why a certain part of the design was chosen, but in-
consistency arises when those individual decisions are viewed as parts of the overall
design.
In the previous chapter we looked at argumentation-based models of design de-
cisions, and in this chapter we looked at decisions as part of a design, embedded in
decision sequences. The following chapter will be concerned with what actually makes
an argument, and investigate arguments about arguments (rather than arguments about,
say, the merits of aluminium over steel).
Chapter 5
Argument Schemes
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we used the ASPIC+ argumentation system and a “logical
language”L . We did not specify an inference mechanism forL , using only defeasible
ASPIC+ rules for inference. We only specified the conflict function ·, as required in the
definition of ASPIC+ (see Section 2.3.2.2 on page 33). This resulted in a two-tiered
system with deductive inferences in L in one tier, and defeasible rules in ASPIC+
in the other tier. However, an important aspect of argumentation within engineering
design has been neglected so far: Decisions are made not only on the basis of logical
inferences from some knowledge base, but also on the basis of informal arguments
(including personal convictions, experience, and preferences) and experimental data.
Any formal model of design debates must therefore be able to handle non-deductive
arguments as well as deductive ones.
In this chapter we will study how non-deductive arguments are captured by our
framework. In Section 5.2 we start by describing some common patterns of non-
deductive reasoning in more detail, in order to get a clear understanding of the different
types of arguments and inferences that our model should be able to express.
We then define an argumentation system that is specifically designed to handle
non-deductive inferences in Section 5.3. In Section 5.3.2, we introduce the notion of
meta-argumentation and show that it has an intuitive interpretation in our system. We
conclude with a practical application of the theory, a case study about the interpretation
of experimental data within our framework (Section 5.4). The case study is about
comparing different drilling methods and involves a software prototype (Section 5.4.4)
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as well as meta-argument schemes (Section 5.4.4.5). The chapter concludes with a
review of the relevant literature (Section 5.5) and a discussion (Section 5.6).
5.2 Non-Deductive Arguments
Many argumentation systems in the literature have a base logic [123] (the underlying
logic L in ASPIC+), for example propositional or first-order logic, from which argu-
ments are built. The advantage of using a formal logic for arguments is that it provides
the means for automatic determination of both the set of arguments (by using the in-
ference relation of L ) and the set of attacks (by using L ’s notion of inconsistency).
When applying the theory of argumentation to practical arguments, for example in our
domain of engineering design, one is faced with a challenge: The large majority of
real-life arguments can only be formalised in a logical language if either a lot of im-
plicit background knowledge is taken into account, or the result is rather general and
the benefits of using a logical language are lost.
With the overall goal of our project in mind (to build an argumentative model on
top of what will ideally be automatically processed documents), we will take a differ-
ent avenue altogether: In this chapter we are completely going to drop the assumption
that arguments are built with a base logic. Instead, we will only assume a set of argu-
ments that have no inference relation between them. The formalities of this approach
will be discussed in Section 5.3, but first we need to answer the question “What is an
argument?”
If we do use a base logic, then the answer is easy: In this case, “an argument is a
pair 〈ϕ,α〉 where ϕ is a minimal subset of the knowledge base such that ϕ is consistent
and ϕ entails the claim α .” [123]. This definition of an argument relies on the base logic
for all three conditions (minimality, consistency and entailment). In order to verify the
three conditions and thus to confirm that a = 〈ϕ,α〉 is an argument, one only has to
know the definition of inference in the base logic. Crucially, whether a is an argument
does not depend on any other arguments (it is only the acceptability of a that can be
influenced by other arguments).
The case for inductive arguments (arguments without a base logic) is not as
straightforward. An important difference between deductive and inductive arguments
is that the latter can only be validated in a context – additional knowledge about the ar-
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guments. To check that a deductive argument is valid, we only need a proof (in the base
logic) that the claim can be inferred from the premises. Such a proof only depends on
information contained within the argument itself. The validity of inductive arguments
depends on additional information external to the argument. For example, natural lan-
guage arguments often take the form of enthymemes. An enthymeme is an argument
that does not contain all of its premises – in other words, it is context-dependent (cf.
recent work on natural language arguments [124, 125]). To verify that an enthymeme
is an argument (even before one can determine the acceptability of that argument) one
has to take into account the context given by implicit assumptions.
Since inductive arguments are context-dependent, there is nothing that can be said
about an individual inductive argument on its own (for deductive arguments we can
at least decide whether the three conditions are met). We can only make meaningful
judgments about an inductive argument if we know its context, that is, if we know
its relationship with other inductive arguments. This idea is reminiscent of abstract
argumentation in the sense of Dung [42], and indeed we will see in Section 5.3.1 that
inductive arguments are built on top of an abstract argument graph. Inductive arguments
can be in two possible interactions with other arguments (conflict, and support).1
Let us further motivate our theory of inductive arguments by looking at two spe-
cific examples, argument schemes (Section 5.2.1) and the interpretation of experimental
data (Section 5.4.3).
5.2.1 Argument Schemes
Most arguments produced by humans are not deductive, but they are not completely
arbitrary, either. They follow well-known patterns, so-called argument schemes. Argu-
ment schemes have been studied extensively by Walton [126] and we will give a brief
review of some of the most common schemes listed in his survey.
According to [126], argument schemes are informal patterns of human reasoning.
One of the most common argument schemes is appeal to expert opinion, in which a
claim is supported by evidence of an expert (a person different from the proponent of
the argument).
The following list of argument schemes is not exhaustive for two reasons. Because
1The relationship of our framework to bipolar argumentation will be discussed in Section 5.5.2.
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argument schemes are not formally specified, there is no consensus on how many dif-
ferent schemes there are, and it is impossible to prove that a list of argument schemes
is complete, so any attempt at compiling such a list would be vulnerable to claims of
its partiality. But our list below only includes a subset of the argument schemes in
Walton’s book [126]. It has been purposefully selected to draw out the possible im-
plications that argument schemes may have on arguments they are used in, in order
to provide a good motivation for the theoretical model developed in Section 5.3. In
addition, we placed special emphasis on argument schemes that are commonly used in
engineering debates.
Notation Throughout the examples in this chapter we will use free variables X ,Y, . . ..
These variables are only used as patterns that serve to build an intuition for argument
schemes. Whenever we talk about concrete argumentation systems, we assume that all
free variables have been eliminated by replacing them with appropriate values. This
practice is not only in line with ASPIC+ conventions but it also greatly simplifies the
formal notation.
Since a formal definition for meta-ASPIC will only be given in the following sec-
tion (page 178), we are going to assume the same syntax ASPIC+ for arguments as
in other places in this thesis. To see how argument schemes are represented in meta-
ASPIC, the reader is referred to Section 5.3.1.1 on page 182.
Appeal to Expert Opinion Recall the following argument from Chapter 4 (page 120).
It claims that a structure is non-corrosive because it is made of aluminium:
[[al];al⇒ non corrosive;non corrosive] (A1)
This argument does not provide any evidence in support of the claim, except the defea-
sible rule al⇒ non corrosive. But what is our justification for applying this rule?
We can imagine an expert E (who specialises in the science of corrosion) claiming that
components made from aluminium are not prone to corrosion. The expert E would
be able to produce an argument for this rule, that is, an argument whose claim is
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al⇒ non corrosive:
[[al⇒ Al oxide coating];Al oxide coating⇒ non corrosive;
non corrosive]
(A2)
Argument A2 says that aluminium does not corrode because it is coated in a layer
of aluminium oxide (this layer is actually caused by corrosion of pure aluminium).
If prompted, E would be able to produce additional arguments in support of A2, for
example scientific studies or a more in-depth explanation of the phenomenon involving
the reaction of aluminium oxide with water at a molecular level.
But in order to make argument A1, it is enough to refer to E’s expert opinion - we
do not actually have to produce argument A2 as well. This particular argument scheme
is therefore a way of pruning the tree of supporting arguments which would otherwise
be very difficult to keep track of during a design debate. On the other hand, if we rely
on argument A1, then we open ourselves to attacks of the form “E is not an expert” and
so on – regardless of whether E’s statement is true or not.
The appeal to expert opinion in schematic terms is shown below, based on the
original definition in [127]. The variables X , D and C stand for expert, domain and
claim.
[Expert(X ,D),Domain(C,D),Claims(X ,C)⇒C] (Exp)
To apply the scheme Exp to argument A1, we can instantiate it as follows:
[Expert(E,metals),Domain(A1,metals),Claims(E,A1)⇒ A1] (Exp(A1))
Argument Exp(A1) shows that the claim we made in A1 is backed up by E, who is an
expert in “metals”.
Argument from Alternative The argument scheme “Argument from Alternative” con-
sists of stating that there are two options, a and b, which are mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive. One then has to show that a is not viable, which leaves only b
as a logical conclusion. For example:
[[¬composites];¬composites⇒ al;al] (A3)
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Argument A3 says that composites are ruled out as a material, and therefore alu-
minium has to be chosen. However, the only reason why the defeasible rule
¬composites⇒ al holds is that composites and al are mutually exclusive, and one
of the has to be chosen. We can therefore give the following example in support of our
claim:
[alternative(composites,al);alternative(X ,Y )⇒ (¬X ⇒ Y );
¬composites⇒ al] (A4)
With argument A4, we can give a reason for inferring al from ¬composites in argu-
ment A3. However, we need to establish first that the two options are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive (or at least be ready to defend our argument against attacks
on those premises). Again, this argument schemes saves us from having to elaborate
on the benefits of al, instead relying on it being the only viable option.
[¬alternative(composites,al)] (C1)
A simple counter-argument to A4 is given by C1. By denying the assumption
alternative(composites,alu), we can derive an attack on A4. This counter-
argument does not draw into question the scheme (argument from alternative), it only
attacks the application of the scheme to this particular instance.
Argument from Positive Consequences The next argument scheme, Argument from
Positive Consequences, is perhaps the most fundamental one as far as decision mak-
ing is concerned: We should choose an option a because a will bring about positive
consequences. For example:
[[result(al,low cost)];result(al,low cost)⇒ al;al] (A5)
5.2. Non-Deductive Arguments 171
In argument A5, we argue that aluminum is the right choice because it is a low-cost
material. We can support this argument by making the underlying scheme explicit:
[result(al,low cost),desirable(low cost);
result(X ,Y ),desirable(Y )⇒ Y ;result(al,low cost)⇒ al] (A6)
When using the argument scheme from positive consequences, we have to establish
that the consequences are indeed good, and that choosing that particular option will
bring about the consequences.
Personal (ad hominem) Arguments Another common argument scheme is that the
appeal at the person (ad hominem). This scheme is an argument about the proponent
of another argument, not against that other argument. There are many types of the ad
hominem argument – for example, one can claim that the proponent of an argument is
not qualified to make the argument, or that they have been known to make false claims
in the past, etc.
[proponent(al,james);proponent(al,james)⇒¬al;¬al] (A7)
Argument A7 is a counter-argument against choosing aluminium, and it is supported by
the fact that the argument for aluminium has been produced by James. The inference
can be justified by providing the following argument:
[proponent(al,james),unqualified(james);proponent(X ,Y ),
unqualified(Y )⇒ (proponent(X ,Y )⇒¬X);
proponent(al,james)⇒¬al] (A8)
Note that argument A8 only need one premise related to the claim X , namely that it was
put forward by Y – no additional information about X is needed to apply the scheme
to obtain ¬X . Ad hominem arguments can therefore be constructed with very little
evidence.
The ad hominem example differs from the other schemes in an important way:
It can be used to produce arguments against an option – in other words, we can use
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it to produce counterarguments. The other argument schemes presented here all build
up support for an argument, but A7 introduces an attack. This is important because if
we had no attacks, then there would be no reason for using Dung’s framework. Ad
hominem is not the only scheme that can produce attacks. The scheme “Argument
from Negative Consequences” for example is very similar to “from Positive Conse-
quences” (5.2.1), except that it has a negative conclusion. A7 is different from the
previous counter-argument C1, because A7 is relevant in any scenario where an argu-
ment for al is made, whereas C1 does not argue for or against al per se, but rather
attacks any arguments such as A4 which rely on the assumption that aluminium and
composites are the only two options.
We can contest the use of ad hominem by producing an argument against the de-
feasible rule ad hom = unqualified(Y )⇒ (proponent(X ,Y )⇒¬X):
[¬personal attacks⇒¬〈ad hom〉] (C2)
C2 says that because personal attacks are disallowed (they are not valid arguments),
the rule ad hom should not be used. C2 attacks any argument that does ad hom, for
example A8.
Appeal to Authority The last scheme in our survey is the appeal to authority. This
scheme subsumes appeal to expert opinion (Section 5.2.1), since experts are figures of
authority, but it includes other types of authority. For example, groups often follow a
“seniority principle” in which the opinion of the senior and more experienced members
is afforded a higher weight. We can encode the seniority principle as follows:
[proponent(al,james),proponent(composites,jane);
proponent(al,james),proponent(composites,jane)⇒ composites;
composites] (A9)
Argument A9 says that we should choose composites over aluminium because the ar-
gument for composites was put forward by Jane, whereas the argument for aluminium
was produced by James. The reasons for this preference can, for example, be explained
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by
[proponent(al,james),proponent(composites,jane),
senior(james,jane),senior(Y,X)⇒ (proponent(X ,X ′),
proponent(Y,Y ′)⇒ Y ′);proponent(al,james),
proponent(composites,jane)⇒ composites] (A10)
It is clear that the line between appeal to authority and ad hominem arguments is blurred
- the argument for aluminium is rejected because it was brought forward by James, and
not because of the claim al (aluminium) as such.
5.2.2 Interpreting Experimental Data
It is possible to treat the interpretation of experimental data as an instance of one of
Walton’s argument schemes, for example “Argument from Experience”. However, the
status of arguments from experimental data (and to some extent from other empiri-
cal data, e.g. from past obervations) is differrent from those based on other argument
schemes. First, such arguments are more difficult to defeat because empirical obser-
vations (“numbers”) are considered to be more reliable than, say, personal feelings or
intuitions. Second, when arguments from empirical data are disputed, they are rarely
attacked on the underlying data, and more commonly on the conclusions that can be
drawn from this data. In contrast, argument schemes as a whole are more commonly
attacked on their assumptions. For example, the scheme “Argument from Expert Opin-
ion” can be attacked by arguing that X is not an expert in domain Y , or that the problem
at hand is not part of Y . Experimental results can only be attacked if mistakes were
made when conducting the experiment. Otherwise they can almost be considered to
have the same status as axioms in logic, because of their reproducibility.
A typical argument from experimental data draws an analogy between the ex-
perimental setting and the actual problem at hand. For example, one could make the
following argument based on the case study about conventional versus orbital drilling
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(see Section 5.4 for more details):
[goodResults(diameter 5/16,conventional),
hole diameter(5/16)⇒ use conventional] (A11)
saying that because the experiment using conventional drilling techniques with a 5/16
inch diameter gave good results, and our current design involves the same diameter, we
should use conventional drilling.
The pattern of drawing analogies between the experiment and the problem at hand
can be formulated as an argument scheme, too: If the experimental outcome for tech-
nique Y and setting X was good, and our decision involves a setting similar to X , then
we can expect a similarly good outcome from technique Y .
[goodResults(X ,Y ),similar(X ,X ′)
currentProblem(X ′)⇒ choose(Y )] (A12)
Of course, the quality of the argument is determined by the meaning of “similar” in this
scheme. This is drawn out in the next two arguments.
[diameter(dec1,3/8),diameter(exp1,5/16)
⇒ similar(exp1,dec1)] (A′12)
A′12 argues that the difference between the whole diameter in the experiment and the
one in our current problem is rather small, so the two settings can be considered similar
enough for the results to be transferrable. In A′12, we set X = exp1 and X
′ = dec1 to
highlight that we are applying the scheme to a concrete setting (current problem dec1
and experiment exp1).
[environment(dec1,dry),environment(exp1,wet)
⇒¬similar(exp1,dec1)] (C3)
C3 rebuts A′12, and it undercuts any instantiation of A12 for the two choices of X and X
′.
The two arguments C3 and A′12 are an example of debates over the meaning of experi-
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mental results. The core question in this case is which of the parameters (environment,
hole diameter) is more likely to have influenced the outcome of the experiment and thus
to have an impact on hole quality. C3 is an example of a critical question, an important
concept in argument schemes which we will discuss in the next section.
5.2.3 Critical Questions
In the previous two sections, 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, we discussed arguments and counter-
arguments (for example, C1, C2 and A7) together. Prior work on argument schemes
(primarily Walton [128, 126] but also formalisations in theory of argumentation such
as [127] (expert opinion), [129, 130, 131] (law) and [132] (trust)), makes a clear dis-
tinction between critical questions (C1, C2, C3) and regular counter-arguments (A7),
which we will draw out in this section.
In Walton’s theory, there exists a list of critical questions for every argument
scheme. Each critical question identifies possible attacks on arguments from the
scheme it is associated with, by pointing out either a condition that must hold for an
argument scheme to be applied, or an exception that renders an argument scheme in-
valid for a specific instance. The first kind of critical question is called condition, and
the second kind is called exception.
Some critical questions, such as the one expressed in C1, target the conditions of
an argument scheme. Another type of critical questions is aimed at exceptions to the
applicability of a scheme, for example C2. Both kinds have in common that they do not
attack the conclusion drawn from the argument scheme directly and do therefore not
act as counter-arguments against the original proposition. Instead, they only prevent
the application of a particular argument scheme, by claiming either that its conditions
are not met, or that it is not applicable at all, regardless of the specific premises.
A good starting point for a formal characterisation of critical questions is thus
to look at the attackers of an argument from argument schemes. If the conclusion of
an attacking argument a negates one of the attacked argument’s premises, then a is
an attack on a condition of the scheme. If it is the negation of a rule, then a is an
exception to the scheme. This definition also clearly distinguishes critical questions
from counter-arguments. The latter is always a rebuttal, the former can be an undercut
or an undermining atttack. We will make this definition more precise in Section 5.3.1.1
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on page 182.
5.2.4 Summary
After a brief discourse on the nature of non-deductive arguments, we examined a num-
ber of argument schemes commonly used in engineering debates. We studied five
concrete argument schemes and proposed tentative translations into the ASPIC+ ter-
minology. We also discussed arguments from experimental data and their special status
among argument schemes in the engineering domain. What all argument schemes we
considered have in common is that they are context-dependent: Each of the five argu-
ments (A1, A3, A5, A7, A9) is accompanied by a supporting argument to establish that
the premises of the scheme are met, and to turn the scheme into an ASPIC+ rule.
The assumptions underlying argument schemes are arguments on their own, and
can therefore be supported, defeated etc. In the following we will formalise the idea of
representing argument schemes as defeasible rules produced by other arguments.
5.3 Meta-ASPIC
In this section we will define an argumentation system called “meta-ASPIC” that is
designed specifially to reason about argument schemes. Its syntax is similar to the
ASPIC+ syntax we have been using throughout this thesis, and its semantics (meaning)
are given by a translation to regular argument graphs.
The discussion in Section 5.2 made it clear that inferences are of great importance
in non-deductive arguments, because debates in engineering revolve around the ques-
tion whether a set of premises warrants a particular conclusion. The question whether
premises hold or not is of comparatively lesser importance. For our meta-ASPIC sys-
tem, we consequently take the set of facts F as given and instead focus on the formation
of arguments. First, we assume that any fact a ∈ F gives rise to an argument [a]. The
reason for this requirement is that it will lead to a simple syntax for arguments, because
it will allow us to treat all arguments (atomic and compound) uniformly, without hav-
ing to distinguish the case that an argument is “only” a fact. Second, we treat inference
rules and arguments as one and the same. As a result, there is no set of rules (unlike
in ASPIC+) from which arguments are constructed. Instead, it is possible and legal to
form an argument from any combination of other arguments as support and with any
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other argument as conclusion. The only restriction we do place on arguments is that
they are non-cyclic, that is, an argument cannot be used as its own support. This reflects
our inuitive understanding that cyclic arguments are rarely used in real-life debates, and
leads to some interesting properties in relation to meta-argumentation, which we will
discuss in Section 5.3.2. We use the symbol to denote argument formation.
The second component of our system, besides arguments, is contradiction. In
meta-ASPIC, the set of facts F may be contradictory. This constraint, or rather lack of
constraint, allows us model situations where arguments are built from facts based on
faulty observations. Note that any set F endowed with a binary “conflict” relationship
is by definition an abstract argument graph. We will therefore speak of the underlying
argument graph of a meta-ASPIC system, as opposed to the underlying logic of an
ASPIC+ system.
The examples in Section 5.2.1 indicated how argument schemes can be repre-
sented in ASPIC+: As arguments whose conclusions are defeasible rules (the rules that
allow the argument scheme to be applied). However, in order to get the most general
definition of meta-arguments, we cannot assume anything about defeasible rules that is
not already part of the syntax. In particular, we cannot assume that a defeasible rule
is in any way schematic, that is, contains free variables that may be bound to different
values. The reason is that defeasible rules represent inductive arguments and as such do
not necessarily stand for an abstract inference rule that applies to anything but the spe-
cific case for which they are stated. As a result, the only constraint on what constitutes
a meta-argument is given in the syntax – it must have a set of supporting arguments and
a conclusion – and there is no requirement for the support to be in any kind of deductive
relationship with the conclusion.
This section is organised as follows. We start by defining the syntax (Definition
68 on page 178) and semantics (Definition 72 on page 182) of meta-ASPIC. We then
consider to separate issues in meta-ASPIC: The argument schemes that were introduced
in the previous section are translated to meta-ASPIC+ on page 182, and expressions of
the truth paradox in meta-ASPIC is discussed on page 187. In Section 5.3.2 (page 188)
we apply the concept of meta-argumentation to meta-ASPIC.
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5.3.1 Definition of Meta-ASPIC
We will define meta-ASPIC as a formal foundation for meta-arguments in two steps. In
Definition 68 below we set up the syntax of a language for describing meta-arguments.
The subsequent definitions up to Definition 72 on page 182 will establish the meaning
of that language, by providing a translation from it to Dung’s argument graphs.
Definition 68 (Meta-Argument). Let G = (A,Att) be an argument graph. A meta-
argument over G is
1. If a ∈ A then [a] is a meta-argument
2. If ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ϕ are meta-arguments (with n≥ 0) then [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ] is a meta-
argument
3. If ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ϕ and are meta-arguments (with n≥ 0) then [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ¬ϕ] is a
meta-argument
If a meta-argument has an empty set of supporting arguments then we do not write
the arrow symbol (for example, instead of [ ¬a] we write [¬a]). We use the notation
MA for a set of meta-arguments over an argument graph (A,Att) if there is no risk of
ambiguity.
Example 49. Let G = (A,Att) be an argument graph with A = {(a1,a2,a3,a4)} and
Att = {(a1,a3),(a2,a4),(a4,a2)}. We can define the set MA = {m1, . . . ,m6} of meta-
arguments over G with
m1, . . . ,m4 = [a1], . . . , [a4]
m5 = [m3 m2]
m6 = [m1 ¬m4]
The first four meta-arguments m1 to m4 are simply the meta-level equivalents of a1 to
a4 on the object level. m5 and m6 exist only on the meta-level and represent additional
information that is not present in G: First, m5 states that m3 supports m2. Second, m6
states that m1 is a reason against (counterargument to) m4. The attacks-relation Att of
the object-level graph is only relevant in the evaluation of sets of meta-arguments. It
does not affect which meta-arguments can be formed.
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The function conc(a) : MA→MA returns the conclusion of a meta-argument a and
is defined as
conc(a) =

[a′] if a′ ∈ A and a = [a′]
[ϕ] if a = [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ]
[¬ϕ] if a = [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ¬ϕ]
Likewise, sup(a) : MA→P(MA) returns the support of a meta-argument a and is de-
fined as
sup(a) =
{ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn} if a = [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ]/0 otherwise
The final function we need for talking about meta-arguments is obj. If a meta-
argument is of the form ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn  ϕ , then intuitively it is an argument about the
arguments ϕ1 to ϕn and ϕ . The function obj captures the intuition that arguments
“about” other arguments or about domain-level facts. In the former case, obj(a) returns
the arguments that are referred to by an argument a, and in the latter case obj(a) returns
the empty set.
Definition 69 (Object Function). Let Ω = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with G =
(A,Att) The object function of Ω, obj : MA→ 2MA , is defined as
obj(a) =

{ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ϕ} if a = ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ
{ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,¬ϕ} if a = ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ¬ϕ
/0 if a = [a′] for a′ ∈ A
Example 50. For arguments m5 and m6 from Example 49, obj returns the following
values:
obj(m5) = {m3,m2} obj(m6) = {m1,¬m4}
and for all other arguments it returns the empty set.
We are now ready to give a definition of our meta-ASPIC argumentation system.
It is simply a set of meta-arguments over an argument graph G = (A,Att), with two
conditions. First, all arguments a ∈ A must have corresponding meta-arguments [a] ∈
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MAtt , and second, MAtt must be closed under obj - that is, it must contain the supports
of all its arguments.
Definition 70. A meta-ASPIC system is a tuple (G,MA) where G = (A,Att) is an argu-
ment graph and MA is a set of meta-arguments over G such that
1. MA ⊇⋃a∈A[a]
2. For all a ∈MA, obj(a)⊆MA
Example 51. (G,MA) from the previous example (Example 49) is a meta-ASPIC sys-
tem, because every object-level argument (a1 to a4) is represented by a meta-level ar-
gument (m1 to m4), and the component arguments of m5 and m6 are also part of MA.
There are several important differences between standard ASPIC+ systems and
meta-ASPIC systems as defined in Definition 70.
First, the logical language L has been replaced by an argument graph G. This
may seem like a radical change, but in reality it is only syntactical. In the original
definition of ASPIC+, the logical language L is only characterised by the existence
of a “conflict” function ◦ :L → 2L . It is not required to have an inference relation
or any operators. An argument graph (A,Att) on the other hand consists of a set A
and an “attacks” relation Att ⊆ A×A. Given that every binary relation of two sets
Rel ⊆ A×B specifies a function fRel : A→ 2B, we could easily convert Att to a function
fAtt : A→ 2A, so G would meet the requirements for a logical languageL . Conversely,
we can create an argument graph (L ,Rel◦) for any logical language with “conflict”
function. Our Definition 70 therefore does not augment or diminish the expressive
power of the underlying languageL .
Finally, the negation symbol ¬ in Definition 68 does not have the same meaning
as it would for example in classical logic. The effect of writing ¬a in the conclusion
of a rule is to introduce an attack on the argument a, and not to conclude the opposite
of a’s conclusion. This means that ¬¬a is not the same as a. Double negation cannot
be expressed directly. Instead one can introduce a third argument which attacks ¬a. ¬
therefore modifies the relationship between arguments, not between their conclusions.
The advantage of our Definition 70 is that we do not have to translate between
“conflicts” in our arguments and “attacks” in the argument graph produced by the sys-
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tem. Instead, we can simply use the attacks relation Att to determine whether two
arguments are incompatible.
What does meta-ASPIC give us that regular argument graphs do not? To answer
this question we need to look at the second component of argument graphs: Attacks.
There are two sources of attacks in meta-ASPIC – the attacks relation Att of the underly-
ing graph G, and the negation operator ¬ that may be used in conclusions of arguments
in MA.
Definition 71 (Attacks in meta-ASPIC). Let (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with
G = (A,Att) and let a,b ∈MA. a m-attacks b if and only if
1. conc(a) = [a′],conc(b) = [b′] and (a′,b′) ∈ Att or
2. conc(a) = [¬b′],conc(b) = [b′] or
3. b = [ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk  ψ] such that there is an i ∈ N with 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that a m-
attacks ϕi.
Example 52. The meta-ASPIC system given by the argument graph G = (A,Att) with
A = {(a1,a2,a3,a4)} and Att = {(a1,a3),(a2,a4),(a4,a2)} and meta-arguments MA =
{m1, . . . ,m6} with
m1, . . . ,m4 = [a1], . . . , [a4]
m5 = [m3 m2]
m6 = [m1 ¬m4]
from Example 51 has the following attacks: {(m1,m3),(m2,m4),(m4,m2),(m6,m4)},
as shown in Figure 5.1.
Arguments a and b in meta-ASPIC can attack one another in three ways, as defined
in Definition 71. Either there is already a conflict between a and b in the underlying
argument graph, or the conclusion of a is ¬b, or a meta-attacks a supporting argument
of b.
In a meta-ASPIC system (G,MA), no restrictions are placed on the argument graph
G. In particular, there is no requirement for the attacks relation Att to contain any
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m1m2 m3m4 m6 m5
Figure 5.1: Reified graph of the meta-ASPIC system from Figure 5.2 on page 185
elements. If we start with an attacks-free argument graph G = (A, /0), we can can use
meta-arguments to introduce conflict in a set that is otherwise conflict-free.
With the previous two definitions in place it is now straightforward to define the
reified graph of (the abstract argument graph acting as the interpretation of) a meta-
ASPIC system.
Definition 72 (Reified graph of meta-ASPIC). Let Ω= (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC sys-
tem. The function reify(M) returns the reified graph of M and is defined as
reify(Ω) = (MA,Att∗)
where Att∗ = {(a,b) ∈MA | a m-attacks b}.
Note that reify(Ω) returns a Dung-style argument graph, not a meta-ASPIC system.
Example 53. The reified graph of the system in Example 51 is given by (A,Att∗) with
Att∗ = {(m1,m3),(m2,m4),(m4,m2),(m6,m4)}. It is visualised in Figure 5.1.
To summarise, meta-arguments have the standard structure of supports and con-
clusions, but they differ from standard ASPIC+ arguments in the “type” of their conclu-
sion: In our system, the conclusion of an argument is also an argument, but in classic
ASPIC, the conclusion is a sentence of the underlying languageL .
5.3.1.1 Argument Schemes
To illustrate how argument schemes are handled by meta-ASPIC we will now describe a
discussion between aerospace engineers in the framework, using some of the argument
schemes introduced in Section 5.2.1. The discussion is fictional, but it is based on a use
case from our industry partner.
Several engineers are designing a rib that is part of a wing. They are currently
trying to decide on a material to be used for the rib. While in reality there is a choice of
a large number of alloys and composites, we assume here that the principal decision is
only that of aluminium or composite materials. The choice will be represented by two
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arguments Comp and Al. In this example we assume that the object-level graph consists
only of those two arguments and is conflict-free: G= ({Comp,Al}, /0). Throughout this
example we will represent object-level arguments by their conclusions (as we are not
interested in their internal structure, or how that conclusion was derived). We are going
describe a set of meta-arguments and give the final result in the form of a meta-ASPIC
system at the end of this example.
The two options are mutually exclusive, so the scheme “argument from alterna-
tive” (page 170) can be applied. Since aluminium and composites cannot both be cho-
sen at the same time, choosing one means excluding the other. The argument scheme is
represented by three meta-level arguments: One to establish that aluminium and com-
posites are mutually exclusive, and then one for each of the two attacks that result from
this argument scheme.
[Alternative(Comp,Al)] (M1)
[[Alternative(Comp,Al)] (Comp ¬Al)] (M2)
[[Alternative(Comp,Al)] (Al ¬Comp)] (M3)
The reader may have noticed that the first meta-argument M1 makes use of an
object-level argument Alternative(Comp,Al) which is not part of the graph G. As
we build up this discussion we will introduce several new object-level arguments,
which stand for additional domain-level knowledge necessary to support the argument
schemes we use. The resulting meta-ASPIC graph will therefore be based on an ex-
tended object-level graph G′, with G v G′. It is important to note that, while M2 and
M3 resemble the logical axiom tertium non datur, the assumption that a third option
does not exist can be attacked (and indeed there are more than two possible materials
for the component).
Having established the external constraints of the solution, we now turn to the
actual debate about the materials. Engineer E is recognised by her peers as an expert
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on metallurgy (abbreviated Mly) and suggests to use aluminium.
[[Expert(E,Mly)], [Domain(Al,Mly)], [Claims(E,Al)] [Al]] (M4)
In reality, arguments from expert opinion usually do not just state a conclusion without
backing it up with further evidence. Instead, expert arguments summarise the expert’s
reasoning as well as the conclusion [133]. For example, E might recommend aluminium
based on her experience with similar designs. We omit the details in this example
because we want to demonstrate additional argument schemes.
The knowledge of E, the expert, may be outdated because E has not published any
work on metallurgy recently – NoPub(E,Mly). This opens the argument from expert
opinion to an attack on one of its supports:
[[NoPub(E,Mly)] ¬[Expert(E,Mly)]] (M5)
This attack is an example of a common pattern. Every argument scheme is associated
with a list of “Critical Questions”, questions which point to potential weaknesses of the
argument. Some critical questions, such as the one expressed in M5, target the condi-
tions of an argument scheme. Another type of critical questions is aimed at exceptions
to the applicability of a scheme.
Another common pattern of argumentation is to argue from (positive or negative)
consequences. In our example, heavy components increase the fuel consumption of
airplanes. Minimising weight is therefore very important in aerospace design. The
relatively high weight of aluminium is a reason to avoid it. This argument scheme is
known as argument from negative consequences (bringing about A will result in C, C
is negative, therefore A should not be brought about). Conversely, using composites
will have positive consequences, since it is lighter. The following two meta-arguments
illustrate reasoning about consequences.
[[BadCons(Al)] ¬Al] (M6)
[[GoodCons(Comp)] Comp] (M7)
M6 attacks the argument for aluminium Al. M7 does not attack any arguments in this
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A1 A2
M′2 M
′
3
M2 M3M1
M4A3
A4
A5
M5 A6
M6A7 M7 A8
Figure 5.2: Meta-ASPIC graph with argument schemes from Section 5.3.1.1. Its reified graph
is shown in Figure 5.3. Dashed arrows represent the obj function for illustrative
purposes. Argument definitions are given in Table 5.1 on page 186. All arguments
shown here are meta-arguments.
setting, but it would any argument against Comp if such an argument existed. In a real-
life debate there would be additional arguments about how bad the consequences of
choosing aluminium are, and if the benefits outweigh the costs. These kinds of argu-
ments for decision making have been extensively studied in Chapter 3 of this thesis. At
this point we can evaluate the meta-ASPIC system to obtain an argument graph, which
can then be used to determine the acceptability of A1 (the meta-argument for Al) and A2
(the meta-argument for Comp). The graph is shown in Figure 5.2 on page 185. As men-
tioned earlier, we introduced several new object-level arguments, which are accounted
for in the object-level graph G′ with G′= ({Al,Comp,Alternative(Comp,Al), . . .}, /0).
In Figure 5.2, those object-level arguments are omitted. We only show their corre-
sponding meta-arguments (for example, we show A2 = [Comp] but not Comp).
The reified graph of the system shown in Figure 5.2 is a standard Dung-style
argument graph, visualised in Figure 5.3. As shown by the mutual attack between
M′2 and M
′
3, attacks on the meta-level may be circular, even though meta-arguments
themselves are strictly non-circular (Definition 68).
One effect of the argument from alternative, represented by M1 to M3, is that the
two options Comp and Al are mutually exclusive - their meta-arguments A1 and A2
cannot be part of the same extension.
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Figure 5.3: Reified graph of meta-ASPIC system from Figure 5.2.
Arg. Content Arg. Content
A1 [Al] M1 [Alternative(Comp,Al)]
A2 [Comp] M2 [M1 M′2]
A3 [Expert(E,Mly)] M′2 [A2 ¬A1]
A4 [Domain(Mat,Mly)] M3 [M1 M′3]
A5 [Asserts(E,Al)] M′3 [A1 ¬A2]
A6 [NoPub(E,Mly)] M4 [A3,A4,A5 A1]
A7 [BadCons(Al)] M5 [A6 ¬A3]
A8 [GoodCons(Mat)] M6 [A7 ¬A1]
M7 [A8 A2]
Table 5.1: List of arguments in Figure 5.2
Critical Questions In Section 5.2.3 on page 175, critical questions were introduced as
pointers to potential attacks on argument schemes. Based on that discussion, we can
adopt the following definition of critical questions:
Definition 73 (Critical Question). Let (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system and let a,b ∈
MA be meta-arguments. a is a critical question for b if
1. conc(a) = ¬b (exception) or
2. conc(a) = ¬ϕ for a ϕ ∈ sup(b) (condition)
Example 54. The following argument is a critical question because it attacks the con-
dition of the scheme argument from alternative (cf. C1 on page 170):
[ ¬alternative(composites,al)]
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It represents (the negative answer to) the critical question “Are there really only two
options?”. An example of an exception (cf. C2 on page 172) is given by
¬personal attacks ¬[unqualified(james) (proponent(al,james) ¬al)]
It represents the objection “ad hominem arguments are invalid”.
In the above sections we showed how some common argument schemes can be
represented in meta-ASPIC, and we gave a definition of critical questions based on
the discussion in Section 5.2.3 at the beginning of this chapter. This concludes our
evaluation of argument schemes in meta-ASPIC.
5.3.1.2 The Truth Paradox in Meta-ASPIC
As we have effectively defined a new argumentation system, a natural question to ask
is whether the results it produces are sound. Our system can be used to determine
the acceptability of arguments, and one basic attribute of “soundness” should be that
it does give two different answers to an argument’s acceptability at the same time.
This problem is closely related to the truth paradox in logic: Is the sentence s:“this
sentence is false” true or false? We can attempt to translate this sentence into meta-
ASPIC with the following argument q: q = [[a]  ¬[a]] (for an argument a of the
underlying argument graph). q intuitively says “if a is an argument then a is not an
argument”. However, the crucial difference between argument q and statement s is that
q does not refer to itself. It is indeed not possible to construct an argument that refers
to itself in meta-ASPIC (see Definition 68). This is why the acceptability of q can be
decided unambiguosly in the same way as that of any other meta-argument: By reifying
the meta-ASPIC system containing it (using reify, Definition 72) and then determining
the acceptability of a in the resulting abstract argument graph. For our example, we
know that if q cannot be part of an extension under any semantics because it attacks
itself (by Definition 71 Cond. 2 and 3). Any set of arguments with a self-attacking
argument is not conflict-free and can therefore not be a subset of an extension.
When considering the truth paradox in this context it is important to remember
that an argument’s acceptability is different from its truth status. Acceptability is a
weaker notion than truth, and it is subjective (as for example in argument graphs with
two mutually exclusive preferred extensions).
5.3. Meta-ASPIC 188
Our system gives rise to an intuitive and direct notion of meta-arguments, which
we will explore in the next section.
5.3.2 Object- and Meta-Level Arguments
Let us consider two of the arguments from Section 5.2.1 again. They were originally
introduced on page 171 as arguments A7 and C2, but we repeat them here in meta-ASPIC
notation:
[[proponent(al,james)] ¬[al]] (A′7)
[[¬personal attacks] ¬A′7] (C′2)
The conclusion of C′2 is ¬ A′7 – an attack on another argument. We can see that A′7 is not
about the merits of aluminium over composites, but about another argument. We can
therefore call C′2 a meta-argument. Meta-arguments are quite common in engineering
debates. They arise, for example, whenever a critical question in form of an exception
is raised (cf. Definition 73, condition 1). In general, we can view argument schemes as
arguments on the meta level, and their instantiations as arguments on the object level.
There are several reasons why meta- and object-level should be distinguished.
First, this distinction is necessary if we want to classify debates by their topic.
The topic of a debate is exactly what arguments are “about”, and meta-arguments are
more relevant to the topic of arguments (where questions such as “what is a legitimate
argument?” are answered) than the topic of, say, materials engineering. Second, by
distinguishing the levels in which a debate takes place, we can make our analysis of
each level more fine-grained: on the meta-level of argument schemes, we can refer e.g.
to Walton’s work, and on the level of engineering we can refer to a different source of
knowledge.
In this section we will define a method to stratify (clearly separate) the arguments
in a meta-ASPIC system by their meta-level, that is, how far they are removed from
the object level of domain-specific arguments. We start by considering obj, the object
function from page 179 (Definition 69). It returns the arguments one meta-level below
the given argument. The principle behind obj can be turned around: The characteristic
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object function obj∗ (below) maps a set of arguments A to all arguments that are about
an argument in A (all direct meta-arguments for a). It is the meta-ASPIC equivalent of
an argument graph’s characteristic functionF .
Definition 74 (Characteristic Object Function). Let Ω = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC
system with G = (A,Att) and let G′ = (MA,Att ′) = reify(Ω). The characteristic object
function of (G,MA), obj∗ : 2MA → 2MA , is defined as
obj∗(B) = {a ∈MA | obj(a)⊆ B}
Example 55. Continuing with Example 51, we get obj∗( /0) = {a1,a2,a3,a4}, and
obj∗(obj∗( /0)) = MA.
Given a meta-ASPIC system Ω = (G,K), can we define a sequence ObΩ =
(Ob1,Ob2, . . .) with Ob1 = obj∗( /0) and Obn+1 = obj∗(Obn). obj∗ resembles the char-
acteristic function F that is of argument graphs. F is used to define the grounded
extension of an argument graph, by computing the fixed point of F (F (. . .F ( /0))).
This fixed point exists for obj∗ too, but it is not very interesting because it always con-
tains the entire set of arguments A.
The abstraction index of an argument a is the index of the first meta-level that
includes a.
Definition 75 (Abstraction Index). Let Ω = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with
ObΩ = (Ob1,Ob2 . . .). Let a ∈ MA. The abstraction index of a, abbreviated IΩ(a),
is the lowest i such that a ∈ Obi.
The abstraction index is defined for every argument in a meta-ASPIC system. It
can be calculated directly from the argument a, without needing to know the entire
meta-ASPIC system.
Definition 76 (Abstraction Index Function). Let (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system and
let a ∈MA. The function abstract(a) is defined as
abstract(a) =
1 if a = [a
′] for an a′ ∈ A
i+1 otherwise, where i = max{abstract(b) | b ∈ obj(a)}
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Proposition 39. Let Ω = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with G = (A,Att) and let
ObΩ = (Ob1,Ob2, . . .). Let a ∈MA. Then
IΩ(a) = abstract(a)
Proof. First assume that a = [a′] for an a′ ∈ A. Then, obj(a) = /0 and obj(a) ⊆ /0, so
a ∈ obj∗( /0). Therefore, IΩ(a) = 1 = abstract(a).
We prove the second case (obj(a) = {a1, . . . ,an}) via induction. Specifically we
prove the following statement: ∀n ∈ N≥ 1 : If max{abstract(b) | b ∈ obj(a)}= n then
IΩ(a) = n+1 = abstract(a).
Base case, n = 1 If max{abstract(b)|b ∈ obj(a)} = 1, then by Definition 76, for all
b ∈ obj(a), b = b′ for a b′ ∈ A, so obj(a)⊆ Ob1 and IΩ(a) = 2 = abstract(a).
Induction case Let n= k+1 with k≥ 1, and suppose max{abstract(b) | b ∈ obj(a)}=
n. Then for all b ∈ obj(a), abstract(b) ≤ n, and there exists a c ∈ obj(a) such that
abstract(c) = n. Now we show that for all b ∈ obj(a), IΩ(b)≤ n. Let b ∈ obj(a). Either
abstract(b)< n, so abstract(b)≤ k, so we can apply the hypothesis and get obj∗Ω(b)≤
n. If abstract(b) = n, then by Definition 76, for all b′ ∈ obj(b), abstract(b′)≤ k and we
can apply the induction hypothesis to get obj(b) ⊆ Ok, so b ∈ obj∗(Ok) = Ok+1 = On
so IΩ(b)≤ n. Since there exists an argument c such that abstract(c) = n, we can apply
the same reasoning to obtain IΩ(c) = n. Then obj(a)⊆On, so a ∈ obj∗(On) and we get
IΩ(a) = n+1 = max{abstract(b) | b ∈ obj(a)}+1 = abstract(a).
Example 56. For m4 and m5 from Example 51, we get abstract(m5) = abstract(m4) =
2. All other arguments in that example have an abstraction index of 1.
Since all arguments eventually appear in ObΩ, the abstraction index exists for
every argument a. We can use IΩ to compare the “level of abstraction” of arguments.
An argument a is said to be an object-level argument if IΩ(a) = 1.
With the obj function (Definition 69) we can inspect arguments to see which other
arguments they talk about. The characteristic object function obj∗ of a meta-ASPIC
system inverts this perspective as it maps a set of arguments S to the set of arguments
whose domain is S. Both obj and obj∗ have counterparts in Dung’s original argumen-
tation system, namely in the attacks-relation Att and in the characteristic function F .
There are two principal differences between the two functions.
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First, the polarity of obj is always positive. The “is-about” relation is intuitively
transitive – if argument a is about b and b is about c then a is also about c, or at least
the relationship of a and c is similar to the one of a and b. With attacks on the other
hand, the polarity is inverted. If a attacks b and b attacks c then a defends c, so a
is in a positive relationship with c and in a negative one with b. For this reason, the
characteristic function F is defined in terms of the “defends” relationship, covering
two attacks in each successive application. The characteristic object function obj∗ only
covers one level of the “talking-about” relation given by obj.
The second difference only comes to light when Dung’s argument frameworks are
instantiated. In instantiations of argument graphs, attacks are the result of an incon-
sistency between the conclusion of one argument (the attacker a) and the assumptions
or the conclusion of another argument (the attackee b). However, if either a or b was
removed from the argument graph, by deleting the knowledge it is based on, then the
attack would disappear, but the remaining argument would still be part of the argument
graph – assuming a and b do not overlapage The attack by a on b only exists because
both a and b are present in the graph, and not because a explicitly refers to b or vice
versa. Attacks in instantiations of Dung’s argument graphs are incidental. Support in
meta-ASPIC systems (as evidenced by the obj function) on the other hand is an essen-
tial part of meta-arguments, because they are about other arguments. If a ∈ obj(b) then
it is impossible to remove a from the system without changing b.
5.3.2.1 A Hierarchy of Meta-Argumentats
The characteristic object function obj∗ (Definition 74) makes it possible to stratify the
arguments in an argument graph G according to their first appearance in the sequence
ObΩ = (Ob1, . . . ,Obn). The first set of arguments, Ob1, can be called the object level
because it contains only arguments that are truly atomic in Dung’s sense and thus are
making claims about the domain (for example about engineering decisions) rather than
about other arguments. The second level, Ob2, adds arguments that are based on argu-
ments from the first level, and so on.
In this hierarchy we can define some concepts that are commonly part of higher-
order argumentation, such as attacks on attacks, and attacks on supports.
Definition 77 (Hierarchy of Argument Graphs). Let Ω be a meta-ASPIC system and
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let ObΩ = (Ob1,Ob2, . . .) and let (G,Att∗) = refiy(Ω) be its reified argument graph.
The hierarchy of argument graphs of Ω is defined as GΩ = (G1,G2, . . .) where each
Gi = reify(Ωi) for the meta-ASPIC system Ωi = (G′i,MA∩Obi) with G′i = (Obi,Att∗∩
(Obi×Obi)).
In a hierarchy of argument graphs (G1, . . . ,), the first graph G1 is the object-level
graph containing all atomic arguments of the underlying meta-ASPIC system.
Proposition 40. Let Ω = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with G = (A,Att) and let
GΩ = (G1, . . .). Then G1 = (A′,Att ′) where
A′ = {[a] | a ∈ A}
Att ′ = {([a], [b]) | (a,b) ∈ Att}
Proof. To prove the claim it suffices to show that Ob1 = A′, because then the “attacks”
part of G1 is uniquely determined by Att (since Att1 = Att∗uOb1).
Ob1 = obj∗( /0)
= {a ∈MA | obj(a)⊆ /0} (By Definition 74)
= {a ∈MA | obj(a) = /0}
= {a ∈MA | a = [b] for a b ∈ A} (By Definition 69)
= A′
Example 57. Example 51 gives rise to a hierarchy of argument graphs with depth 2.
The graphs G1 = (Ob1,Att1) and G2 = (Ob2,Att2) are defined as
Ob1 = {m1,m2,m3,m4}= {[a] | a ∈ A}
Att1 = {(m1,m3),(m2,m4),(m4,m2)}= {([a], [b]) | (a,b) ∈ Att}
Ob2 = Ob1∪{m5,m6}
Att2 = Att1∪{(m6,m4)}
The graphs are shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Argument graphs for Example 57. G1 is shown on the left, G2 (a supergraph of G1)
on the right.
The hierarchy of meta-arguments is monotonic, in the sense that lower-level argu-
ment graphs are contained in higher-level ones.
Proposition 41. Let Ω be a meta-ASPIC system and let GΩ = (G1,G2, . . .). For every
i≥ 1, Gi v Gi+1.
Proof. Let Ω,GΩ as required and let i ≥ 1. Let Gi = (Ai,Att i) and Gi+1 =
(Ai+1,Att i+1). To show that Gi v Gi+1, we need to show that Ai ⊆ Ai+1 and
Att i ⊆ Att i+1.
1. Ai ⊆ Ai+1: Let a ∈ Ai, so by Definition 77 a ∈ Obi, so obj(a) ⊆ Obi. By Definition
74, a ∈ obj∗(Obi) = Obi+1 = Ai+1.
2. Att i⊆ Att i+1 Let (a,b)∈ Att i. By Propage 41 part 1, a and b∈ Ai+1, so by Definition
77, (a,b) ∈ Att i+1.
5.3.2.2 Attacks on Attacks
Meta-arguments with conclusions of the form ¬ϕ result in object-level attacks. As a
result, we can argue about those attacks just as we can about other arguments.
Definition 78 (Meta-Attack). Let Ω = (G,MA) be meta-ASPIC system and let a ∈MA
and let b ∈MA with b = [ϕ ′1, . . . ,ϕ ′k ¬a]. Then b is a meta-attack on a.
A meta-attack can itself be attacked like any other meta-argument, resulting in
attacks on attacks.
Example 58. Consider argument m6 = [m1 ¬m4] from Example 51. A meta-attack
on m6 is given by m7 with [m5  ¬m6]. In the resulting argument graph, m7 attacks
m6. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Argument graph for Example 58, showing a meta-argument m7 attacking the meta-
attack m6.
Example 59. A realistic example of attacks on attacks can be seen in Figure 5.2 on
page 185. It involves arguments M1 to M3 and A1, A2 which are repeated below:
A1 = [Al] M1 = [Alternative(Comp,Al)]
A2 = [Comp] M2 = [M1 M′2]
M′2 = [A2 ¬A1]
M3 = [M1 M′3]
M′3 = [A1 ¬A2]
Here, arguments M1 to M3 represent an application of the scheme “argument from
alternative”, to conclude that A1 and A2 are mutually exclusive. Since M2 and M3
mutually attack each other and are meta-attacks by Definition 78, both are examples
of attacks on attacks. Please refer to Section 5.3.1.1 for a discussion of the underlying
argument scheme.
Since meta-attacks are themselves arguments, we can compute their abstraction
index IΩ. Every meta-attack on an argument a has a higher abstraction index than a:
Proposition 42. Let b be a meta-attack on an argument a. Then IΩ(b)> IΩ(a).
Proof. Follows from Definition 78 and the proof of Propage 39
5.3.2.3 Acceptability of Arguments in Meta-ASPIC
In this section we discuss the relationship between the output of a meta-ASPIC sys-
tem and its underlying argument graph. Our goal is to show that the two functions
meta (taking an argument graph to a meta-ASPIC system) and reify (interpreting a
meta-ASPIC system as a regular abstract argument graph) are well-behaved. We show
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this by proving two properties: (a) for every object-level graph G there exists a meta-
ASPIC system meta(G) = (G,MA) whose extensions2 exactly match the extensions of
G, and (b) for any meta-level graph M = (G,MA) of an object-level graph G, if we
first “materialise” all its attacks by computing reify(M), and then take the minimal
graph meta(reify(M)), we get a meta-ASPIC system whose extensions match those of
reify(M).
Notation Before we look at the two statements in more detail, we would like to clarify
the notation used in the following paragraphs. We are going to use the symbol ' to
mean the “is isomorphic to” relationship between two graphs, specifically between two
abstract argument graphs. We will then introduce a similar notion for meta-ASPIC
systems (consisting of a graph and a set of rules), which will be denoted by ∼=. So
' relates two graphs and ∼= relates two meta-ASPIC systems (not to be confused with
∼=D, the equivalence relation on options for a decision frame, introduced in Chapter 3
on page 72).
The first statement (a) trivially holds: We simply choose the “minimal” meta-level
system for G, whose only meta-arguments are of the form [a] for the underlying object-
level arguments.
Proposition 43. Let G be an argument graph and let meta(G) = (G,MA) with MA =
{[a] | a ∈ A}. Then,
reify(meta(G))' G
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that the output of meta(G) is a graph G′ =
(A′,Att ′)with A′= {[a] | a∈A}=MA and Att ′= {([a], [b]) | (a,b)∈Att}. By Definition
71 Cond. 1, all attacks (a,b) ∈ Att result in attacks ([a], [b]) ∈ Att ′. By construction of
MA, none of the other conditions of Definition 71 is met, so Att ′ = {([a], [b]) | (a,b) ∈
Att}, and A′ = MA by construction, so the claim holds.
Proposition 43 shows how every argument graph can be lifted into meta-ASPIC,
resulting in the minimal meta-level system M. Since reify(M) is isomorphic to G, its
extensions are exactly the same.
The second statement (b) is formalised similarly, but we first need to define the
meaning of “match” - that is, we need the meta-ASPIC counterpart of the equivalence
2In this section, when we say “the extensions of the meta-ASPIC system Ω” we mean the extensions
of its reified graph reify(Ω).
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relation' in the world of argument graphs. The following definition generalises equiv-
alence to meta-ASPIC systems:
Definition 79 (Isomorphic meta-ASPIC system). Two meta-ASPIC systems M =
(G,MA),L = (G′,LA ′) with G = (A,Att) and G′ = (A′,Att ′) are isomorphic, abbre-
viated M ∼= L, if
1. G' G′, witnessed by a bijection f : A→ A′, and
2. LA ′ = {map f (r) | r ∈MA} with
map f (r) =

map f (ϕ1), . . . ,map f (ϕn) map f (ϕ) if r = ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ
map f (ϕ1), . . . ,map f (ϕn) ¬map f (ϕ) if r = ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ¬ϕ
[ f (a)] if r = [a] for a ∈ A
In Propage 43, we looked at the result of combining the reify function with the
meta function, in effect a round-trip from (Dung’s) argument graphs to meta-ASPIC
systems to argument graphs. Statement (b) is similar, but it works in the other direction:
We start with a meta-ASPIC system, take its output, and then apply the meta function
to it, resulting in another meta-ASPIC system. Instead of using graph isomorphism as
a notion of equality, we will use isomorphism of meta-ASPIC systems. However, if
we simply stated that meta(reify(M)) ∼= M for some meta-ASPIC M, then our formal-
ism would not be any more expressive than Dung’s argument graphs (and indeed this
proposition does not hold, because the reify function “reifies” meta-attacks which then
become part of the graph that is the argument to meta – see Example 60 below). There-
fore, we have to adopt a looser notion of equality: When combining meta with reify,
we may not immediately get the same result again, but we are guaranteed to get the
same result after at most one iteration. In other words, the operation meta(reify(M)) is
idempotent.
Proposition 44. Let M = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system. Then
meta(reify(meta(reify(M))))∼= meta(reify(M))
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Proof. Let M = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system with an argument graph
G = (A,Att). Let M1 = (G1,M1A) = meta(reify(M)) and let M2 = (G2,M2A) =
meta(reify(meta(reify(M)))) be the two meta-ASPIC systems resulting from apply-
ing reify and meta to M. To show that M1 ∼= M2 (by Definition 79), we first need to
show G1 ' G2, and then M2A = f ∗(M1A) for a bijection f between G1 and G2.
1. G1 ' G2 Let G′ = (A′,Att ′) = reify(M1). Then meta(G′) = M2 = (G2,M2A) and
G2 = G′. By the definition of meta (in Propage 43), all arguments in M1A are of the
form [a], so by Definition 71, for all attacks in (a,b) ∈ Att ′, a = [a′] and b = [b′] for
some arguments [a] and [b] ∈ M1A (specifically, a and b are not meta-arguments). So
all attacks in Att ′ have a corresponding attack in Att1, and hence there exists a bijection
between attacks and arguments in G′ and attacks and arguments in G1, and so G1 'G′.
Since G′ = G2 (by Definition of meta), G1' G2.
2. M2A = f
∗(M1A) Let G
′ = (A′,Att ′) = reify(M1). Then meta(G′) = M2 = (G2,M2A)
and G2 = G′, as above. As already established, there exists a bijection f between G1
and G2, and by the same reasoning as above, all arguments b ∈ M2A are of the form
b = [b′] for a b′ ∈ A′ - so for every b′ ∈ A′, there exists a b ∈M2A such that b = [ f (b′)]
and the claim holds.
Example 60. To see why it is not the case that meta(reify(M)) ∼= M in Propage 44,
consider this counter-example. Let G = ({a1,a2}, /0) be an argument graph with two
arguments and no attacks. Let M = (G,{[a1], [a2], [[a1] ¬[a2]]}) be a meta-ASPIC
system based on G. Note that the only additional information in M, besides what is
required by Definition 70 on page 180, is an attack by [a1] on [a2]. Using the symbols
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m1 = [a1], m2 = [a2], m3 = [[a1] ¬[a2]], we get
meta(reify(M))
(Definition 72)
= meta(({m1,m2,m3},{(m3,m2)}))
( Let G′ = reify(M) = ({m1,m2,m3},{(m3,m2)}))
= meta(G′)
(Definition of meta in Propage 43)
= (G′,{[m1], [m2], [m3]})
We can see that G is not isomorphic to G′ (and thus M is not isomorphic to meta(G)),
because G has two arguments and no attacks, whereas G′ has three arguments and one
attack. On the other hand, M contains two object-level arguments [a1] and [a2] and
one meta-attack, but meta(G′) contains only the object-level arguments [m1], [m2] and
[m3]. The meta-attack m3 in M has been reified as an object-level attack in G′.
The results 43 and 44 together show that meta and reify are “almost” inverses - they
always converge after a single round trip (modulo graph isomorphism). This shows us
that meta-ASPIC is really a language on top of Dung’s argumentation system3 , and
that our framework is well-behaved and has a standard interpretation in the underlying
theory of abstract argumentation.
5.4 Case Study: Choosing a Drilling Technique
As part of project DEEPFLOW, the model developed in Section 5.3 was applied to the
problem of choosing a drilling technique for the production of a wing component. The
decision between conventional and orbitall drilling involves many parameters and has
to be made for each case individually, because there is no clear favourite between the
two. In Section 5.4.1 we give a brief overview of the subject
3In the language of abstract algebra, espage Lawvere [134], we have shown that meta is left adjoint
to reify.
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5.4.1 Conventional or Orbital Drilling?
An important part of any engineering project is manufacturing design, that is, to decide
how the new product will be manufactured. Manufacturing design covers many areas
such as shopfloor layout, machining parameters and assembly tasks. A typical choice
that has to be made as part of preparing the machinery is whether to use conventional
or orbital drilling. In orbital drilling, the cutting tool (drill) is rotates around two axes
– its own axis, as in conventional drilling, and an eccentrical axis. As a result, the hole
diameter is greater than the drill diameter. Advantages of orbital over conventional
drilling are reduced thrust force and a smaller broken-off pieces (chips). The smaller
drill also makes it possible to extract the chips with a vacuum during the drilling. As a
result, less heat develops and the chippings are prevented from damaging the structure.
There are also several reasons against using orbital drilling: It requires specialised
machinery and drills and is not suitable for all metals.
While the arguments above play a role in the choice of drilling method, much
greater weight is afforded to the concrete parameters of the tasks, for example hole
diameter and depth and material. It is common to undertake experiments to determine
how the material will react to different drilling methods. The experimental data then
forms the basis of arguments used in the decision making process. The same data can
be interpreted several ways, leading to different conclusions.
In a case study with Queen’s University Belfast4 we compared the two drilling
methods for a variety of different materials, hole dimenions and temperatures.
5.4.2 Experiment Results
For the experiments, conventional and orbital drilling methods were tried compared
with varying parameters, resulting in sixty-four different configurations. For each con-
figuration, between one and four holes were drilled and the outcome was assessed in
three categories: Tool wear, hole quality and surface finish.
The complete list of parameters is
1. Environment: Dry, coolant, wet, MQL
2. Drill bit: Carbide, PCD, HSS, HSS-Co
4To be published; all experimental data courtesy of David Payne, d.payne@qub.ac.uk
5.4. Case Study: Choosing a Drilling Technique 200
3. Drill bit coating: Yes/No
Several other parameters remained fixed due to time constraints. These include
material (one layer of CFRP composites and one layer of titanium), hole diameter ( 516
inch), drill speed and drill bit condition. After each experiment, the results were ranked
on a scale of one to five. The results can be found on page 201. Table 5.2 shows a selec-
tion of the experimental results. The first two rows show, for example, that switching
from a dry environment to one that is cooled with a coolant liquid results in slightly
better hole and surface quality, while the tool wear stays the same. However, both val-
ues (1 and 2) are relatively weak on a scale of 1 to 5. The next row (experiment 5)
shows that orbital drilling performs even worse in the same context. On the other hand,
orbital drilling yields adequate results when used with MQL cooling and a carbide drill
without coating (experiment 16).
In order to use the results for decision making, one has to choose which configu-
ration is the closest to the actual setting, and interpolate when data is missing – in other
words, one has to draw an analogy. This analogy is where arguments and counter-
arguments are produced.
Example 61. Assume that we are working with an aluminium piece and a 34 inch hole
diameter. We can make the following assumptions: The changed diameter probably
has the same effect on both types of drilling, and (for the purpose of this particular
drilling step) aluminium is more similar to titanium than to composites. Based on
those assumptions and the results in Table 5.2, we argue that conventional drilling is
better suited because it results in a higher quality and lower tool wear.
5.4.3 Interpreting Experimental Data Using Meta-ASPIC
We treat the experimental data from Table 5.2 as a set D= {r1, . . . ,r64}whose elements
are the rows of the table. There is a set of functions number, type, material for the
attributes of the table, mapping rows to field values: type(r5) = Orbital and so forth.
Arguments are formed using both the field name functions and any number of user-
defined terms such as cost or experience With.
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5.4.3.1 Gathering Support for Orbital or Conventional Drilling
For example, to say that our machining process does not support application of coolant
for orbital drilling, and as a result we cannot use evidence from experiments in which
coolant was used, we can write
experiment(X), type(X ,Orbital),environment(X ,Coolant)
 ¬supportingEvidence(X ,Orbital)
where experiment(X) will be grounded for each row r1 to r64, type, environment
are binary predicates that can be used to check for specific field values, and
supportingEvidence is a user-defined term that indicates whether a result X can be
used as supporting evidence for its method, that is for type(X). This schematic rule is
instantiated for example with X = r46, resulting in the following argument:
A1 = [experiment(r46), type(r46,Orbital),environment(r46,Coolant)
 ¬supportingEvidence(r46,Orbital)]
The last remaining step is to use arguments with conclusion supportingEvidence( ,X)
as support for the claim choose(X):
supportingEvidence( ,X) choose(X)
The underscore signifies a free variable that is not referenced in the rule head.
When evaluating arguments, the system only deals with completely grounded argu-
ments such as A1 above, so the standard definition of the reified graph of a meta-ASPIC
system (Definition 72) can be used to determine acceptable arguments.
With the rules described above, we will end up with some arguments with conclu-
sion choose(Orbital) and some arguments with conclusion choose(Conventional). As-
suming an appropriate encoding of the mutual exclusivity of Orbital and Conventional,
the resulting graph will have two preferred extensions, one with arguments in support
of conventional drilling and one with arguments in support of orbital drilling. The exact
number of arguments depends on the user-defined rules.
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However, a decision still has to be made, even if there is no clear favourite emerg-
ing from the argument graph. We can resolve such disputes by adding additional infor-
mation (in form of arguments), as the next section shows.
5.4.3.2 Combining Empirical Evidence With Other Argument Schemes
In addition to arguments that are directly supported by experimental results, we can
create arguments from argument schemes that take into account the circumstances of
our particular problem.
One example is the resolution of conflicts in group decision making. When the
options have been evaluated, for example using the methods described in Chapter 3,
but there is no clear winner, one way do resolve the tie is by letting the most senior
team member decide, using an “argument from seniority”. Because the argument from
seniority overrides a junior’s argument by virtue it being made by a junior person, rather
than the quality of their argument, it is counted as an ad hominem argument. While ad
hominem arguments are often disallowed in professional debates (cf. [126]), arguments
from seniority are more readily accepted, especially when a senior decision is the only
way to resolve a tie.
The example can be modelled using a standard logic-programming approach, as
discussed in [127]:
seniorTo(alice,bob).
proponent(alice,Orbital).
proponent(bob,Conventional)
proponent(X ,Y ),proponent(R,S),seniorTo(X ,R),neq(Y,S) ¬choose(S)
As usual, the last rule will be grounded for each valid assignment of the variables
(neq is a built-in predicate that holds whenever its two arguments are not equal). As a
result, we get an argument
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A2 = [proponent(alice,Orbital),proponent(bob,Conventional),
seniorTo(alice,bob),neq(Orbital,Conventional)
 ¬choose(Conventional)]
A2 now attacks any argument with claim choose(Conventional) asymmetrically.
When looking at the grounded extension of the resulting graph we will find the claim
choose only for one drilling method, orbital.
5.4.4 Software Prototype
In this section we describe a prototypical implementation of the case study on orbital
and conventional drilling (Section 5.4.3), giving evidence of the practical usefulness of
our argumentation system.
5.4.4.1 Overview
The program is an editor and interpreter for argument schemes. Argument schemes are
entered using a PROLOG-like syntax with rules, variables and a “negation” operator ¬.
There are two interpreters: The first produces a graph-based interpretation for visialis-
ing arguments and their extensions. The scond produces an SQL query that instantiates
schemes with acceptable subsets of the argument graphs.
The program consist of three layers: The user interface, a REST5 application
server and an SQL server. The only purpose of the REST server (middle layer) is
to forward SQL queries to the database server, which cannot be accessed directly by
the UI because it is behind a corporate firewall. The comptuations are done on the
client and by the SQL server.
The programming language Haskell [136] was chosen for implementing the soft-
ware, because there already exists an open-source implementation of Dung’s argument
graphs [137, 138], and because its type system, terse syntax and lazy evaluation seman-
tics make it well-suited for implementing domain-specific languages and interpreters.
Another reason is that Haskell programs can be compiled to JavaScript, so they can
5Representational State Transfer, a standard architecture for communication between servers in the
world wide web [135]
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data Rule = Rule {
body : : [ R u l e P a r t ] ,
headName : : Pred ica teName ,
headVar : : UnaryVar
}
data R u l e P a r t =
P r e d i c a t e { pr : : P r e d i c a t e D e f i n i t i o n }
| Aggr{
o p e r a t o r : : AggOperator ,
p r : : P r e d i c a t e D e f i n i t i o n ,
comp : : CompOperator ,
compWith : : S t r i n g
}
Figure 5.6: Rule parts and rule types in Haskell
run in ordinary web browsers without having to install them. This was an external
requirement from SAP under whose supervision the software was developed.
5.4.4.2 Implementation Details
We will now discuss some aspects of the implementation in more detail. We start with
the internal representation of arguments.
An argument in our system is a tree. The nodes of the tree are rules
p1(X1), . . . , pn(Xn) p(X) (where the pi are predicates) and the children of a node are
those rules whose conclusion is used in the rule body (a supports relationship).
Typed Predicates A special feature of our definition is that the predicates pi are
typed in the same way as tables in a relational database. For example, the type of
engineer(X) is (Int,Text,Text), so each row of the table describes an engineer with
ID number, first name and last name. The system has a number of built-in predicates
that are based on the tables of the underlying database. Every tables is assigned a
“primary” predicate, such as engineer. If a table has foreign keys, then each of the
foreign-key relations is assigned an additional, binary predicate – for example, if there
was a table of “conclusions” and each conclusion was supported by an engineer, a
supports(X ,Y ) predicate would be generated.
Implementation of Rules The listing in Figure 5.6 shows the definition of a rule in
Haskell. A rule consists of a list of rule parts (the rule body), and a unary predicate
(the rule head). A rule part is either a predicate, or an aggregation. Aggregations are
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a special feature of our implementation that allows end users to count the acceptable
arguments for a given conclusion.
For example, the scheme argument from expert opinion can be attacked by show-
ing that the person making a claim is not actually in expert in a domain. In our software
prototype, we can establish “experthood” as follows:
person(X),COUNT(publication(X ,Y )≤ 3) ¬expert(X ,Y )
The rule above expresses that X is not an expert in domain Y if they do not have at
least four publications in Y . The set of available aggregation functions includes MIN,
MAX, AVG, and any other aggregations that are supported by the underlying SQL
server implementation.
Argument Creation Users can generate new predicates by writing rules of the form
p1(X1), . . . , pn(Xn) p(X), with i≥ 1. This ensures that all user-defined predicates are
ultimately derived from system-defined ones, and thus can be turned into SQL queries
(see below).
Another important difference to a traditional logic-programming approach to argu-
mentation is that arguments are created from rules without unifying free variables with
atoms. There is, though, unification with relational types: The predicate engineer(X)
introduced earlier binds the variable X to the record type (Int,Text,Text). When at-
tempting to unify another free variable with X , the unification engine checks that the
types are compatible.
5.4.4.3 Argument Evaluation
When arguments have been formed as described in the preceding section they are rep-
resented internally as abstract syntax trees (ASTs). The program has two evaluators for
ASTs: As SQL queries and as argument graphs.
Argument Graph Evaluation The argument graph evaluation is straightforward: The
set of arguments is completely determined by user input, and an argument a attacks
another argument b if the conclusion of a is the negation (¬) of b’s conclusion. Please
refer to Definition 81 on page 210 for a formalisation of this evaluation.
5.4. Case Study: Choosing a Drilling Technique 207
SELECT * FROM (SELECT * FROM p u b l i c a t i o n AS Y)
JOIN (SELECT * FROM p e r s o n AS X)
ON X. p e r s o n I d = Y. a u t h o r I d
Figure 5.7: Generated SQL query for publication(X ,Y )
SELECT (X. * , Y . * ) FROM (SELECT * FROM p u b l i c a t i o n AS Y)
JOIN (SELECT * FROM p e r s o n AS X)
ON X. p e r s o n I d = Y. a u t h o r I d
GROUP BY X. p e r s o n I d
HAVING COUNT(X. p e r s o n I d ) <= 3
Figure 5.8: Generated SQL query for COUNT(publication(X ,Y )≤ 3)
SQL Query Evaluation In order to instantiate an argument scheme such as (Exp)
above, we first translate the preconditions of the rule into SQL. The predicate
person(X) translates into
SELECT * FROM p e r s o n
When translating the predicates into queries, we proceed from left to right, using
the free variables directly as identifiers in SQL. To evaluate COUNT(publication(X ,Y )≤
3), we have to perform two steps. First, we translate the predicate publication(X ,Y )
to the SQL query shown in Figure 5.7. The translation described in Figure 5.7 is pre-
defined and can be generated automatically from the database schema, by exploiting
the fact that the publication table has a foreign key authorId, which is linked to the
primary ID column of the author table. The JOIN statement in l. 2 directly uses the
previous query for person(X).
The second step in the translation of COUNT(publication(X ,Y )≤ 3) adds a filter
condition to the inner query from Figure 5.7. The result is shown in Figure 5.8.
From Arguments to Graphs The examples demonstrate the principle of translating
arguments step-by-step to SQL. To extend the approach from individual arguments to
argument graphs, two additional steps are necessary: First, there may be several ar-
guments with the same conclusion (for example, representing different reasons why
someone might be an expert). All arguments with the same conclusion are joined using
the UNION operator in SQL. Second, attacks on arguments should result in the exclu-
sion of records from the query. Attacks stem from negated conclusions (¬expert(X))
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and are implemented using the EXCEPT keyword, which is the SQL equivalent of set
difference. To build the query for expert(X) arguments, the interpreter first creates
a UNION query of all arguments whose conclusion is expert(X). It then takes all
arguments with conclusion ¬expert(X) and excludes them from the first query. This
is done recursively, from the bottom up.
5.4.4.4 Optimising the System
As stated above, we do not generate all possible arguments in order to evaluate the
argument graph: Instead of instantiating each rule with all possible database results,
we only check whether the set of possible results is empty or not. If it is, then we
delete the rule, if it is not (i.e. if the result set is populated) then we take the rule as a
proxy for all arguments it generates. This simple optimisation means that most of the
computational work is offloaded to the SQL server and does not have to be performed
on the client. In this section, we will show that this optimisation is correct in the sense
that it does not affect the acceptable sets of arguments.
First, let us make precise the meaning of some of the terms we have been using.
We will start by defining database arguments, which are arguments that consist of
predicates on some universe (of rows) U . Technically, U consists of several sets
(one for each table), but we will ignore the fact that rows have a type for now. In the
following we also assume a set N of names, or labels.
Definition 80 (Database Argument). Let P= {P1, . . . ,Pn} be a set of predicates on U ,
with Pi : 2U → 2U .
1. If P ∈ P and n ∈ N, then P n is a database argument
2. If A1, . . . ,Ak are database arguments and n∈N then A1, . . . ,Ak n is a database
argument
3. If A1, . . . ,Ak are database arguments and n ∈ N then A1, . . . ,Ak  ¬n is a
database argument
The function lbl(A) returns the label (in N) of a database argument.
Database arguments are essentially trees whose leaves are predicates in P and
whose nodes are labelled with elements of N.
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Example 62. Assume that U contains all rows in Table 5.2 on page 201. Then we can
define the following predicates:
conventional(X)⇔ type(X) = “Conventional′′
orbital(X)⇔ type(X) = “Orbital′′
dry(X)⇔ environment(X) = “Dry′′
coolant(X)⇔ environment(X) = “Coolant ′′
good(X)⇔ holeQuality(X)> 3
bad(X)⇔ holeQuality(X) = 1
with P = {conventional,orbital,dry,coolant,bad}. N contains claims we want
to make based on the data, for example N = {chooseOrbital,chooseConventional, . . .}.
Remember that in the actual application, N is defined by the user (implicitly, through
the rules that are entered into the system), and P is given by the underlying database.
Some database arguments are:
A1 = [conventional(X),good(X) chooseConventional(X)]
A2 = [orbital(X),good(X) chooseOrbital(X)]
A3 = [coolant(X),conventional(X) ¬chooseConventional(X)]
A4 = [coolant(X),orbital(X) ¬chooseOrbital(X)]
The rationale behind arguments A3 and A4 is that we want to discount results which
are based on an environment where coolant was used, because the machines in our
workshop are not able to drill in such an environment.
Database arguments act as queries over the database U . To interpret them in the
meta-ASPIC framework, we define a translation process consisting of three steps. First,
we give a straightforward translation of a set of database arguments A to an argument
graph (A,Att) by defining the attacks-relation Att. This graph (A,Att) will serve as the
underlying argument graph for the eventual meta-ASPIC system (G,K).
The purpose of the second and third steps is to filter out vacuous arguments, that
is, arguments which are not backed by any data in the database. To achieve this we
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map each database argument to a set of rows in U . We then add an attacker for each
vacuous argument, thereby making it unacceptable in (G,K) under any semantics.
The first step in the translation, Definition 81, produces an argument graph
(A′,Att) from a set of database arguments A by defining the attacks relation Att.
Definition 81 (Argument Graph from Database Arguments). The argument graph for
database arguments A over a set of symbols N is a graph (A,AttN) where
AttN = {(a,b) ∈ A×A | lbl(a) = ¬lbl(b) or lbl(b) = ¬lbl(a)}
Example 63. Applying Definition 81 to the example 62 we get the following graph:
A1 A2A3 A4
It seems that the grounded extension contains A3 and A4 (the “negative” argu-
ments), but we will see in Example 65 that some of the arguments are invalid, because
they are not backed by any actual experimental data.
For the second step we map each database argument to a set of rows in the
database. This step is what enables the performance gains described above: Because
we only need to know whether the set of rows for a database argument is empty or
not, we do not need to add every possible instantiation of that argument to our graph -
instead, we only check if the query has any results or not. That way, most of the work
of evaluating arguments is performed by the SQL server.
Queries are generated for each argument with a positive (non-negated) conclusion,
by first taking the intersection of the subsets of U defined by the predicates in the
argument’s body, and then subtracting all arguments whose conclusion is a negation of
one of the argument’s supporting predicates:
Definition 82 (Argument Query). Let (A,AttN) database argument graph over a set
of symbols N and a set of predicates P. The function ins : A→P(U ) instantiates
arguments and is defined as
ins(a)=
P(U )\ ins
−(a) if a = [P n] for a P ∈ P
(ins(A1)\ ins−(A1))∩ . . .∩ (ins(An)\ ins−(An)) if a = [A1, . . . ,Ak n]
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where ins− is a helper function that instantiates the attacking arguments, defined
as ins−(a) = {ins(b) | b ∈ A and (b,a) ∈ AttN}.
The recursive definition of ins ensures that arguments are instantiated only by
those rows for which either no counter-arguments exists (so ins− is empty), or for
which all counter-arguments are in turn countered. Because the only operations used
are ∪ and ∩, the instantiation of an argument can be performed entirely by the database
server. To this extent we translate ∪ to the UNION statement and ∩ to the EXCEPT
statement in SQL.
Example 64. Let us begin with argument
A1 = [conventional(X),good(X) chooseConventional(X)]
from Example 62. Using the definitions from Example 62, we get the following instan-
tiation (with rows from Table 5.2): ins(A1) = {r20}\ ins−(A1). Row 20 is the only one
that fulfils the criteria conventional and good. In order to fully evaluate the argument
graph we also need to compute ins−(A1), by evaluating ins(A3). This may result in
a successful attack on a, if {r20} \ ins(A3) = /0. However, as there are no rows for
A3 (ins(A3) = /0), we get ins(A1) = {r20} \ /0 = {r20}. A3 is an example of a vacuous
argument (see below).
Definition 84 distinguishes two cases. For database arguments that correspond
directly to a predicate in P, we simply apply the predicate on U . If it is a defeasible
rule, we instantiate its body by recursively calculating ins for each supporting argument.
However, we also subtract all rows that act as parts of counter-arguments. This means
ins(a) effectively performs an evaluation of a.
It is possible to describe database arguments that do not map to any rows in the
database, that is, arguments a with ins(a) = /0. We call such arguments vacuous be-
cause they are not backed by any data. Vacuous arguments should not be allowed to
attack other arguments. We exclude them from our graph, resulting in a sub-graph
(A+,Att+N )v (A,AttN) of valid arguments:
Definition 83 (Valid Database Argument Graph). For any argument graph from
database arguments G = (A,AttN), the valid sub-graph of G is defined as (A+,Att+N )
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with
1. A+ = {a ∈ A | ins(a) 6= /0}
2. Att+N = {(a,b) ∈RN | a,b ∈ A+}.
Example 65. Argument A2 from Example 62 is defined as
[orbital(X),good(X) chooseOrbital(X)]
It is not valid (in the sense of Definition 83) because there are no rows in the database
that satisfy both predicates, orbital and good. For the same reason, A3 is not valid. We
thus get the subgraph (A+,Att+N ) of valid arguments, with A
+= {A1,A4} and Att+N = /0.
With Definition 81 we get an argument graph and with Definition 84 we can map
each argument to a set of rows in U . To instantiate database arguments, we simply
apply ins to each database argument, and extend the attacks relation Att accordingly.
Definition 84 (Instantiation of Database Argument Graph). Let A be a set of database
arguments and let (A,AttN) be its argument graph. The instantiated graph of A is an
argument graph (A˜, ˜AttN) with
1. A˜ =
⋃
a∈A ins(a)
2. ˜AttN =
⋃
(a,b)∈AttN{(a′,b′) ∈ A˜× A˜ | a′ ∈ ins(a) and b′ ∈ ins(b)}
Example 66. The argument graph from Example 63 is instantiated in (A˜, ˜AttN), where
A˜ contains the following rows:
ins(A1) = {r20} ins(A2) = /0
ins(A3) = {r2} ins(A4) = {r30,r46}
We finish this section by showing that our optimisation (computing ins(a) for all
arguments on the server, instead of computing the preferred extensions of the graph
on the client) is valid: A database argument a ∈ A is credulously acceptable in (G,K)
if and only if all of its instantiations ins(a) are acceptable in (G′,K′) (see Theorem 6
below). Before we can prove the claim, we need a handful of additional definitions.
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First, we say that two arguments a and b in a graph G are extension equivalent if
and only if every (preferred or grounded) extension of G either contains both a and b,
or neither a nor b.
Definition 85 (Extension Equivalence). Let G= (A,Att) be an argument graph and let
a,b ∈ A. a is extension equivalent to b (short a ≡E b) if and only if for all s ∈ {gr,pr}
and for all E ∈ Σs(G), a ∈ E ⇔ b ∈ E .
The notion of extension equivalence is an equivalence relation:
Proposition 45. ≡E is an equivalence relation
Proof. Follows from the fact that⇔ is an equivalence relation on truth values
In order to show that our optimisation is correct we need to show that the
query function ins(a) returns an equivalence class of the instantiated argument graph
(A˜, ˜AttN), and it is therefore enough to check the acceptability of a single member of
ins(a) to determine the acceptability of all instantiated arguments in ins(a).
Theorem 6. Let (A+,Att+) be a valid database argument graph and let (A˜+, ˜Att+) be
its instantiation. For all a ∈ A+ and all a′,b′ ∈ ins(a), a′ ≡E b′.
Proof. G = (A+,Att+) be a valid database argument graph and let G′ = (A˜+, ˜Att+) be
its instantiation. Let a ∈ A+ and let a′,b′ ∈ ins(a).
Proof by contradition. Assume that there is an s∈ {pr,gr} such that there exists an
E ∈ Σs(G′) such that a′ ∈ E and b′ /∈ E . Then there exists a c′ ∈ A˜+ such that (c′,b′) ∈
˜Att+ and (c′,a′) /∈ ˜Att+. By Definition 84 there exists a c ∈ A such that (c,a) ∈ AttN .
However, by the same definition, (c′,a′) ∈ ˜Att+, so the assumption is false and the
claim holds.
In this result we made a number of simplifications compared to the software im-
plementation. For example, our rules do not support aggregates, and record types have
been omitted as mentioned above. However, the general principle behind Theorem 6
still applies.
To summarise: Our software can be used to define database argument graphs (Def-
inition 81), which are argument schemes that can be instantiated by data in an SQL
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database. The acceptability of database arguments is therefore determined by the ac-
ceptability of the concrete database rows they map to (Definition 83). However, it is
not necessary to load all rows that instantiate database arguments into memory. As
Theorem 6 shows, it is enough to check whether each database argument is populated,
and then to evaluate the graph of valid database arguments (Definition 83). The size
of the argument graph is therefore not bounded by the number of rows in the database,
only by the number of database arguments.
5.4.4.5 Meta-Arguments to Counter Vacuous Arguments
An important step in proving Theorem 6 was to discount argument schemes that are not
instantiated by any data as “vacuous” (see page 211). Saying that an argument should
not count because it is not backed by any data is a meta-argument, and as such we can
express it in meta-ASPIC. In this section we describe how such a meta-argument can be
transplanted from Definition 83 to a meta-ASPIC argument graph. By formulating this
constraint as a meta-argument we open up the possibility of adding counter-arguments
or additional meta-arguments within the framework itself.
Definition 86 (Counter-Argument). Let G = (A,AttN) be an argument graph from
database arguments. The graph G′ = (A′,AttN) is G extended with counter-arguments
and is defined as
1. A′ = A∪AC∪AD
2. AC = {[vacuous(a)] | a ∈ A s.t. ins(a) = /0}
3. AD = {[vacuous(a) ¬a] | [vacuous(a)] ∈ AC}
Example 67. Consider the argument graph in our running example (Example 63).
As we saw above, ins(A2) = /0, so AC for the example contains the single argument
[vacuous(A2)]. For AD we get one attack: AD = {[[vacuous(A2)] ¬A2]}.
Instead of restricting the original set of arguments A (as was done in Definition
83 for valid database argument graphs), Definition 86 adds two new sets to the graph:
AC, with arguments [vacuous(a)] stating that a is not backed up by any data, and AD –
the actual argument scheme against vacuous arguments – introducing an attack on all
arguments that had been singled out as vacuous in AC.
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Both approaches, restricting and adding counter-arguments, result in the same ac-
ceptability of database arguments. This result is formalised in the next proposition.
However, the acceptable sets of arguments are not identical for G′ and G+, because
of the counter-arguments that G′ contains. We can therefore only show that the ac-
ceptability of arguments in the two graphs is identical up to linear extension, a notion
introduced in the previous chapter (page 39).
Theorem 7. Let G = (A,Att) be an argument graph from database arguments, let
G′ = (A′,AttN) be G extended with counter-arguments, and let G+ = (A+,Att+) be the
valid graph database argument graph of G (Definition 83). Then, for all s ∈ {pr,gr},
Σs(G′) is a linear extension of Σs(G+)
Proof. First note that G+ v G′, so all arguments in G+ are also in G′. To show that
Σs(G′) is a linear extension of Σs(G+), we need to prove that
1. For all E ∈ Σs(G+), there is an E ′ ∈ Σs(G′) such that E ⊆ E ′ and
2. For all E ′ ∈ Σs(G′), there is an E ∈ Σs(G+) such that E ⊆ E ′
(1) Let E ∈ Σs(G+). We distinguish two cases, one for s = pr, and one for s = gr.
First assume s = pr so E is a preferred extension of G+. To prove that there is an
E ′ ∈ Σpr(G′) with E ⊆ E ′, it suffices to show that E is an admissible set in G′, because
then it is the subset of a preferred extension (by Dung’s fundamental lemma). E is
an admissible set if it is conflict-free and defends itself against all attacks. Since E
is a preferred extension in G+ it is conflict-free (in G+). It is also conflict-free in G′,
because additional attacks in G′ are introduced only through the set AD and AD∩E = /0.
Now we prove that E is admissible in G′ by contradiction. Assume that there exists an
argument a ∈ E and b ∈ A′ such that (b,a) ∈ Att ′ and there is no c ∈ E ′ such that
(c,b) ∈ Att ′. b ∈ A′, so (by Definition 86) b ∈ A∪AC∪AD. If b ∈ A, then either b ∈ A+
or b /∈ A+. If b ∈ A \A+, then ins(b) = /0 (by Definition 83) so there exists a c ∈ AD
such that (c,b) ∈ Att+ (by Definition 86). c itself is not attacked in G′ so c ∈ E ′. If
on the other hand b ∈ A+ then there exists a c ∈ E such that (c,e) ∈ Att+ (because
E is admissible) and so (c,e) ∈ Att ′. Therefore b /∈ A, so b ∈ AC or b ∈ AD. As the
arguments in AC do not produce any attacks, b ∈ AD. So b ∈ AC with b = [vacuous(a)]
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(by Definition 86). However, since a ∈ E, ins(a) 6= /0 so there is no argument b′ ∈ AC
with b′ = [vacuous(a)]. This contradicts the assumption that an argument b attacking a
exists in G′.
Now assume that s = gr, so E is the grounded extension of G+. Let E be the
grounded extension of G′. We show that E is a subset of E ′ by structural induction over
the characteristic functionFG+ . Specifically, we show that for all D⊆ E, ifFG+(D)⊆
E ′ then FG+(FG+(D)) ⊆ E ′ (induction step), and we show that FG+( /0) ⊆ E ′ (base
case). SinceFG+ is monotonically increasing, and the grounded extension is the least
fixed point of FG+ , this suffices to show that E ⊆ E ′ (because for every a ∈ E there
is a D0 with a ∈FG+(D0)). Base case: Let a ∈FG+( /0). To see that a is unattacked
in G′, assume that there is an argument b such that (b,a) ∈ Att ′. Since a ∈FG+( /0),
b /∈ Att+. So either b ∈ A \A+, or b ∈ AD. In the first case, there exists a c ∈ A′ such
that (c,b) ∈ Att ′, and c is unattacked in G′ so c ∈ Σgr(G′) \ {a} so a ∈ Σgr(G′). Since
a ∈ A+, ins(a) 6= /0, so b /∈ AD. This contradicts the assumption that b ∈ A∪AC ∪AD.
Therefore a is not attacked in G′, so a ∈ E ′. Induction step: Let D ⊆ E such that
FG+(D)⊆ E ′. To show thatFG+(FG+(D))⊆ E ′, let D′ =FG+(FG+(D))\D′. So D′
contains the arguments that were added by the latest application of FG+ . Let a ∈ D′.
Assume that there is an argument b ∈ A′ such that (b,a) ∈ Att ′. If b ∈ A+, then b is
attacked by FG+(D), and thus (by induction hypothesis) b is attacked by E ′ \ {a}, so
a is admissible with respect to E ′ \{a}, and thus a is in E ′ (the grounded extension of
G′). If on the other hand b ∈ A′ \A+, then we can derive a contradiction similarly to the
other cases of this proof above.
(2) Let E ′ ∈ Σs(G′). Again we distinguish s = pr and s = gr. If s = gr then E ′ is the
grounded extension of G′. In this case, E is the grounded extension of G+, and E ⊆ E ′
can be shown analogously to part (1) of this proof for the case that s = gr.
If s = pr, then E ′ is a preferred extension of G′ and we will show that there exists
a preferred extension E in G+ such that E ⊆ E ′. Let E = E ′ ∩A′. To prove that E is
admissible, we need to show that E is conflict-free and that E defends itself against all
attacks. E is conflict-free because E ⊆ E ′ and E ′ is conflict-free (since it is a preferred
extension of G′). Now assume that there is an argument a ∈ E and an argument b ∈ A+
such that (b,a) ∈ Att+. Either b ∈ A′, or b /∈ A′. If b ∈ A′ then there exists a c ∈ E ′
such that (c,b) ∈ Att ′ (since E ∈ Σpr(G′)). By Definition 86, c ∈ A∪AC ∪AD. If c ∈ A
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Figure 5.9: Relationship of D+,D and D′ in Theorem 7
then c ∈ A+, so c ∈ E ′. If c ∈ AD, then ins(b) = /0, so b /∈ A+ (which contradicts the
assumption that b ∈ A+). Therefore E is an admissible set in G+. To finish the proof
we need to show that E is a preferred extension – a maximal admissible set. Assume
that there is an argument a ∈ A+ such that a is admissible with respect to E and a /∈ E.
Since A+ ⊆ A′, a ∈ A′. a ∈ A+ so by Definition 83, ins(a) 6= /0. Therefore, a is not
attacked by any arguments in AD, so a is admissible with respect to E ′ too. Since E ′ is
a preferred extension it is a maximal admissible set so a ∈ E ′. But then a ∈ E ′∩A′, so
a ∈ E and we have shown that E is a preferred extension in G+.
This completes our theoretical evaluation of the case study, closing the circle with
the original discussion of meta arguments in Section 5.2. Theorem 7 demonstrates how
meta-arguments can be taken from the meta-language of mathematics and informal de-
scriptions (as in Definition 83) and incorporated into meta-arguments in a meta-ASPIC
system (as in Definition 86). The relationship between the graphs D+, D and D′ is
shown in Figure 5.9. D represents the original graph of database arguments, includ-
ing those that are potentially invalid (vacuous). D+ on the left contains only valid
arguments and is therefore a subgraph of D. D′ on the right contains additional meta-
arguments to attack (and make unacceptable) any invalid arguments in D. D′ is there-
fore a supergraph of D. The dashed arrows in the lower half of the diagram show how
the two graphs D′ and D+ can be generated from D.
We conclude with a discussion of our approach and a review of the relevant liter-
ature.
5.4.5 Summary
We implemented a software prototype based on the meta-ASPIC system introduced in
Section 5.3. The prototype has been used to model arguments about drilling meth-
ods, combining empirical evidence with arguments from argument schemes. An early
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version of the software has been presented at COMMA 2014.
The prototype as described here used arguments to describe database queries. SQL
databases do not have a notion of conflict between data rows. Therefore, when viewed
as a meta-ASPIC system, the underlying argument graph was a conflict-free graph, and
attacks were only introduced on the meta-level. This approach can easily be extended to
other data sources. The resulting meta-argumentation system can be used to summarise
debates across a variety of media, including text, verbal discussions, experimental data,
and requirements specifications.
5.5 Related Work
The work in this chapter brings together two areas of research in formal methods of
argumentation: Argument schemes, and meta-argumentation. We have argued that the
two are closely related, and that argument schemes are a form of meta-argumentation.
However, they have traditionally been treated as separate entities. We will therefore
review the state of the art in each area individually.
We can also view meta-ASPIC as “yet another argumentation system”, regardless
of our motivation to use it for studying meta-arguments. From this perspective it makes
sense to compare meta-ASPIC with similar argumentation systems.
5.5.1 Argument Schemes
Previous research has been concerned with the representation of argument schemes
in a formal setting [139, 21, 140, 127, 141, 132, 142], in particular for the legal do-
main [143, 144, 26, 145, 131] (see [27] for a review). Arguments schemes are seen as
“generators” of arguments [146], a view that we also take (especially in our case study
(Section 5.4) where argument schemes literally generate arguments in the form of SQL
queries). However, there is a significant conceptual difference between our work and
the literature in that we studied formal representations of argument schemes on the
basis of non-deductive arguments (Section 5.2). As a consequence, our system can rep-
resent argument schemes (as arguments about arguments), but it cannot infer arguments
from a set of argument schemes and some formalised knowledge, which has been the
primary use case for formalising argument schemes. Instead, the purpose of our system
is to extend classical notions of acceptability to the meta-argumentation, and the fact
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that meta-ASPIC can represent argument schemes at all is only a consequence of our
view that argument schemes are examples of meta-argumentation.
Our work takes quite a unique position within the literature on formalising argu-
ment schemes. Our primary intention has been to develop a framework in which meta-
arguments can be evaluated using traditional argument graph semantics, and argument
schemes are only one example of meta-argumentation.
5.5.2 Meta-Argumentation
Meta-level argumentation is the study of arguments about arguments [147, 148, 149],
describing the properties of arguments and attacks in the same language as arguments
themselves.
Research by Modgil et al. [147] has shown how several extensions to abstract
argumentation can be modeled using meta-level constructs in a standard (that is, with-
out any special arguments) abstract argumentation system as defined by Dung [42].
This is achieved by translating each of these additions, such as attacks on attacks, or
preferences, into a constellation of several arguments that are only connected by the
“attacks” relation. The extensions of the extended abstract argumentation systems are
shown to conincide with those of the resulting argument graph. However, this ap-
proach to meta-level argumentation does not provide a systematic way of instantiating
abstract arguments. The examples in [147] suggest that there is a need for a systematic
approach which uses structured arguments to unify the various proposals for abstract
argumentation.
In an earlier paper by Modgil [150], a method is introduced for organising several
abstract argument graph into a hierarchy. The proposal distinguishes defeats from at-
tacks, both of which are binary relations between arguments. Defeats are a subset of
attacks. Whether an attack is also a defeat depends on information in the next-higher
level in the hierarchy of argument graphs. Defeats give rise to the notion of resolutions,
which are sub-graphs of an argument graph in which all mutual attacks are resolved (so
only one of the two edges exists in the subgraph). The main difference between our
approach and the work by Modgil is that in [150], attacks are presumed to be caused by
contradictions in a formulae of a logical language, and thus symmetric in most cases.
The reason for organising argument graphs in a hierarchy is that it allows one to resolve
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symmetric attacks by establishing preferences.
As we have mentioned above, one of the distinguishing features of meta-ASPIC is
that it allows arguments to appear as premises and conclusions of other arguments, in
order to better represent natural language arguments. A recent proposal by Amgoud et
al. [125] has a similar feature and we will therefore discuss it here as a system for meta-
argumentation. We explained in Section 5.2 that the validation of natural language
arguments requires context (unlike that of deductive arguments), and that this context
is provided by meta-arguments. Amgoud et al. introduce a formalism (as a set of
inference rules) for reasoning about meta-arguments. Their aim is to answer questions
such as “is a a reason for concluding b?”, where a and b can be arguments themselves.
Their approach is promising, but as the authors say, the question of soundness and
completeness of their logic is still open. In our approach we do not have to worry
about this problem because we project meta-arguments into the well-known domain of
abstract argumentation [42].
The idea that there is a hierarchy of meta-arguments, instead of only one meta-
level and one object-level, is not new and has been explored for example by Wooldridge
[149]. The link between meta-argumentation and argument schemes has been drawn in
[127].
Abstract argumentation [42] provides a graph-based interpretation of argument
graphs. Bipolar argumentation [151, 152, 153] is an extension of Dung’s abstract ar-
gumentation framework, adding a “supports”-relation as a second relation over argu-
ments. Dung’s original framework considered this relationship only implicitly, using
the concept of defence for the defeaters of an argument’s defeaters. Supporting ar-
guments allow additional extension semantics. For example, sets of arguments are
considered safe if none of their members depend on (are supported by) an argument
outside the extension, which results in a stronger notion of internal coherence than just
being conflict-free. Whilst bipolar argumentation is appealing as it offers a range of
possibilities for defining the “supports”-relation, there is no formalisation of meta-level
arguments, and supports for attacks (i.e. each attack by an argument A on argument B
is justified by an argument C) cannot be defined.
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5.5.3 Bipolar Argumentation
The central idea in bipolar argumentation [154, 153, 155, 151] is that, besides attacking
or conflicting (as in abstract argument graphs), there is a second “supports” relationship
that abstract arguments may be in.
It is important to distinguish the later work on bipolarity in argumentation (e.g.
[154, 153]) from the earlier work on bipolar argumentation frameworks, short BAFs
(e.g. [153, 155, 151]). The latter establishes BAFs as the formal foundations for the
former. Bipolarity in argumentation characterises different kinds of support, such as
deductive support, necessary support and evidential support, in terms of a BAF.
In BAFs, there is no notion of meta-argumentation, because all arguments are on
the same level and the “supports” relationship between arguments is not restricted. For
example, it is possible to have cyclic supports (although in an earlier version of BAF
[151], only acyclic graphs were considered). In BAF it is thus not possible to separate
the different domains in which arguments can exist, for example engineering (the ob-
ject domain) and argument schemes (the meta-domain). This however is an important
requirement for our model engineering debates, as discussed in Section 5.2.1. On the
other hand, in meta-ASPIC one cannot model self-supporting arguments without resort-
ing to a second argument on a higher level (ie. one has to write [[a] [a]]). The reason
for these differences is that BAF utilises a binary relation to express support, whereas
in meta-ASPIC we chose an algebraic approach (compare our Definition 68 on page
178 with the BAF definition as (G,Attatt ,Attsup) where Attsup is the supports-relation).
Our approach prevents, for example, self-attacking arguments (so in this sense it is less
expressive than BAF), but on the other hand it enables interesting constructions in the
realm of meta-argumentation such as the hierarchy of argument graphs in Definition 77
on page 191, and the characteristic object function O on page 189.
As far as the comparison between bipolarity in argumentation and meta-ASPIC
is concerned, of the three notions of support discussed in [154], meta-ASPIC is most
closely related to evidential support. This term stems from evidence-based argumenta-
tion, which we will discuss in detail in the following section.
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5.5.4 Evidence-Based Argumentation
Evidence-based argumentation frameworks (EAFs, [156, 157, 158]) extend Dung’s ar-
gument graphs in two ways. First, they complement the existing “attacks” relation
Atta with an “evidential supports” relation Atte. Second, Atta and Atte are not binary
relations over the set of arguments A, but rather they are subsets of P(A)×A - thus
allowing supports and attacks by sets of arguments. It is easy to see the analogy with
meta-ASPIC, where we allow several arguments in the premises of a meta-argument.
In this section we first give an interpretation of meta-ASPIC in terms of EAF, and then
discuss the relative advantages of each approach.
5.5.4.1 Translation
Let us begin with the formal definition of EAF.
Definition 87 (Evidential Argumentation System [156]). An evidential argumentation
system is a tuple (A,Atta,Atte) where A is a set of arguments, Atta is a relation of the
form (P(A) \ /0)×A, and Atte is a relation of type P(A)×A, such that within the
argumentation system, @x ∈P(A),y ∈ A such that xyAttay and xAttey. We assume the
existence of a “special” argument η /∈ A.
The Atte and Atta relations encode evidential support and attacks between argu-
ments. The special argument η represents the environment, and is used as a support for
“self-evident” arguments, which are not supported by any other arguments. η can be
seen as an interface to the world outside the particular EAF under consideration. EAFs
give rise to the notion of evidential support:
Definition 88 (Evidential Support [156]). An argument a is e-supported by a set S iff
1. SAttea where S = η , or
2. ∃T ⊂ S such that T Attea and ∀x ∈ T , x is e-supported by S\{x}.
S is a minimum support for a if there is no T ⊂ S such that a is e-supported by T .
By Definition 88, for every supported argument there exists a chain of evidence
starting with the special argument η . We can then define evidence-supported attacks as
follows:
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Definition 89 (Evidence-Supported Attack [156]). A set S carries out an evidence-
supported attack on an argument a if
1. XAttaa where X ⊆ S, and
2. All elements x ∈ X are e-supported by S.
An evidence-supported attack by a set S is minimal iff there is no T ⊂ S such that T
carries out an evidence-supported attack on a.
And finally, the traditional notion of acceptability extends to EAFs also:
Definition 90 (E-Acceptability [156]). An argument a is e-acceptable with respect to
a set S iff
1. S e-supports a and
2. Given a minimal evidence-supported attack X ⊆ A against a, ∃T ⊆ S such that
T Attax, where x ∈ X such that X \{x} is no longer a supported attack on a.
The second condition of Definition 90 ensures that any argument which is involved
in an attack on S it itself attacked by S. A set of arguments S is conflict-free iff ∀y ∈ S,
@X ⊆ S such that XAttay (i.e. if it does not attack itself). The final definition we need
is that of e-admissibility:
Definition 91 (e-Admissible Set of Arguments [156]). A set of arguments S is said to
be admissible iff
1. All elements of S are e-acceptable with respect to S
2. S is conflict-free
We will now define a mapping T from meta-ASPIC systems to EAFs. It has the
property that it preserves admissibility of sets of arguments, in the sense that if a set
of meta-ASPIC arguments S ⊆ MA for some meta-ASPIC system M is admissible in
reify(M), then the closure of M under sup (cf. page 179) is e-admissible in T (M).
Further, T is non-trivial, because it does not simply define Atte to ({η},a) for every
argument a - instead it uses the sup function to define evidential support.
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Definition 92 (meta-ASPIC to EAF). Let M = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system. The
corresponding EAF is a tuple T (M) = (A′,Atta,Atte) with
1. A′ = MA
2. Atta = {({a},b) | a,b ∈MA such that a m-attacks b}
3. Atte = {(sa,a) | a ∈MA and sa = sup(a) iff sup(a) 6= /0, and sa = η otherwise}
Proposition 46. Let M = (G,MA) be a meta-ASPIC system. Let S ⊆MA such that for
all a ∈ S, sup(a)⊆ S. Let G′ = (MA,Att) = reify(M) and let S⊆MA. S is admissible in
G′ if and only if S is e-admissible in T (M).
Proof. Let S, T (M) = (A′,Atta,Atte) and G′ = (MA,Att) = reify(M) as defined in the
claim.
(⇒) Assume S is admissible in G′. We need to show that S is e-admissible in T (M).
By Definition 91, this involves two conditions. (1) All elements of S are e-acceptable
with respect to S. Let a ∈ S such that a is not e-acceptable with respect to S. Then
by Definition 90, either (1.i) S does not e-support a, or (1.ii) there exists a minimal
evidence-supported attack X ⊆MA such that there is no T ⊆ S such that T Attax for an
x ∈ X such that X \{x} is no longer an e-supported attack on a. Assume that (1.i) is the
case. Considering Definition 88 Conditions 1 and 2, and Definition 92 Cond. 3, this
means that S is not closed under sup - a contradiction with the assumptions on S laid
out above. For (1.ii), let X ⊆MA be a minmal evidence-supported attack such that there
is no T ⊆ S such that T Attax for an x ∈ X such that X \{x} is no longer an e-supported
attack on a. By Definition 92 Cond. 2, X = {b} for some b ∈MA, and b is not attacked
by any argument in S. This contradicts the assumption that S is an admissible set in G′.
(2) S is e-conflict-free. Suppose that S is not e-conflict-free, that is, there exists a
y ∈ S such that there is a X ⊆ S such that XAttay. By Definition 92 Cond. 2, Y = {a}
for some a ∈ S, and a m-attacks y. However, if a m-attacks y then by Definition 72, a
attacks y in G′, so S is not conflict-free in G′, which contradicts the assumption that S
is admissible.
(⇐) Assume S e-admissible in T (M). We need to show that S is admissible in G′.
Assume S not admissible in G′. Then either (1) there exist x,y∈ S such that (x,y)∈ Att,
or (2) there is an a ∈ S such that a is not acceptable with respect to S. (1) If S is not
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conflict-free in G′ then there exist x,y ∈ S such that (x,y) ∈ Att, so by Definition 92
Cond. 2, ({x},y) ∈ Atta, so S is not e-conflict-free and thus not e-admissible in T (M),
contradicting the assumption. (2) If there exists an a ∈ S such that a is not acceptable
with respect to S, then there is a b ∈MA such that (b,a) ∈ Att but S does not attack b.
In this case, by Definition 92 Cond. 2., {b} constitutes a minimal evidence-supported
attack on a, and there is no T ⊆ S such that T Attaa, so by Definition 90 Cond. 2, a is not
e-acceptable with respect to S, contradicting the assumption that S is e-admissible.
5.5.4.2 Comparison with meta-ASPIC
If every meta-ASPIC system can be translated to a non-trivial EAF, then one may legiti-
mately question the reasons for choosing meta-ASPIC over EAF. There are two reasons
for favouring meta-ASPIC in the scenario we have defined it for – to describe engineer-
ing debates.
First (and this point applies to bipolar argumentation too), in our approach we did
not re-define the established acceptability semantics for meta-ASPIC, in contrast with
EAF, where for example the notion of admissibility is redefined in Definition 91. In-
stead, the meaning (acceptability of arguments) of a meta-ASPIC system is determined
by its translation to a regular abstract argument graph, as evidenced in the function
reify. This means we can immediately apply all prior work on abstract argumentation
to meta-ASPIC, without having to translate concepts such as different acceptability se-
mantics into our framework first. A very practical consequence of this decision is that
we can re-use existing implementations of Dung’s argument graphs, for example the
one by van Gijzel and Nilsson [137], in implementations of meta-ASPIC.
Second, the primary motivation for meta-ASPIC was the ability to represent meta-
argumentation and specifically argument schemes. As a result, we can for example
stratify a meta-ASPIC system into different levels of abstraction (see Definition 76 on
page 189), and separate argument schemes from domain-specific arguments. This dis-
tinction does not exist in EAF, and all arguments reside on the same (object) level.
In [142], EAFs were used to reason about argument schemes for normative practical
reasoning, however without considering meta-argumentation.
We advocate the position that the choice of argumentation system should be gov-
erned by its application, and there are also reasons for choosing EAF over meta-ASPIC.
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To give an example, for EAF there exists a further, semantics-preserving translation to
AIF, the argument interchange format [157], which does not exist for meta-ASPIC.
5.6 Discussion
In this chapter we presented meta-ASPIC, a modified version of the ASPIC+ argumen-
tation framework with express consideration of meta-arguments. The main semantic
difference to the original framework is in the structure of arguments: Arguments in
ASPIC+ have sentences of the underlying logicL as their conclusions, whereas in our
system the conclusions of arguments are other arguments. This distinction is essen-
tial, because it makes it possible to create arguments about arguments (as opposed to
arguments about sentences ofL ).
As stated in Section 5.2, the purpose of meta-arguments is to justify (or deny) that
something is an argument. In our view, meta-argumentation is most interesting in the
case of non-deductive arguments, because deductive arguments (of the form a ` b) are
supported on the meta-level by their proofs, which – once they have been formalised –
are not subject to debate. This prompted us to replace to replace the “underlying logic”
L in ASPIC with an argument graph in meta-ASPIC, which is the second difference
between our system and the original.
In the beginning of this chapter we characterised the difference between deduc-
tive and non-deductive arguments as context-dependence: Deductive arguments can
be validated without external context as they contain all the information necessary
to obtain the conclusion from the premises. Non-deductive arguments (including en-
thymemes) can only be validated with additional context – for example, we can only
say that “Al oxide non corrosive” is an argument because we know that it was
put forward by an expert in metal oxidation. In meta-ASPIC, this context is provided
by meta-arguments. We gave two concrete examples of meta-argumentation. First, we
listed a number of common argument schemes in Section 5.2.1. Argument schemes
are common patterns of human reasoning often used in spoken dialogue or written text.
From a survey of common argument schemes we concluded that argument schemes
are examples of meta-argumentation, because they are reasons that a statement is ar-
gument. In addition, some argument schemes talk about other arguments (as opposed
to domain-level statements), which is also a form of meta-argumentation. The second
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example of meta-argumentation is the interpretation of experimental data. Arguments
are formed from this data by relating it to the context of the decision that the experi-
ment was intended to support. As with argument schemes, this context is provided by
argument schemes.
The second part of this chapter was dedicated to a case study on interpreting ex-
perimental data. We described a software prototype that allows domain experts to use
the results of drilling experiments in arguments. In other words, users provided the
context necessary to draw conclusions from raw data. The prototype was implemented
as a browser application with a SQL server backend and it was backed by data pro-
vided by David Payne (of Queen’s University Belfast). An interesting aspect of the
implementation was covered in Section 5.4.4.4: By transforming arguments into SQL
queries we moved a large part of the computational effort required to evaluate argument
schemes from the client to the SQL server. This way, argument graphs can be evaluated
asynchronously and with full support of the SQL server’s query engine.
The case study showed the potential of meta-ASPIC for creating and evaluating
arguments across a range of data sources that do not necessarily have an underpinning
in formal logic. We believe that argumentation systems such as meta-ASPIC will be
crucial for analysing human-generated arguments. In the broader context of this the-
sis, meta-ASPIC serves as the fundamental representation of arguments on which the
developments of the previous chapters can be based. Due to its ability to represent nat-
ural language arguments, meta-ASPIC is well suited as a target language for arguments
mined from large corpora of engineering documents, thus bringing us one step closer
to the original aim of project DEEPFLOW.
The initial application of our framework in the engineering domain was evalu-
ated positively by our colleagues at Queen’s University. The main advantages of our
approach were perceived to be (a) the ability to quickly summarise experimental data
using database arguments and (b) the visualisation of arguments. Future versions of the
system should provide a facility for annotating experimental results with user-defined
argument data that can then be queried in the same way as the experimental data itself.
Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Future Work
Throughout the thesis we tried to show a path towards practical applications of our
theory, most extensively in Chapter four where we illustrated how our decision model
gives rise to a novel visualisation of decision documentation in a design process (page
154). A number of obstacles remain before our model can be used in a fully automated
way, as envisioned in the introduction.
The biggest piece of work is argument extraction. Our model of decision outcomes
already reflects the structure of design documents, but the step from textual design doc-
umentation to an ASPIC+ knowledge base is still missing. Most of this work is a natural
language processing problem: Sentences have to be analysed and their argument struc-
ture extracted. Then the conflict between arguments needs to be established. Much
decision documentation in engineering design takes the form of semi-structured (as op-
posed to unstructured) documents. Semi-structured data includes, for example, tables
where each column determines the type of data in its cells, and requirements specifica-
tions, where sentences follow a pattern such as “The product shall have 〈 property 〉”.
We assume that exploiting this structure will ease the task of extracting arguments.
For the argumentation model itself we see the following possible improvements.
First, we would like to investigate whether additional data about arguments – such as
strength, plausibility, etc – yields benefits that are large enough to justify the additional
work required to formalise this data. Throughout the thesis it has been our goal to
minimise the information required by our system (in addition to the actual arguments).
However, for future work we would like to relax this requirement a little, especially if it
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can be combined with the information from semi-structured data as mentioned above.
Second, as we mentioned earlier we see decision outcomes as representations of
design documents. It would be interesting to consider if a set of design documents can
be extracted from a formalised decision process, representing the most up-to-date ver-
sion of the documentation. For this task one could also consider the audience (project
managers, engineers, customers, etc.), building on existing work by Dunne et al. [159].
For the meta-ASPIC system for meta-argumentation and argument schemes from
Chapter 5 we gave a formal comparison with evidence-based argumentation frame-
works. This line of work should be continued, by comparing meta-ASPIC with other
existing approaches to argumentation. It should, for example, be possible to encode
meta-ASPIC graphs in propositional logic directly, similar to the proposal by Besnard
et al. for abstract argument graphs [160], without first computing the reified graph and
then applying their encoding.
The source code of the implementation of the case study described in Section 5.4.3
(page 200) cannot be made available to the public because it is owned by SAP, but it
would benefit the practical adoption of our system if it was released under an open-
source license. We would therefore like to write a new implementation of the code in
Haskell and release it.
6.2 Discussion
At the beginning of this thesis (page 14) we listed a number of requirements for an
argument-based model of engineering design processes. These requirements were
RQ1 Represent design decisions with the pros and cons for each of their options, in-
cluding the reasoning that was applied to arrive at the pros and cons and possible
worlds in which the underlying assumptions hold.
RQ2 Reason about decisions so represented, specifically by characterising the decision
rules used to arrive at the decision, and determining the effect that “choosing an
option” has on the knowledge base.
RQ3 Formulate sequences of decision problems in which decisions made at one stage
influence the range of options and constraints for decisions made later in the
process, and assess the impact of changing a previous decision.
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RQ4 Combine various forms of reasoning such as deductive arguments, empirical ev-
idence, intuition and heuristics.
How does our system meet those requirements? To address RQ1 we developed
the Argumentation Decision Framework (ADF) in Chapter 3. The pros and cons of
each option are expressed as arguments, and the reasoning behind the pros and cons
is represented in the structure of those arguments. ADF combines both multi-criteria
decision making (MCDM) and decision making under uncertainty (DMU). For MCDM
a list of requirements can be specified, and the requirements met by each option are
represented by acceptable arguments for that option. The possible worlds of DMU
correspond to preferred extensions in an option’s argument graph, and the utility of
each option is again a set of acceptable arguments. We gave correspondence results for
traditional models of DMU and MCDM.
Moving beyond mere representations of DMU and MCDM, we addressed RQ2
with an exploration of decision rules and a formal definition of “accepting a decision”
in our model. We translated several DMU decision rules into ADF, and classified them
according to their decisiveness (i.e. their ability to assign different rankings to differ-
ent options). We identified a degree of decisiveness unattainable by traditional means
and proposed an argumentation-specific decision rule that meets this highest degree
of decisiveness. We further compared decision rules by their optimism (i.e. by their
propensity to assume more positive outcomes). Such classifications are useful for char-
acterising decisions after they have been made. By using decision rules to compare a
number of past decisions made by different engineers, one can spot patterns which may
lead to improvements in the decision making process.
We then investigated the effect of accepting a decision on the knowledge base.
We defined an “enforce” operation that promotes a conflict-free set of arguments from
credulous to sceptical acceptability. In terms of ADF, we can apply “enforce” to the set
of arguments pro the chosen decision, to reflect the fact that they are now more firmly
believed than before the decision was made (when they were only one of a number
of credulously acceptable sets of arguments). We also showed that enforcement in
ASPIC+ relies on the ability to deactivate defeasible rules.
Chapter four was dedicated to the third requirement, RQ3. We started with a defi-
nition of the outcome of a decision (its set of arguments pro) and looked at the possible
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effects of chaining several outcomes in a sequence. We obseved that, given a sequence
S = (Res1,Res2) of decision outcomes, the union Res1unionsqRes2 may contain conflicting
arguments even if Res1 and Res2 on their own are conflict-free. At the same time, Res2
may contain more, less or different knowledge than Res1 - there is no relationship be-
tween the knowledge bases of two separate decision outcomes. This prompted us to
look at a second kind of sequence which we called “decision process”. The decision
process of a sequence S (obtained through EmbS) is a sequence of knowledge bases
which are not necessarily conflict-free, but monotonically increasing. Each stage con-
tains the knowledge of all previous stages. By transforming S into a decision process
we can draw out some of the implicit assumptions in S and make them explicit. This is
one example of earlier decisions affecting later one. In a second step we measured the
impact of changing a past decision, by choosing a different option for it.
The final requirement, RQ4, has been addressed in Chapter five. Based on a
study of argument schemes commonly used in engineering design we proposed meta-
ASPIC, an argumentation system loosely based on ASPIC+ that aims to capture meta-
argumentation. Arguments in meta-ASPIC can exist on different levels on a hierarchy
of abstraction. For example, arguments about a specific engineering problem are on
the lowest level, and arguments about those arguments (such as ad hominem arguments
against their proponents) are located on the level above. We discussed a case study
in which drilling techniques are compared based on a number of experiments, and de-
scribed an implementation of this case study.
From the above discussion it should be clear that our framework addresses the
requirements adequately. Some of the techniques we developed are independent from
the others. For example you can apply ADF to a single decision without worrying about
decision sequences, or meta-argumentation. We believe that modularity is a key factor
in the adoption of a framework like ours, because it means that applications do not have
to implement the entire system to make use of one of its features.
Appendix A
Functions & Symbols
Table A.1 on page 233 contains a list of important functions and symbols used in this
thesis.
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